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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Success in business is for the most part defined in financial terms and, because of this, 
business operations are almost entirely, if not entirely, directed to this end. The principle 
behind this rationale has been informed by the thought that the best contribution businesses 
can make to social justice is to focus on the bottom line. By appealing to enlightened self-
interest and the high premium people place on freedom, neoliberal economists like Milton 
Friedman and Friedrich Hayek argue that maximising profits is necessarily socially 
responsible. And, moreover, that not to pursue this end is socially irresponsible. Social 
responsibility is the ultimate justification that thinkers such as Friedman and Hayek appeal to 
when claiming that the business of business is to maximise profit. Yet this position is 
internally inconsistent. The position is ultimately justified by what is socially just but this 
means that in fact social justice, and not profit-making, ought to be the end of business. I 
shall argue that taking this commitment seriously involves rejecting the idea that the aim of 
business is to maximise profits. This is not to say that businesses should not make profits, 
rather it implies that this feature is not what ultimately makes them successful. The central 
contribution of this project is to resolve the contradictions embedded in the traditional 
approach to business by arguing that the primary aim of business is the promotion of social 
justice. To this end success in business needs to be redefined so that it reflects the 
achievement of its ultimate ends and not simply its instrumental means (profit) to the 
realisation of these aims. We ought then to revise our fundamental assumptions about the 
structures and policies that are necessary for business to achieve its real end of social justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to thank all my friends and family members who have gone far beyond the call 
of duty in supporting me during my studies. To my family in Zimbabwe who continuously 
welcome me into their fold at the worst of times, thank you. To my distinctive friends Kelly 
Brittle and Kim Taylor: thank you for your comments, insights and friendship. To my father 
Paul Zorn thank you for all that you are and for your unfaltering love, support and sense of 
humour. My brother, also a Paul Zorn: thank you for you. Maman, Lydia Atteridge, none of 
this would have been possible without you, I am eternally grateful. Thank you for listening to 
and reading countless drafts of this work and for keeping me grounded but at the same time 
reminding me of the ability to soar. The financial assistance provided by Rhodes University 
and the Rhodes Philosophy Department is also here acknowledged and sincerely appreciated. 
The continuing support of my colleagues and pupils at Port Alfred High School has been, and 
continues to be, a source of great reassurance. Professor Marius Vermaak provided invaluable 
insight and encouragement. Finally, to my supervisor Professor Pedro Tabensky thank you 
for your relentless efforts to turn me into a writer and for sharing story after horrid business 
story with me. Thank you for making me do better than I ever thought possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to  
 
Savannah and Skye Swanepoel 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
Introduction               1 
 
 
Chapter 1: The Bottom-line: Two Arguments for the Primacy of Profit       4 
 
I. The Argument from Enlightened Self-interest 
A. Adam Smith             8 
B. Milton Friedman          13 
C. Friedrich Hayek          21 
 
II. The Argument from Freedom 
A. Milton Friedman          26 
B. Robert Nozick           28 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Invisibility of the Invisible Hand: the Social, Environmental and 
Economic Failure of the Bottom-line Approach to Business     35 
 
I. Social Failures            
A. Violation: Sweatshop labour         36 
B. Domination: The Coffee Industry in Brazil       42 
 
II. Environmental Failure 
Degradation: Oil and Natural Gas Operations in the Niger Delta    44 
 
III. Economic Failures 
A. The Free-market in Practice: the Deregulation of Electricity in California   48 
B. The Free-market in Practice: Financial Deregulation in Iceland    54 
 
 
Chapter 3: Social Justice: The Ultimate Social Responsibility of Business        60 
               
I. What is Social Justice? Fairness and Equality of Opportunity     62 
 
II. Business and Social Justice         73 
 
 
Chapter 4: Effecting Change: A New Paradigm for Success      78 
 
I. Internal Changes 
A. Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Management     81 
B. Business Cultures and Moral Agency       84 
 
II. External Changes 
A. Regulation           88 
B. Stock-market Changes: A New Paradigm for Measuring the Success of 
Business           91 
v 
 
C. Consumer Awareness, Investor Responsibility and Education    95 
D. Global Commitment          99 
 
III. Case Studies 
A. The Grameen Bank        102 
B. Interface         103 
 
 
Conclusion           106 
 
 
Bibliography            108 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The market is the institutionalisation of non-responsibility1 
 
This project is a response to the claim that social responsibility in the world of business lies 
in profit-making. Classical and neoclassical economics teaches that successful business is the 
most critical instrument for the assurance of an equitable distribution of wealth and benefits 
across society. By making money and ensuring that money is made in the most efficient 
manner possible, business imparts benefits to society that go far and beyond any measures 
that governments or philanthropists can do to ensure a just society, or so the argument goes. 
Creating employment, satisfying consumer demand and generally contributing to the 
economic health of a nation are some ways in which business forwards the public good. As 
everyone primarily acts from self-interest business actors will, in seeking to advance their 
own financial ends, ensure that efficiency is maximised, thereby making the product or 
service as cheap as possible for the consumer. Furthermore because of the desire to outdo the 
competition quality will also be maximised. The conclusion reached by both classical and 
neoclassical economists is that market conditions should therefore be conducive to the 
fostering of a business climate that is primarily, if not entirely, geared towards the bottom-
line. For neoclassical economists like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek of the so-called 
Chicago School of economic thought, protecting market freedom is the most important thing 
that a nation can do to guarantee social equity. Deregulating business operations ensures that 
the market will not be one of coerced conformity to restrictive legislations, but rather one of 
voluntary cooperation where business, employees and customers choose for themselves the 
terms of trade.  
 A free and just society thus begins with a free-market within which people seeking to 
advance their own financial ends indirectly and effectively advance the public good. There 
are two aspects to this position. The first is that there is a correlation between acting from 
self-interest and acting for the good of society in general. Selfish intentions are hence 
enlightened in the sense that they simultaneously advance social ends. They are therefore to 
be encouraged. Secondly, the argument goes, because hindering selfish intentions is not a 
good thing (as above), protecting freedom is first and foremost among the conditions 
necessary to ensure social justice. These arguments must not then be considered in isolation. 
                                                            
1 Schumacher, E.F., as quoted in Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line, p.246.  
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Together they attempt to provide rational grounds for the bottom-line approach to business, 
where these grounds are primarily ethical, as they are concerned with ensuring that 
economics and economic structures are so arranged as to ensure social justice.  
 However both of these arguments fail. Given that both classical and neoclassical 
economists are primarily concerned with ensuring justice in society, their proposals turn out 
to be essentially contradictory. It is not true that justice is advanced by treating it as an 
incidental benefit of making money. The argument from enlightened self-interest is 
misguided because there is not enough of a correlation between acting for one’s own benefit 
and acting for the benefit of society in general to justify such an approach. Also in its 
statement that financial bottom-line concerns ought to be the primary focus of a business, it 
inverts the proper relationship between instrumental and ultimate value, making what 
economic theorists know to be ultimate (the public good, social justice) secondary in value to 
that which we know to be only instrumentally valuable: money. Such a treatment of ultimate 
value is clearly inappropriate. It is for this reason that there is little to no positive correlation 
between acting from the desire for personal financial gain and ensuring social justice. The 
argument from freedom is similarly problematic because the condition of a free-market that 
the position justifies leads to the protection of moneyed interests often to the detriment of 
others’ interests. Free markets enable certain businesses to become extremely powerful and 
so better suited to advance their bottom-line interests than other parties. Freedom is thus 
defended in elitist terms as the freedom of the wealthy to obtain more wealth. Neoliberalism, 
in other words, advances a very narrow conception of freedom as being attached above all 
else to capital worth. For these reasons there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that in fact the 
social responsibility of business cannot simply be to increase its profits.  
 Social justice is the real end of business operations, which even neoliberals do not 
dispute, so this is what must be protected first and foremost. Doing this requires social justice 
to be an explicit and direct responsibility of business that cannot be hidden behind desperate 
appeals to an ‘enlightened self-interest’. Social justice is too often written off in the bottom-
line climate, which still principally prevails today. Although it might be true that 
neoliberalism has been largely discredited there is a need to look, from a philosophical point 
of view, at why this system has failed in order that we may not repeat any of the same 
contradictions and flawed assumptions. In particular the assumption that business is all about 
making money needs to be reconsidered, both because this is simply incorrect and because it 
remains predominant. I shall argue that in order to ensure that value concerns are not trumped 
in the name of the bottom-line, we need to redefine business success in terms of the end 
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which is ultimately aimed at: broad social flourishing or social justice. This is not to say that 
profits are not important, rather it is to say that profits are not of ultimate importance and that 
hence they cannot and should not be the measure of success. 
 In Chapter One I shall present the classical and neoclassical positions that have given 
rise to the belief and practice that businesses are socially responsible by mere virtue of a 
burgeoning bottom line. I shall show how these positions are conceptually flawed. In Chapter 
Two I aim to demonstrate that the bottom-line approach in practice can be extremely 
detrimental and harmful to society, to the environment and even to business and national 
economies. In other words, enlightened self-interest is in many ways an elusive concept, as is 
the freedom that such a system is intended to defend. It must be noted that in this thesis I 
shall conflate environmental justice to fall under the umbrella term social justice. This is not 
to say that I necessarily think that the environment is only valuable insofar as it is 
instrumental to human existence, but for the purposes of this project I will focus only on its 
instrumental value.  
In Chapter Three I shall argue that businesses have a positive and primary duty to 
advance the ends of social justice because they are critical social players capable of intensely 
morally relevant impacts on people and the planet. Social justice is the point of economic 
thought (and the resultant structures) in the first place and so this cannot be ignored in the 
way that the bottom-line approach advances by the argument from enlightened self-interest. 
As money is not an ultimate value, it is wholly inappropriate that it receives the status it does 
in current business climates. We have, I shall conclude, to instate the real end of business – 
which is social justice – as the ultimate determinant of success and value in business life. 
Finally in Chapter Four I shall very tentatively attempt to demonstrate the kind of changes 
that would be necessary (both internal and external) to business functioning to ensure that 
social justice and not profit-making becomes the end of business. I shall argue that not only is 
such a shift possible, it is both necessary and inevitable.   
 It is not my intention to argue for or against any particular economic system. Rather, 
my aim is to argue that it is inappropriate, at least and extremely damaging at worst, to 
approach business from a bottom line perspective. This project is an attempt to ameliorate the 
harms caused by the bottom-line approach by analysing the arguments made in its defence 
and suggesting a new paradigm within which operations should occur. Such a paradigm can 
stay true to the incentives provided by competitive capitalism for product development and 
market innovation, but it can also be sensitive to the fact that profit is not good for its own 
sake.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
THE BOTTOM-LINE: TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THE PRIMACY OF PROFIT 
 
The role of well run companies is to make profits, not save the planet2 
 
The invisible hand has been more potent for progress than the visible hand for retrogression3 
 
In this chapter I shall present two classical arguments of the dominant view that the ultimate 
end of business is to maximise profit. The first argument as it is made by Milton Friedman4 
and Friedrich Hayek5 implies that in order for society as a whole to flourish and to ensure 
maximum economic benefits for the greatest number of people the maximisation of profits 
ought to be the guiding value in business. The best way in which a business can make a 
positive contribution to society is by engaging in activities that are designed to ensure the 
greatest profit. What makes this argument particularly appealing is that it suggests that there 
is a direct correlation between doing what is in one’s own interests and doing what is the 
interests of society in general. There is no need to be ‘self-effacing’ in any way, we need only 
be motivated by selfish intentions for society as a whole to meaningfully benefit. I have 
called this argument ‘the argument from enlightened self-interest’.  
Although these views are clearly inspired by Adam Smith’s invisible hand argument6 
there are certain critical differences between the so-called ‘classical’ economics of Smith and 
the ‘neo-classical’ or ‘neoliberal’ economics of Friedman and Hayek. It is important that 
these differences are made apparent and so to this end I shall discuss Smith’s advocacy of 
self-control and ‘fellow-feeling’7 in order to show that Smith is an advocate of competitive 
capitalism but only insofar as it is not left “to the mercy of rapacious individuals or groups or 
imperfect market conditions.”8 Hence, there is a crucial difference between the kind of self-
interest that Smith discusses and the self-interest that Friedman and Hayek advocate. It is 
                                                            
2 Wolf, M., ‘Sleeping with the Enemy: Corporate Social Responsibility Distorts the Market by Deflecting 
Business from its Primary Role of Profit Generation’, Financial Times, 16 May 2000, p.21. 
3 Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, p.200.  
4 In both Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and the New York Times article ‘The Social Responsibility of Business 
is to Increase its Profits’ (1970) Friedman argues for the bottom line as the trumping concern in business 
activities.  
5 I shall discuss Hayek’s arguments as they appear in The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (1988), and 
more loosely in The Road to Serfdom (1944). Although Hayek’s surname was actually von Hayek, I shall go 
with convention and simply refer to him as Hayek.  
6 Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, p.478. 
7 Although Smith’s major economic work appears in The Wealth of Nations (1776), it must be considered in the 
light of the arguments that he makes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1799), as I shall argue below.  
8 Fisher, C. and Lovell, A. Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives, 
p.361.  
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arguable that it is only Smith’s conception of enlightened self-interest that is genuinely 
enlightened.   
The second argument that I shall discuss is ‘the argument from freedom’ as it is made 
by Friedman9 and Robert Nozick.10 Simply put this argument centres on the idea that 
demanding that a business does any more than focus on the bottom line constitutes a violation 
of the liberty of business owners. The idea is that if excess legislation and prescriptions are 
demanded of business then this will hinder legitimate profit-making abilities. Excessive 
regulation hence impinges on the freedom of individuals to pursue their own financial 
interests. It also, the argument goes, restricts the freedom of consumers to participate in the 
market by ‘voting’ with their dollars. This is because market regulations create artificial 
conditions which often do not accurately represent consumer desires. If market conditions are 
distorted by government interference, Friedman argues, then this “threatens both national 
security and domestic harmony.”11 Furthermore, he continues, as many of the legislations 
exist in order to benefit the poor, such legislations will constitute a redistribution of wealth 
which is not in keeping with our modern concept of democratic liberty.12 For Friedman, and 
for Nozick, freedom is the ultimate value worth protecting and economic coercion, in the 
form of regulation, constitutes “coercion in general.”13 Friedman’s stance on enlightened self-
interest must necessarily be understood in light of his argument from freedom, as he believes 
that the only way for enlightened self-interest – the invisible hand – to truly operate is under 
the conditions of free enterprise.     
I shall go on to argue that the bottom line approach to business, which is the end of 
both the argument from enlightened self-interest and the argument from freedom, has failed 
on at least three critical levels: socially, environmentally and economically. In the next 
chapter I shall present various case studies in order to show these failures and to show how 
they are directly linked to the bottom-line approach. My intention is to question whether 
empirical evidence supports the separate (but related) claims that the best way for a business 
to aid society at large and the best way to protect individual freedom is to maximise profits. 
                                                            
9 This position is presented in Capitalism and Freedom (1962); ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits’ (1970); and Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (1979), which Friedman co-wrote with 
his wife, Rose Friedman.  
10 As it appears in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).  
11 Friedman, M., ‘The Paternal State’, Newsweek, 22 January1979. 
12 Friedman argues, rightly perhaps, that most regulatory measures such as price and wage controls and, in 
particular, taxation exist in order to ensure that the poor are protected, hence his labelling of regulation in 
business as existing within a ‘paternalistic state’. See for example ‘The Paternal State’, Newsweek, 22 January 
1979.  
13 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.422. 
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This critique aims to ask whether “the evidence we have of the globalising and deregulating 
effects on world markets display an overall elevation of people’s well-being.”14 We need to 
examine whether or not this approach to economics is indeed the superior option, that is, 
given that the end of economics is indeed to elevate social well-being. The inclusion of such 
evidence is revealing because it points to systemic trends and so to large-scale failures.  
In addition to providing empirical evidence against bottom-line thinking I also aim to 
show that the very idea that businesses are profit maximisers is conceptually problematic. 
This is the major aim of this chapter. My point is that there is a problem at the very heart of 
bottom-line thinking and this explains why there is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that 
the bottom-line approach to business typically ends in disaster of some sort. If the primary 
concern of a business is profit-making then this implies that bottom line considerations ought 
to trump all other considerations. So, for example, if it is fashionable to use ‘green’ 
packaging materials, and if this will increase sales, then, according to defenders of bottom-
line thought, a business ought to employ such packaging methods. The driving motivation to 
do so is not environmental sustainability but profit-making. Further, if listing on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Index (JSE SRI)15 will increase 
investment in a public corporation then a company ought to restructure operations in order to 
meet the SRI listing criteria. However, by bottom-line logic, this should only be done if the 
cost of restructuring is less than the increase in potential investment. The motivation to list on 
the SRI index is again profit.  
So, if profit-making is the ultimate guiding business value, then we can reasonably 
hold that considerations for environmental and social justice ought only to extend as far as 
these will increase the bottom line. Yet this conclusion, I shall argue, is unacceptable. Social 
justice (which includes environmental justice) cannot simply be valued in this sense, in other 
words, it cannot only be instrumentally valuable.16 The bottom-line stance towards business 
causes the treatment of those values which we hold to be non-instrumental (such as social 
justice, fairness, human rights, environmental protection) in an instrumental way, making 
profits or money the ultimate criterion for acceptability. Rather, money, I shall argue, is an 
                                                            
14 Fisher, C. and Lovell, A., Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives, 
p.313. 
15 In order to list on the JSE SRI index a company has to conform to a certain number of criteria under the 
categories ‘Environment’, ‘Society’ and ‘Governance and Related Sustainability Concerns’. These range from 
skills development for employees to family benefits, confidential whistle-blowing avenues to empowerment of 
local peoples, and from GHG emissions reductions to data on water consumption. The SRI index will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.    
16 I shall elaborate on the concept of social justice in Chapter Three. 
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instrumental value and so hence it cannot, and should not, be treated as the be-all-and-all of 
business life. My critique of the bottom-line approach to business on this point is that a 
conceptual error in bottom-line thinking leads to a critical moral error. I shall argue that as 
social justice cannot be valued in the way that it is from a bottom-line perspective, it is not 
appropriate to suggest, as Friedman and Hayek do, that the sole ‘social responsibility of 
business is to increase its profits’.  
I should stress that this is not to say that I think that profits are of little importance to 
business. Quite the contrary is the case. What I do believe, and what I will defend here, is the 
idea that profits are crucial in a manner that is analogous to the importance of the human 
digestive system. The digestive system is essential for human living, but it is not that for the 
sake of which humans live. Similarly, profit is arguably essential to the survival of business, 
but it is not that for the sake of which businesses ought to exist and nor should it stand as the 
measure of their success. 
The reason that Friedman and Hayek reach the conclusion that they do is because they 
think that social justice is best served by financial success in business. Their common starting 
point is in fact collective social well-being. Interestingly, this means that they endorse the 
idea that social justice is good in and of itself (i.e. that it is not instrumental). However, it is 
their means to achieving this end, both on paper and in practice, that raises profound 
concerns. On the one hand social justice is treated as good in itself but, on the other, it is 
treated as wholly instrumental, which means that their theories are internally inconsistent. We 
cannot treat as instrumental that which we hold to be ultimately valuable for the sake of 
serving that value. A problem here – which, as I shall below, Friedman does not think is 
problematic – is that this conflates doing the good with actually being good. As suggested 
above, the motivation to engage in some social or environmental project is, for a bottom-line 
business, profit. So, in Friedman’s model, for example, there is never an independent reason 
to be ethical. A further conceptual problem is that the argument from enlightened self-interest 
makes the normative claim that people are fundamentally, and almost entirely, self-interested 
and that self-interest is narrowly conceptualised in terms of personal financial gains, as I shall 
demonstrate below. However, in the way of introduction, this claim is in itself deeply 
worrying because it entails a very limited conception of what motivates us as human beings. 
The argument from freedom is likewise conceptually limited because it provides a radically 
inadequate notion of freedom, as I shall argue below. Given these limitations, the arguments 
made by Friedman and his acolytes are deeply problematic because they suppose that social 
justice necessarily flows from their deficient views on ethics, human motivation and liberty. 
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My task in this chapter is not to question the stated fundamental purpose of neo-
classical economics – that is, social well-being or social justice - but rather to question 
whether or not the proposed means to this end are conceptually sound. I shall begin this task 
by discussing Smith’s exposition of the intricate workings of the market wherein lies the 
genesis of the argument that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.  
 
I. The Argument from Enlightened Self-interest: 
A. Adam Smith: 
In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations17 Smith argues for the 
primacy of market-based capitalism for economic and social coordination. His suggestion is 
that profit-making in business ensures the health and thriving of the national economy and 
that this in turn is the surest way to ensure broad social prosperity. Smith justifies this 
seemingly self-interested pursuit of profits by arguing that there is a correlation between 
doing what is in one’s own interests (making money or more loosely, advancing one’s 
financial status), and doing what is in the interests of society in general (social justice). He 
makes, an albeit passing, reference to a market concept which he dubs ‘the invisible hand’. 
He writes, “By pursuing [one’s] own interests [one] frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when [one] really intends to promote it.”18 Smith makes his point 
regarding the workings of the invisible hand by arguing that: 
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner but 
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-
love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages19 
 
 
Smith suggests that it is ultimately better for society at large if people pursue their own (self-
interested) profit-making intentions than if they set out to actively relieve the symptoms of 
poverty. In Smith’s opinion overt justice-promoting economic activities, such as price 
controls, are not as effective as the creation of wealth in lessening the plight of the poor.20 He 
comments, “I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the 
public good.”21 So, as Robert Solomon and Clancy Martin comment:  
 
                                                            
17 This is often shortened simply to The Wealth of Nations and from here on I shall refer to it as such. 
18 Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, p.478. 
19 Ibid, p.477. 
20 Ibid, p.478. 
21 Ibid, p.478. 
9 
 
Economic life, according to Smith, does indeed proceed on the principle of self-interest – namely, that 
the general welfare, will be served best if individuals are allowed to pursue their own financial well-
being22 
 
 
Hence if we are genuinely concerned with greater social equity, as indeed Smith was, 
with the ‘wealth of the (entire) nation’, then we should rather allow the invisible helping hand 
of a thriving economy to aid the poor. According to Smith, the way to expunge poverty is not 
through visible hand-outs and charitable giving but rather through the creation of a 
competitive market enterprise driven fundamentally by the personal desire to make money. 
Smith writes that business people, “by directing [their] industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value [to themselves],” intending only their own gain are, “in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
[their] intention” (my emphasis).23 This argument is rather peculiar as Smith is suggesting 
that business people focused on making money for their own ends are more effective in 
meeting the end of social justice than those who overtly work to promote justice. In other 
words he is saying that those motivated by their own gain (in essence, by greed) are better 
positioned to serve the greater good than those who are primarily motivated by the end of 
social justice. Smith holds this view because (like Friedman and Hayek, in their turn) he 
thinks that thriving business is better for society as a whole than charity is. Creating 
employment is more effective in alleviating poverty, for example, than charitable giving. We 
are reminded of the old saying that it is better to teach a man to fish than to give him a fish. 
People cannot thrive, the argument goes, if business is not thriving, so it is better to focus on 
creating a healthy business economy than on treating the symptoms of an unhealthy 
economy, such as poverty. This is why Smith argues for market deregulation (I shall describe 
this argument below): remove the barriers to trade and you improve the bottom lines of 
businesses. This in turn, both classical (Smith) and neoclassical (Friedman and Hayek) 
economists argue, will ensure social flourishing. The suggestion is that there is a strong 
correlation between personal interests and the interests of society in general. Hence this is an 
‘enlightened’ self-interest and so is not to be condemned. 
However, the implication of this argument is that people should not do the good 
intentionally, which means that they are blinded to the ends that the system ultimately aims 
at. In other words there is an improper understanding of what economics is all about. In such 
                                                            
22 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.204. 
23 Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, p.478 . 
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a system people’s intentions are formed in a way that they do not have an explicit 
understanding of the proper aims of business. Essentially the motivation (greedy self-interest) 
does not accord with the actual end (social justice). This disjuncture can quite legitimately be 
offered as one of the reasons why neoliberal economics has failed to deliver on its aims. 
Economic actors ought rather to form intentions that directly accord with the aims of justice. 
My suggestion here is that justice is best served by actually forming intentions which have, as 
part of their content, an explicit understanding of the proper aims of business. This idea will 
be developed throughout this thesis.  
Yet, to be fair to Smith, it must be said that despite the fact that he thinks that self-
interest ought to be the driving force of social justice, it would be disingenuous to argue that 
he confines self-interest to material greed. Friedman and Hayek, as we shall see, do think that 
this is the case. Smith, by contrast, argues that part of our motivation as human beings is 
indeed an explicit desire for social justice. So there is a critical difference between the self-
interest that Smith argues for and the self-interest that Friedman and Hayek argue for.  
To this end Smith’s socio-economic vision in The Wealth of Nations cannot be wholly 
understood without referencing his later arguments made in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
in which he develops the notion of ‘self-control’. It is most likely because this latter work has 
been largely overlooked that Smith’s work is often misunderstood. Essentially Smith allows 
for a broader motivational set than neoclassical economists do. He would not have condoned 
the kind of unbridled greed that travels in the neoliberal world of today under the banner of 
social responsibility. While he advocates the pursuit of personal interests in The Wealth of 
Nations, he argues at the opening of The Theory of Moral Sentiments that: 
 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it24  
 
 
So self-love for Smith is not to be equated with selfishness. Hence, when he condones 
appealing to the butcher’s ‘self-love’ he is not implying that economic issues should be “left 
to the mercy of rapacious individuals or groups.”25 Rather, he argues, such self-love should 
be tempered by self-control.  
                                                            
24 Smith, A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.3.  
25 Fisher, C. and Lovell, A., Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives, 
p.361. 
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Smith argues in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, as Plato and Aristotle do before 
him,26 that self-control is a virtue in its own right and that hence it ought to be cultivated. He 
argues that deregulated climates are ultimately better for socio-economic coordination (I shall 
describe this argument below) but that such a climate is conditional on two important 
elements, as Colin Fisher and Alan Lovell describe.27 The first is that any business should not 
be allowed to get too powerful as this interferes with the ends of competitive market-based 
capitalism. The second important condition is that people possess a “constrained self-love.”28 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith argues that people ought to be guided by two forms 
of jurisdiction: their conscience (‘the man within’) and the judgement of strangers (‘the man 
without’).29 If people act so as to appease both of these aspects they will develop what Smith 
calls a ‘fellow-feeling’ which will ensure that their self-love is constrained; that they express 
self-control.30 Smith thus places a great deal of responsibility on individual people to control 
their impulses to be greedy, because for him self-control is a virtue. He recognises the risks 
embedded in the kind of market-based competitive capitalism which he advocates but he is 
optimistic about the cultivation of the moral inclinations of ‘man’ to experience a ‘fellow-
feeling’ so as to offset these risks. So Smith’s economic argument is ultimately that self-love 
is an important part of ensuring social justice: it is necessary to drive business and economic 
development. But this self-love ought to be tempered by self-control. Unfortunately, as I shall 
argue below, neither of Smith’s two conditions have been met in reality. Businesses are 
extremely powerful and individual greed is largely unbridled. Relying solely on people to 
express their moral sentiments has proved insufficient to control what has become an era of 
‘capitalisme sauvage’.31     
Although Smith differs from modern economists because he endorses self-control to 
harness the greed that can result from a market-based economics, he is still often referred to 
as the ‘father of modern economics’ and this is not entirely inappropriate. He was indeed 
responsible for formulating what are known today as the ‘market mechanisms’ and he did 
believe that society as a whole would be better off if businesses were given a free-rein to 
pursue their financial ends. This does not contradict what Smith writes regarding restrained 
self-love. Rather, the two should be understood as being complementary: we ought to be free 
                                                            
26 See for example, Plato, The Republic (Penguin: 1987) and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: 2005). 
27 Fisher, C. and Lovell, A., Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives, 
p.361.  
28 Ibid, p.362. 
29 Ibid, p.363. 
30 Ibid, p.363. 
31 Translated from French as ‘savage capitalism’ or ‘capitalism gone wild’. 
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to pursue our own financial interests, but we ought to do so in a manner that is in keeping 
with the recognition of others as fellow human beings. Smith argues that the nation as a 
whole is wealthier if business people are enabled, by deregulation, to freely pursue their own 
self-interested financial ends, although, for him, these ought to be tempered by self-control 
and a recognition of the other as a ‘fellow’.  
Smith argues in The Wealth of Nations that the market possesses its own self-
regulating forces that should not be disrupted by artificial, government-imposed restrictions 
and legalities that serve to divert attention from the bottom line (i.e. from people’s financial 
self-interest). Instead, if money is allowed to flow freely in the market, society at large will 
enjoy the benefits of increased quality and reduced prices. Central to Smith’s theory is the 
law of supply and demand: a “self-controlling device of society.”32 This law, in effect, drives 
the invisible hand. Basically, the mechanism must be allowed to operate independently from 
government interference to ensure that prices are indeed an accurate reflection of society’s 
interests. The greater the demand, the greater the supply and from there, the cheaper the 
prices and the better the quality. Competition to meet demand, for self-interested reasons, 
hence optimises the well-being of the nation. Solomon and Martin write, “It is with this mind 
that we must understand Smith’s insistence that the government should leave the market 
alone.”33 
This elegantly functioning system which Smith describes is, he argues, disrupted 
when government restrictions, such as price controls, cause artificial fluctuations in the 
market mechanism. In such cases it is the poor that are most affected as although controlled 
product x might be cheap, other products will become more expensive to compensate for the 
loss of profits in x. Commodities that used to be affordable now become too expensive, 
especially for the poor. Therefore the best way to ensure the greatest economic benefits for all 
is not to introduce well-intentioned restrictions and regulations, but rather to create the 
conditions necessary for “an open, competitive market place, with free exchange and without 
coercion.”34 Such an economy is known as a deregulated economy, or a free market.  
The suggestion made here by Smith is that government presence in the market in any 
form other than in the most basic sense, say as mediator and enforcer of contracts, is 
inappropriate as it prevents the market from reflecting accurately the needs and interests of 
society. Hence, in order to ensure the maximum social and economic benefits for the greatest 
                                                            
32 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.205. 
33 Ibid, p.206. 
34 The Adam Smith Institute, ‘Social Order Based on Freedom’ (online).  
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number, we ought not to restrict the market with measures directly intended to help people, 
particularly the poor. Rather, we should allow the indirect effects of the invisible hand to 
operate by encouraging the self-interested pursuit of profit-making, and from there the most 
pressing needs will be catered for. This means that we ought then to remove all legislations 
that impede the ability of a business to concentrate on profits. So, for Smith, the principle 
value behind business operations should be the self-interested pursuit of profits. However, 
and this is critical, that self-interest must necessarily be constrained. It is not the 
responsibility of governments to ensure such constraint, rather it is the responsibility of 
individual business people to temper their own self-interest with a ‘fellow-feeling’. Profit-
making in Smith’s model should hence not be confused with profit-maximising, this is 
because it is not only profit that motivates us, according to Smith.  
 
B. Milton Friedman: 
Friedman’s argument is in many ways a development of Smith’s but in the sense that 
Friedman supposes that we are almost entirely motivated by personal greed we might be 
inclined to suggest that his argument constitutes a regression from Smith’s. Friedman 
comments, “Is there some society you know that doesn’t run on greed? … The world runs on 
individuals pursuing their separate interests”.35 His arguments are centred on the idea that 
people create the most social benefits when they focus on their own ends, and so essentially 
the more self-interested people are – the more they want for themselves – the more society 
gains. People are all fundamentally greedy, Friedman argues, and so “the problem of social 
organisation is how to set up an arrangement under which greed will do the least harm”.36 His 
solution to this perceived problem is to encourage greed by making it work for society as a 
whole. This is achieved by free-market capitalism, he argues.   
The idea of ‘allocative efficiency’37 is a central tenement of Friedman’s arguments in 
this regard. Anything that distorts allocative efficiency is a bad thing, whilst anything that 
ensures it is a good thing. For Friedman making profits the sole purpose of business is a good 
thing because it ensures that allocative efficiency is maximised, thereby imparting the 
greatest amount of socio-economic good to society. Hence, his argument is also an ethical 
one: the free market focused on financial gain is integral to the achievement of social justice. 
                                                            
35 Friedman, M. on the Phil Donahue Show, ‘What is Greed?’ (online: Youtube). 
36 Ibid. 
37 In a business context this requires the use of the most efficient practices at all levels so that profitability is 
maximised. 
14 
 
So self-interest, here defined in terms of greed, should hence not be curtailed but encouraged 
as it is the fundamental driving force of the market.  
 Like Smith, Friedman argues that establishing a free market is critical to social 
flourishing. He argues that the restriction of self-interested profit-making by government 
intervention in the market is not only ineffective in aiding society but is in fact harmful. He 
strongly supports deregulation, arguing, as in the epigraph to this chapter, that “[t]he invisible 
hand has been more potent for progress than the visible hand for retrogression.”38 Businesses 
are far better suited, Friedman argues, to ensure the conditions necessary for people to 
flourish because, for example, they create jobs and will deliver fairly priced goods and 
services at the best possible quality if businesses are free to focus only on profit-making. 
Hence, for Friedman (and Smith), ensuring social justice requires deregulation. In Capitalism 
and Freedom Friedman critically discusses various governmental measures that, although 
well-intentioned, are actually a hindrance to the achievement of social justice. Among others 
he discusses minimum wage laws, price controls, state sanctioned monopolies, public 
education, licensing, particularly of the medical profession, and trade tariffs. He shows how 
each measure is in fact damaging to society as it creates artificial conditions in the market, 
ultimately increasing prices and reducing quality. With regards to minimum wage laws 
Friedman argues that these tend to increase poverty because employers can no longer justify 
employing some of their workers who lack the relevant skills to justify being paid a minimum 
wage. This means that those who can least afford to give up their income, “small as it may 
appear to the people voting for the minimum wage,”39 are rendered unemployed. Their lack 
of skills ensures that they will not easily find employment elsewhere, leaving Friedman to 
conclude that, “Minimum wage laws are about as clear a case as one can find of a measure 
the effects of which are precisely the opposite of those intended by the men of good will who 
support it.”40 
Friedman argues that rather, in order for everyone to live in conditions under which 
they have the potential to thrive, we should not restrict business activities with ‘red tape’ 
legislations but allow business to simply get down to the business of making money. The 
implicit assumption being that if businesses are thriving then so will people in general. The 
free enterprise market system is, for Friedman, “a ‘just’ way of solving the economic problem 
                                                            
38 Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, p.200.  
39 Ibid, p.181. 
40 Ibid, p.180. 
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of producing and distributing goods as fairly as possible throughout the whole society.”41 
Hence, business itself “is to be defended in loftier terms as an instrument of [distributive] 
justice.”42 In a deregulated economic climate people are best enabled to focus on their own 
desire for personal wealth accumulation and because this is their goal, allocative efficiency 
will be maximised, which will be to the benefit of all. The competitive market that results 
from such a deregulated system ensures that goods and services are produced at the best 
possible price and at the best possible quality for consumers.  
By making business the harbinger of social justice Friedman maps out a vast task for 
business, but the beauty of this task is that it involves nothing else but relying on people’s 
own self-interest. There is no need for regulation; this, according to him, inhibits the 
functioning of the market system. Yet nor is there a need in Friedman’s model for self-
constraint. It is because people are not restrained that the market works as it does. Self-
constraint for Friedman is not a virtue in the market, it is a vice. Hence, greed for Friedman is 
not to be frowned upon, it is to be encouraged. There is no need to limit greed as Smith 
suggests there is, rather if we truly desire to ensure social flourishing then we should be 
motivated wholly by our own self-interest. So Friedman – and indeed the neoliberal tradition 
as a whole – departs from Smith in key ways. 
 According to Friedman, increasing profits is thus the social responsibility of business. 
Society is best served not by overt justice-promoting activities but by the indirect (‘invisible’) 
benefits of personal wealth accumulation. So, for example, if a business makes money it will 
employ people. If it operates in a free-market allocative efficiency will be maximised and so 
prices will be fair and products of a good quality. If the markets are open and greed is 
encouraged then people will be more innovative, benefiting all. If a business is about making 
money then customers and employees will not be discriminated against, say for being Jewish, 
and so discrimination in society will be lessened.43 So, for Friedman self-constraint is a 
detriment to the market and hence to society. Therefore, for him, profit-making in fact entails 
profit maximising. The clear difference here between Smith and Friedman is that Smith 
thinks that economic actors ought to be motivated by more than their own greed. They will 
not, if they are virtuous, pursue bottom-line interests at any cost. Friedman, on the other hand 
thinks that self-constraint in the market is not a virtue: bottom-line interests should be 
maximised because this is the socially responsible thing to do. In Friedman’s model the more 
                                                            
41 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.320.  
42 Ibid, p.320.   
43 These are just some of the benefits of being selfish in a free-market described by Friedman in Capitalism and 
Freedom. I have just mentioned them briefly here. 
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money business makes the better society does. So profit maximising - or as Friedman refers 
to it – ‘increasing profits’ – and not simply profit-making is a market virtue.  
 To be fair, Friedman’s support of greed as the driving force of the market is best 
understood in terms of sustained profit-making. To this end he argues for the necessity of 
some kind of constraint in business actions for pragmatic reasons. It is not beneficial to the 
bottom line, for example, if a business breaks the law, so there is an instrumental reason to 
exercise some constraint in business. Friedman’s economic model includes two important 
conditionals in this regard which are often overlooked. He argues that a business ought, for 
the purposes of social well-being, to “engage in activities designed to increase its profits,”44 
but that it ought to do so, “while conforming to [the] basic rules of the society, both those 
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”45 So, Friedman does not encourage 
breaking the law or violating ethical custom in the pursuit of profits.  
The question, however, is whether he is implying that respect for the law and ethical 
custom is good in and of itself or if it is only good for instrumental reasons relating to profit 
maximisation. There is strong evidence to suggest that Friedman thinks that respect for the 
law and ethical custom is only instrumentally valuable to profit-making. For example, in his 
pertinently titled paper “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits” 
Friedman explicitly argues that actions such as employee reward and incentive schemes and 
community development projects could be justified if they serve to “attract desirable 
employees … reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage or sabotage.”46 Further, he 
writes, if such efforts are tax deductible then this could serve as another (bottom-line) reason 
to respect ethical custom.47 If we consider that treating employees fairly and engaging with 
the community is a part of ‘ethical custom’ then it seems clear that the justificatory status that 
Friedman places on this is merely instrumental. As regards CSR (corporate social 
responsibility) projects, he writes:  
 
In the present climate of opinion, with its widespread aversion to ‘capitalism’, ‘profits’, the ‘soulless 
corporation’ and so on, this [CSR] is one way for a corporation to generate goodwill as a by-product of 
expenditures that are entirely justified on its own self-interest48 
 
 
                                                            
44 Friedman, M., ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, New York Times, 13 
September 1970.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
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Friedman simply shrugs off the implication that this kind of ‘window dressing’ is at best 
dishonest and at worst fraudulent, stating that he “cannot summon much indignation” for 
such a cloaking of the intentions behind business activities. It does not matter that the reason 
to support ethical customs is instrumental, in fact such programmes should only ever occur, 
according to Friedman, if they serve the purpose of increasing the bottom line. This 
instrumental approach to CSR has become so embedded that there are even a number of 
economic terms to describe it. For example, Fisher and Lovell label it “prudential altruism”49 
and Michael Porter and Mark Kramer refer to it as “strategic philanthropy.”50  
Friedman’s conditional claim that the law must be obeyed also has, for him, a bottom-
line motivation: obey the law or you will ultimately end up losing money. Yet, some laws, he 
thinks, should be ignored. Disobeying minimum wage laws, for example, would be a good 
thing for the public good, because, as Solomon and Martin comment, in Friedman’s model:  
 
Even sweatshops that pay below the minimum wage are useful … because they give the otherwise 
unemployable and untrained worker a chance to climb onto the bottom rung of the economic ladder, 
learn a skill, and so go on to a better paying job51 
 
 
For Friedman obeying the law is not then ultimately valuable, and this is probably correct.52 
Obeying or disobeying the law, for him, hinges entirely on what is best for the bottom-line 
and by extension, for society at large. By employing illegally cheap labour the company 
benefits, but so do those whom the company employs. In Friedman’s model the decision of 
whether to obey the law or not does not depend on external value criteria but rather on what 
is in the best long-term financial interests of the company. Similarly, his argument for 
obeying ethical custom is that this would be instrumental to sustainable growth. From there – 
by the argument from enlightened self-interest – this might later turn out to be in the interests 
of the public good. But the value for the business has not been placed on social justice, it has 
been placed on the bottom line. This is the wrong way to value ethics, or as Friedman refers 
to it ‘ethical custom’. I shall expand on this argument in Chapter Three.  
 These two conditionals (obeying the law and obeying ethical custom) do not 
coherently fit with Friedman’s claim that ‘the social responsibility of business is to increase 
its profits’. If the motivation to be ethical and obey the law is bottom-line based, then if there 
                                                            
49 Fisher, C. and Lovell, A., Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives, 
p.311. 
50 Ibid, p.311. 
51 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.320.  
52 For example, South Africa’s pass laws during apartheid were not valuable. 
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are good bottom-line reasons to ignore ethical custom or to break the law, such acts can, in 
fact, be justifiable. There is a wealth of evidence that suggests that in a bottom-line world this 
is exactly what often happens. Just as Smith’s second conditional for the free-market fails 
because we cannot depend solely on people to express their moral sentiments, so we cannot 
rely on people in a bottom-line world to always obey the law and ethical custom. The 
problem is that both Smith and Friedman appear to have implicitly realised the dangers of the 
free-market system: their inclusion of conditionals gives evidence to this claim. Businesses 
will become powerful, people will find it hard to exercise moral constraint and the law and 
ethical customs might often be disregarded. The fact that they both see the need for 
conditionals at all implies that their economic systems are far from flawless. Yet their 
idealistic appeals to some kind of personal constraint (for whatever reason) are far from 
sufficient to offset the volatility of such a system. The real issues are systemic and so if it is 
the system that has a fault then it is the system that should be fixed.  
 By my thought, the major systemic fault embedded in bottom-line logic, classical and 
neoclassical, is that making the self-interested pursuit of profits the driving force of the 
market causes all other values to be treated as instrumental to this aim. This constitutes a 
treatment of morality that is not in keeping with our basic ethical assumptions. Profit is not 
good in and of itself, it is only good insofar as it is instrumental to the achievement of other 
goals. (Again, this argument shall be expanded in Chapter Three.) So although Smith’s and 
Friedman’s models are both premised on the social good, in fact profits become the ultimate 
value in both of their systems. Hence, their theories are internally inconsistent.   
Essentially, both Smith and Friedman argue that if we truly desire to do good for 
society then we should not mandate business to be concerned with social justice issues. This 
would divert attention from the bottom line and so disrupt allocative efficiency, leading to 
disruptions in prices, quality and other areas such as employment. It is because business is 
profit-oriented that social justice will come about. This means that the indirect means (‘the 
invisible hand’) of the market are, for Smith and for Friedman, a much better way of ensuring 
social justice than the direct means of protective laws and philanthropy. Placing profits as the 
ultimate business value is, for them, a good thing, as this is the best instrument to social 
justice. To be fair to Smith we have seen that self-control ought also to be a market value, but 
the problem is that it is simply not clear how this value is to be nurtured in such a system. 
The major problem here is that although profit-making is meant to be simply an instrument to 
social justice, if profits are the driving business value, or the aim of business, then social 
justice issues in fact become instrumental to profit-making. So, profits become what is truly 
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valued in such a system and social justice ‘plays second fiddle’ to this end. Hence both 
Smith’s and Friedman’s models are in essence contradictory. We cannot treat as instrumental 
those things which we hold to be ultimately valuable even, and perhaps particularly, in a 
business context.    
The problem with the argument from enlightened self-interest then is that it leaves 
little room for the recognition of ultimate values, if it leaves room for these at all. If Friedman 
is correct and the only ‘social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’, then 
commitments to other values can only be held instrumentally. This means that the only 
question business people end up asking is whether or not their actions will benefit the 
bottom-line. In such a business culture there is a dearth of recognition of the ends that the 
system ultimately aims at, namely social justice and flourishing. This approach ensures that 
doing the good is severed from actually being good – as in ‘strategic philanthropy’ – which is 
a serious conceptual problem. Intentions ought to be formed in such a way that they accord 
with the proper aims of business, but this is extremely hard, if not impossible, to do in a 
bottom-line world. In a system designed to favour one value (profit-making53) over all other 
values, this outcome is unavoidable.  
Smith’s attempts to offset the risks embedded in the system are wholly insufficient 
and Friedman does not seem to think that an instrumental treatment of ultimate values is even 
problematic. Whichever way one chooses to look at it then a free market economic system 
ultimately implies that what is good is entirely grounded on the concern to maximise profit. 
This is surely so if the bottom line is the only criterion for acceptability and value in business 
life. Social justice is, I shall argue in Chapter Three, an ultimate value and as such it can 
never only be instrumentally valuable. In the next chapter I shall argue that because of the 
systemic weaknesses of neoclassical economics – created by the conceptual flaws illustrated 
above – business has been enabled to be, at best, amoral and at worst, immoral. As social 
justice is not valued in the way that it ought to be, the system in practice often fails to deliver 
on its primary aims. Greed is encouraged and ethical values become instrumental to the 
achievement of financial gain and so when values are of no use to the bottom line they are 
regularly ignored. The point is that by Friedman’s logic, this is what ought to happen, 
ultimately for the public good. Thus he contradicts himself. 
By way of introducing Hayek to the discussion, I shall return briefly to Friedman’s 
case as it is made in Capitalism and Freedom. He argues that one of the valuable incidental 
                                                            
53 Which is on close analysis an instrumental rather than an ultimate value, even for Friedman, once his 
contradictions have been ironed out. 
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benefits to be had from deregulation and profit-maximising is a reduction in socio-economic 
inequality, or a reduction in the gap between the rich and the poor. Writing on the distribution 
of income he asserts that inequalities appear to be less “the more highly capitalist the country 
is.”54 Friedman cites John Stuart Mill’s comments on the industrial revolution which despite 
an explosion in the amount of work available had done little to “effect those great changes in 
human destiny”55 which it had seemed the increase in opportunity ought to have done. 
Instead, by Mill’s observations, the rich simply got richer, while the middle class continued 
to enjoy their modest comforts, but the poor carried on living “the same life of drudgery and 
imprisonment”56 as they had always done. However, Friedman concludes that, with the 
passage of time, and the workings of the invisible hand, “certainly no one could write this 
today about the advanced capitalist countries”,57 although it would not be inappropriate, he 
continues, to write this about the rest of the world.  
Friedman’s reasoning in this regard is that the market eradicates inequality in a far 
more effective way than any other method. This means that if we attempt to redistribute 
wealth in the way that most socialist countries have allegedly done then we are essentially 
removing the potential for the upliftment of the poor and genuine social equity. Instead, 
Friedman argues, the possibility of failure (risk) undertaken and the possibility of return on 
risk is a fundamental principle that enables people to better their circumstances.58 Friedman 
concludes that: 
 
The great achievement of capitalism has not been the accumulation of property, it has been the 
opportunities it has afforded to men and women to extend and develop and improve their capacities59 
 
 
However this assertion can only be understood with reference to its context. The ‘socialist 
threat’ was a major concern in the United States in the 1960’s when Friedman wrote 
Capitalism and Freedom and the book is in many ways a response to this perceived threat. So 
while it might perhaps be true that people are better off in a capitalist country when compared 
to a socialist country this is not to say that therefore free-market capitalism is the best option. 
Hayek makes a similar error.  
 
                                                            
54 Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, p.169. 
55 Mill, J.S., as quoted in Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, p.170. 
56 Ibid, p.170. 
57 Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, p.170. 
58 Ibid, p.169. 
59 Ibid, p.169. 
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C. Friedrich Hayek: 
In The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism Hayek makes analogous arguments to those 
presented by Friedman and his work is also to a very large extent a response to the ‘threat of 
socialism’. Like Friedman, Hayek argues that the opportunities that are created by inequality 
are in fact central to meaningful social development. Hayek suggests that socialistic attempts 
to eradicate inequality are not only inappropriate but are in fact harmful.60 Instead, Hayek 
argues, disparities of income are justified by the fact that they provide incentives for further 
exploration into methods of economic expansion. In other words, if people want to do better 
for themselves then they have to search for opportunities in the market by being creative. In 
this way he argues that in a free market the productive capacity of a nation is multiplied, 
boosting the economy and with that social standards.61 Hayek’s arguments concerning the 
ideal economic setup are based on the idea that the pervasive working of market forces is the 
best route to broad social benefits and so, like Friedman, he argues that business operations 
ought to be motivated purely out of a concern for profits.62 This, he argues, ensures that the 
most effective use of resources (allocative efficiency) is made possible. Such economic 
efficiency positively affects the economy and in turn, by Hayek’s argument, society. Hayek 
argues that a free market dominated by the desire for profits “gives most people the material 
and information resources that they need in order to obtain what they want” (Hayek’s 
italics).63 His larger point is that socialistic attempts to eradicate social inequality and poverty 
by means of redistribution do not spur social development but rather stunt it. Therefore if we 
are genuinely concerned with social equity we ought not to condemn the private search for 
profit, but rather we ought to encourage it and create the economic conditions within which it 
can flourish. In Friedman’s vein, Hayek does not think that greed is necessarily a bad thing. 
Like Friedman, and to a certain extent Smith, Hayek argues for the existence of an 
invisible hand in the market that delivers broad social benefits as a result of the self-interested 
pursuit of profits, but he calls his version of this process “the extended order.”64 He argues 
that by focusing on our own purposes we ensure the health of the independently functioning 
processes of the market, which makes our actions “generally beneficial.”65 Hayek quotes 
David Hume in stating that the market makes it possible to “act to the advantage of the public 
                                                            
60 Hayek, F., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, p.7. 
61 Ibid, p.104. 
62 Ibid, p.104. 
63 Ibid, p.104. 
64 Ibid, p.78.  
65 Ibid, p.77. 
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though it be not intended for that purpose by another.”66 The extended order of the market is 
what justifies, in fact necessitates, the self-interested pursuit of profits.  
According to Hayek, the extended order requires that we embrace such self-interested 
pursuits as it is in being focused on our own ends that we best serve the needs of society. He 
therefore urges us to observe the “abstract rule”67 of bending our efforts towards self-serving 
ends. Selfish behaviour is thus not a bad thing for Hayek and so is better understood as an 
enlightened self-interest. If people deny their own selfish intentions in the way that they 
might be mandated to do in a redistributive, socialist economic framework, then they are in 
essence disrupting the subtle workings of the extended order. Hayek’s argument on this point 
is quite complicated and so it needs to be carefully dealt with. He argues that the extended 
order is “the most complex structure in the universe”68 and that we have evolved as a species 
in accordance with it.  
Hayek’s extended order can be explained by using an analogy of the evolutionary 
term ‘spontaneous order’. The reason, some evolutionists argue, that birds do not fly into 
each other when flying in huge flocks is because of ordering principles that guide and direct 
their behaviour. It is not only in the best interests of an individual bird to ‘embrace’ these 
instincts but it is also in the best interests of the entire flock that it does. If one single bird did 
not ‘trust’ its own instincts to fly in a certain way then it would collide with other birds, 
causing the whole flock to go into disarray. Proponents of spontaneous order argue that the 
reason that birds, such as swallows, can fly together in huge flocks is because each bird 
operates ‘for itself’. It ‘thinks’ not of the flock as a whole but of its own ‘instincts’ to fly in a 
certain way. This allows them to migrate as a team, reducing losses to predators for example, 
and so strengthening the flock as a whole. 
Similarly Hayek’s economic version of this process (the extended order) has enabled 
our survival so much so that Hayek suggests we “owe our existence”69 to it. This is because 
as soon as we ignore our internal drives to ‘fly in a certain direction’ or, in economic terms, 
as soon as we repress our self-interest – that is, our desire for personal wealth acquisition – 
we will essentially be disrupting the entire flock. So, Hayek argues, while it might seem that 
actively pursuing social ends is a worthy cause, in fact, it is far more beneficial, on the whole, 
if people pursue personal ends. These ends may well be materialistic in nature: this is not a 
particular problem for Hayek. For him, it is in the desire to advance our own material ends 
                                                            
66 Hume, D., as quoted in Hayek, F., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, p.47. 
67 Ibid, p.81. 
68 Ibid, p.127. 
69 Ibid, p.128.  
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that we are forced to be creative, essentially creating new knowledge that is to the benefit of 
all.70 Thus the extended order is nurtured and not hindered by selfishness. He concludes that, 
“It is hence hard to believe that anyone accurately informed about the market can honestly 
condemn the search for profit.”71   
For example, Hayek mentions how in striving for personal profit Henry Ford also at 
the same time benefited society at large.72 Out of his desire to make his company more 
efficient the assembly line was developed, enabling mass production. In the case of Ford this 
enabled the mass production of cars, but of course, on a larger scale, this enabled the mass 
production of almost all consumables produced today. Ford satisfied an observable need of a 
large group of people in order to advance his own wealth. He allowed for the cheaper and 
more efficient production of vehicles, which has undoubtedly had a tremendous impact on 
human life. Hayek thinks that this impact has been extremely beneficial, and there is no doubt 
that we all in many ways depend on the method of mass production that Ford developed. Of 
course, on the other hand, there is a strong argument that can be made in terms of the 
negative environmental, social and geopolitical consequences of this revolution in 
manufacturing. However, it is enough, in order to illustrate Hayek’s point that we at least 
grant that Ford’s desire to beat out the competition and amass personal wealth was the direct 
cause of a revolution in production which has had a profound, and at least in some ways 
positive, impact on the quality of life of millions. So the idea is that if we do not embrace our 
own intrinsic desires for personal wealth acquisition, and if we instead attempt to redistribute 
wealth in a socialistic manner, then we will stunt the incentives for creativity and so 
contribute to our own demise as a species.  
The socialist agenda, Hayek concludes, therefore poses “a grave threat to 
civilisation”73 because it is stifling of creativity. By removing the incentive of personal 
wealth acquisition Soviet-style socialism promoted, through policy and coercion, conformity 
of the highest order. The ‘fatal conceit’ referred to in the title of Hayek’s book is thus the 
socialist’s mistaken assumption that she can alter the natural order of healthy economic 
functioning by trying to create a motivational set premised on welfare and not self-interest. 
                                                            
70 The likening of the extended order to spontaneous order is also revealing in other ways. Perhaps it is true that 
birds obey their own instincts – and so behave ‘selfishly’ – but it is also true that some animals might do as they 
do for the benefit of the group – and so behave ‘selflessly’. For example worker bees devote their existence to 
the benefit of the queen bee and so to the bee colony as a whole, and not to the pursuit of their own ends. So, if 
we are going to extend the notion of spontaneous (natural) order to humans then it might also reveal that some 
of our intentions might not necessarily be selfish.   
71 Hayek, F., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, p.105. 
72 Ibid, p.93. 
73 Hayek, F., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, p.119.   
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The road to socialism is thus also the road to serfdom.74 For Hayek creativity, and the 
development that flows from the creative efforts of entrepreneurs, depends on selfishness. 
Yet, this means that he implicitly presupposes that genuine creative entrepreneurialism is 
always the result of greed. Of course it is indisputable that greed often makes people go the 
extra mile, but Hayek is surely wrong to assume that only motivational sets of this sort will 
do the job of properly motivating entrepreneurial activity. 
There are obvious problems here with the false dichotomy set up by Hayek between 
socialism and capitalism, an issue that applies (as above) to Friedman as well. It is certainly 
not obvious that we cannot combine aspects of capitalism and socialism to create a new 
system. It seems to be the case that Hayek thinks that we can either have deregulated 
capitalism or staunch redistributive socialism. However it is not incoherent with the ends of 
capitalism, and the creative market forces that arise from inequality and personal endeavour, 
to suggest that business operations should be regulated and limited and that they should serve 
ends other than profit maximisation. Solomon and Martin write, with reference to Friedman, 
that, “Any effort of society as a whole to affect the social welfare through government 
interference with business … he badly labels ‘socialism.’”75 It is not necessarily socialist, as 
Friedman and Hayek suppose, to suggest that business operations should occur in a manner 
that directly promotes social justice. I shall argue in Chapter Three that businesses ought to 
be explicitly and directly committed to social justice, but for now it is enough to simply point 
out that we are not, as Hayek and Friedman seem to suggest, socialists if we are not free-
market capitalists.  
Hayek’s defence of the bottom-line approach to business leads him, like Friedman, to 
argue for market deregulation. Hayek explains that collective command over available 
resources by a central authority is detrimental to the market because it inhibits innovation. 
The stricter the regulations in a market, the less people will be willing to take risks. Hence, 
for Hayek, deregulation increases competition as more people are willing to enter the market 
if it is free from burdensome ‘red-tape’. Increased competition, as explained above, leads to 
both an increase in quality and a decrease in prices, thereby making it collectively beneficial. 
Therefore Hayek, like Smith and Friedman, argues that it is better for society as a whole if 
markets are deregulated and government involvement in the market is restricted to the 
settling of disputes and the enforcing of contracts.  
                                                            
74 The Road to Serfdom is another of Hayek’s works that deals with the social and economic threats posed by 
socialism. 
75 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.425.  
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However, as I shall discuss in the following chapter, deregulation in practice appears 
to work quite differently. By allowing the drive to make profit to run free, as it were by 
indulging greed, deregulation enables business to transfer some of their greatest costs to 
society. Lack of environmental regulation, for example, places no onus on businesses to 
protect the natural environment in which their operations occur and where their raw materials 
are sourced from. The consequences of environmental degradation is a cost that society, and 
not business, has to incur. In a bottom-line deregulated world a business’s obligation is to 
itself - to its own bottom line - and so the more costs that can be transferred the better. 
Businesses have a pressing motivation to write off as many ‘externalities’ as possible in this 
way. Friedman defines an externality as, “The effect of a transaction between two individuals 
on a third party who has not consented to, or played any role in, the carrying out of that 
transaction.”76 It must be noted that the term ‘externalities’ does not only refer to negative 
outcomes. There are also positive externalities created by business such as life-saving 
pharmaceuticals. However it would be rash to suggest that negative externalities are in some 
way set-off, or balanced, by positive ones. Just as businesses define themselves through their 
positive impacts (or at least through the profits generated by these) so their negative impacts 
are a part of their core, and are certainly not ‘external’. Deregulation however enables 
externalities to be written off because there are fewer (or no) regulations to either prevent 
harms or to hold businesses accountable for their harmful actions. So, as a consequence of 
deregulation and the opportunities it creates to simply write off ‘unfortunate’ outcomes, 
“corporate profits are [often] overstated and shareholders receive inflated returns.”77 Solomon 
and Martin argue that deregulation does not bring the attendant benefits that it is professed to. 
They write:  
 
The orthodoxy of deregulation that characterised the 1980s and 1990s was supposed to bring with it 
intense competition. Instead consumers have seen less competition, higher prices, and deteriorating 
service in industry after industry78  
 
 
They provide evidence from the following industries (in the United States) to give truth to 
this claim: airlines, banks, savings and loans services, the bus industry, cable television, 
railroads, telecommunications and trucking.79   
                                                            
76 Friedman, M., as quoted in an interview for The Corporation (Documentary film) written by Bakan, J. 
77 Fisher, C. and Lovell, A., Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives, 
p.506.  
78 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.424.  
79 Ibid, p.424-425.  
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Hence the lack of controlling legislation allows a business to be more aggressive in its 
bottom-line pursuits. With the removal of the threat of punishment for the violation of 
restrictions imposed by regulation businesses have even less of an incentive to care for 
anything other than making money. Moral concerns which are typically safeguarded by 
regulation go out the window – unless they are beneficial to the bottom line, but that is to 
understand the ethical in the wrong register – and businesses are free to pursue their bottom-
line ends without any other ‘niggling’ concerns. This climate does indeed appear to be very 
beneficial to the bottom line, which makes sense because many of the most important costs 
have been disregarded, or externalised. However, in the next chapter I shall argue that 
deregulation cannot only be harmful to people and the environment, it can even be bad for 
business. The short-term approach to profit-making that deregulation encourages – by 
defining success in financial terms – can make businesses unsustainable in the long run. 
Indeed Friedman’s (and by extension Hayek’s) model does not necessarily preclude a long-
term approach to profit-making, as previously mentioned. But the problem is that the system 
is so designed as to put enormous pressure on quarterly financial performance. This means 
that a long-term approach is often sacrificed for the sake of the job of the CEO who has to 
answer for a poor quarterly bottom line. I shall emphasise this systemic problem with 
reference to the deregulation of electricity in California and financial deregulation in Iceland, 
in order to reveal the economic failure of the bottom-line approach to business. Before 
turning to the empirical evidence on the failures of this approach to business there is another 
argument that is separate, but related to, the argument from enlightened self-interest that is 
important to consider. This argument also concludes that the bottom line should be the final 
business value; it is the argument from freedom, and it is made by, among others, Friedman 
and Nozick.  
 
II. The Argument from Freedom: 
A. Milton Friedman: 
Friedman’s argument against deregulation is not only premised on enlightened self-interest, 
he also suggests that government interference in the market is “an infringement of our 
fundamental right to economic freedom.”80 Solomon and Martin write that for Friedman, 
“Freedom is not only the basis of the market itself, it is also the most valuable result of the 
market system: the freedom of each individual to choose.”81 The market must be free from 
                                                            
80 Ibid, p.421.  
81 Ibid, p.421.  
27 
 
coercion, not only to ensure that allocative efficiency is maximised, but also to ensure that 
liberty, as a democratic principle, is protected. Regulation by a controlling state is, for 
Friedman, unacceptable. The consequences of regulation are for him more unsavoury than 
those of deregulation. In Free to Choose: A Personal Statement Friedman (in partnership 
with his wife Rose Friedman) sums up his opinions by quoting U.S. Justice Louis Brandeis: 
“The great dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.”82 According to Friedman if the economy is controlled, 
then so are citizens in general.  
The free market is hence not only about protecting the liberty of business owners to 
pursue their financial interests, it is also about protecting the liberty of all individuals. 
Friedman suggests that consumers in a free economy are enabled to “vote with their 
dollars.”83 If people are unhappy about the operations of a certain business then they can 
meaningfully affect that business’s bottom line by refusing to support the business, thus 
‘voting with their dollars’. However, Friedman argues, in a regulated economy such exertions 
of liberty are hindered because government interference in the market creates artificial 
conditions, which amounts to the government telling consumers what they want. Hence, if we 
truly value liberty we cannot but support the free market.  
Friedman argues that when we demand certain things from business - say that they 
contribute a percentage of their profits to small business enterprise development - then we are 
demanding that business owners spend a portion of their earnings in a certain way.84 Such 
moves essentially entail forcing people to be charitable with their earnings. This is because 
any deduction from the bottom line is a deduction from the dividend paid to owners or, in the 
case of a corporation, to shareholders. Friedman argues that charity is a personal choice and 
cannot be forced, and so it ought to be done in a personal capacity. If it is not then it is an 
encroachment on our personal liberty.85 
However, Friedman’s argument goes even further than this. He argues that even if 
stockholders collectively decide that a portion of the profits ought to go to some form of 
social development this is still inappropriate as the cut in profits will have trickle down 
effects on employees, who will be paid less, and on customers, who will be charged more. 
                                                            
82 Brandeis, L., [in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.479 (1928)] as quoted in Friedman, M. and Friedman, R., 
Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, p.1. 
83 Friedman, M., as quoted in Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to 
Business Ethics, p.423. 
84 Friedman, M., ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, New York Times, 13 
September 1970.  
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The less money a business makes, the less they will pay their employees and the more 
expensive their products will have to be to defray the additional costs. The only way that such 
projects could be justified are in the manner discussed above with reference to Friedman’s 
first argument, that is, if they will serve an instrumental purpose to the bottom line. Friedman 
states that endowing business with responsibilities beyond profit-making is equivalent to 
‘taxation without representation’ as employees and customers, although ‘taxed’, in the sense 
that they are deprived from a portion of their earnings (either by being paid less or having to 
pay more) do not have a say in how this money is to be spent.86 Unlike taxes paid to the 
government, Friedman continues, this kind of ‘taxation’ is all the more inappropriate as the 
businessperson has now to:  
 
decide whom to tax, by how much, and for what purpose, and he is to spend the proceeds – all this 
guided only by general exhortations from on high to restrain inflation, improve the environment, fight 
poverty and so on and on87 
 
 
Therefore, Friedman concludes, suggesting that business has a social responsibility beyond 
increasing profits is not in keeping with our common sense notions of liberty. So not only is it 
good for society if a business makes money in terms of the beneficial trickle-down effects 
(such as, decreased prices, increased employment, greater efficiency and a reduction in 
poverty) but it is in fact a fundamental violation of freedom if we demand that a business 
ought to be directly concerned with social justice issues.  
 
B. Robert Nozick: 
Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia defends the political analogue to neoliberal economics 
and is primarily concerned with the legitimate functions and justifications of government. He 
argues that only minimal state regulation is justifiable. This minimal state is responsible for 
the protection of its citizens, against, for example, theft, force and fraud. Basically it only 
exists in order to ensure that contracts (legal as well as basic social ones) are respected and 
enforced. Nozick argues that any state that is involved in more than these most basic 
functions is unjustifiable because it would constitute a violation of the freedom of individuals 
and society. In this vein he argues that we cannot either force or coerce people to help others 
nor can we prohibit people from certain actions for their own good. Although this may appear 
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to be “apparently callous towards the needs and sufferings of others,”88 Nozick argues that 
we simply cannot justify a more extensive state on the grounds that anything else is a 
violation of our basic and most primary right to freedom. Nozick hence suggests that we are 
inhibited by moral side constraints from making redistribution, or indeed any form of charity, 
compulsory. This is because according to Nozick, we are separate individuals with separate 
lives and so we cannot be compelled to sacrifice for the sake of others. Nozick is hence 
opposed to the utilitarian ethic which claims that some sacrifices could be justified on the 
grounds of the greater good.89 Instead, he argues, we should protect freedom and thus allow 
people to make the personal choice of whether or not they wish to make sacrifices on 
another’s behalf. Nozick does not deny that we are partially social products, but he argues 
that this “does not create in us a general floating debt which the current society can collect 
and use as it will.”90 He continues: “we are not in the position of children who have been 
given portions of pie by someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless 
cutting.”91 For Nozick then the greater good – or what is just – consists in the protection of 
liberty.  
Hence, Nozick argues, forcing people to pay taxes which are redistributive in nature 
interferes with our individual actions and choices. It compromises our freedom, which he 
takes to be the supreme value that cannot be trumped.92 Some minimal taxes, for example for 
public infrastructure, are justifiable according to Nozick. But taxes that are imposed for 
welfare purposes are wholly unjustifiable. Nozick thinks that just holdings of capital results 
in a just society. His ‘entitlement theory of justice’ expounds the conditions of a just holdings 
of capital. Roughly:  
 
the general outlines of the theory of justice in holdings [the entitlement theory of justice] are that the 
holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and 
transfer, or by the principle of the rectification of injustice93  
 
 
For Nozick ‘just acquisition’ is about being entitled to retain the whole of what you have 
earned, or inherited. If each individual person’s holdings are justly acquired then the total set 
of holdings, or the overall distribution of wealth, is also just. Income tax intended for welfare 
                                                            
88 Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, p.ix.  
89 Ibid, p.33. 
90 Ibid, p.95. 
91 Ibid, p.149. 
92 Ibid, p.166. 
93 Ibid, p.153. As far as ‘the principle of the rectification of injustice’ goes Nozick suggests that this should be 
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purposes is therefore not in keeping with the entitlement theory of justice because taxing a 
person’s income is equivalent to an unjust distribution of holdings. It is, Nozick argues, “on a 
par with forced labour”94 because it is like forcing a person to work n hours for another’s 
purpose.  
Like Hayek, Nozick argues that inequalities among people are necessary as they 
“serve to raise the position of the worst-off group in society”95 by providing the incentives to 
do better. In a world of open and free competition where everyone is entitled to their own 
income everybody receives only their marginal contribution. According to Nozick this is 
what is most fair. Welfare and/or socialist states are for Nozick inappropriate because they 
allow people to live off state benefits and so there is no incentive for them to work. Market 
innovation and creativity is stunted in a system that does not have economic freedom.  
The issues become more problematic when we consider that many wealthy people are 
wealthy simply because their parents were, i.e. they inherited their holdings. However, 
Nozick argues, it is still unfair to suggest that these people then have a responsibility to 
poverty alleviation because “no one has a right to something whose realisation requires 
certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights and entitlements over.”96 
Essentially if we are born into a poor family then this is nobody’s fault, and hence nobody’s 
responsibility to rectify. Likewise, if we are born into a rich family, we cannot be unfairly 
discriminated against by being taxed on our inheritance. This is not to say that such 
discrepancies are not unfortunate, it is simply to say that to truly live in a just society is not to 
compensate those less endowed by taxing those who are more fortunate. It is up to each 
individual to improve their own lot. For Nozick this is part of the very definition of what it is 
to be a dignified person in a free, libertarian, society.  
Nozick continues by arguing that if some redistribution is made acceptable then it 
becomes very difficult to draw the line as to where to stop. If it is acceptable to aid the poor 
then why is it not also acceptable to redistribute other talents and attributes as well. Is it fair, 
Nozick asks, that he should have to pay for plastic surgery for the man that his wife turned 
down in order to balance the scales of attractiveness and desirability? For Nozick the fact that 
we are immediately compelled to answer in the negative suggests that it cannot be assumed 
that equality should form a part of any theory of justice. That is, we cannot be compelled to 
level the playing field just because some people are in a better position than others. Instead, 
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Nozick argues, justice necessarily entails inequality because firstly we cannot control the 
socioeconomic situation that we are born into and secondly we are entitled to that which we 
acquire through our own effort. As some people are born rich and others poor, and as some 
work harder than others or have a better financial acumen, there are bound to be inequalities 
in society. A just society is hence not an equal one, it is one in which we do not take what 
people have a legitimate entitlement over in order to give it to somebody else. Friedman 
agrees. He argues that “equality is impossible to achieve, given the obvious differences in 
skills and talents.”97  
Nozick’s conception of justice implies that we are free to pursue our own ends, as 
long as those ends are within reasonable bounds. So stealing and killing, for example, would 
not be acceptable. The economic implication of this stance is that regulation and government 
interference in the market would constitute a violation of the freedom of individuals to 
accumulate wealth. Such regulations are therefore inappropriate. In other words, a business 
cannot legitimately – in a truly free society – be compelled to conform to government 
measures that have a redistributive purpose, for example, minimum wage laws. According to 
Nozick this would entail an arbitrary display of preference because in a free and just society 
the interests and purposes of one party cannot be sacrificed to those of another. So although 
Nozick does not spend too much time talking about business in Anarchy, State and Utopia, 
there are definite implications of his theory of justice for business.  
However, protecting the freedom to pursue one’s own ends in a market context 
creates the potential for businesses to seriously violate the freedom of other individuals. So 
although Nozick asserts that we should pursue our freedom within reasonable bounds, there 
would – in the kind of free society that he describes – be very few structures to protect those 
bounds. Many businesses thus acquire wealth in a manner that is not in keeping with the 
principle of justice in acquisition and transfer, some examples of which I will describe in the 
next chapter. In other words, they lay claim to that which others have a legitimate entitlement 
over.98 By Nozick’s own logic this economic setup would hence be unjust. So some control 
of freedom, by regulation, might in fact be a good thing. 
Friedman argues that: 
 
A society that puts equality - in the sense of equality of outcome – ahead of freedom will end up with 
neither equality or freedom. The use of force [regulation], introduced for good purposes, will end up in 
                                                            
97 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C. Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.422.  
98 For example, the environment or the fair price for one’s labour. 
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the hands of people who use it to promote their own interests … On the other hand a society that puts 
freedom first will, as a happy by-product, end up with both greater freedom and greater equality99 
 
 
 
Thus Friedman relates the argument from freedom with the argument from enlightened self-
interest. If the market is free, and consumers can participate freely in it, then the pursuit of 
personal ends will uplift society (by the invisible hand) and simultaneously ensure greater 
personal freedom. These freedoms must be considered both in terms of the freedom to pursue 
one’s own self-interest and in terms of the freedom of consumers to ‘vote with their dollars,’ 
either by purchasing or not purchasing a certain product or service. Consumer sovereignty is 
paramount to the workings of the market mechanism and business sovereignty (deregulation) 
is vital to creating the climate of competition which ensures consumer sovereignty.  
One response to this argument – which I shall return to in Chapter Three – is made by 
John Kenneth Galbraith who argues that the classical conception of the workings of the 
market mechanisms in the free market system is simply wrong.100 He argues that the picture 
of independent entrepreneurs competing for business with one another has been replaced by 
“the monolithic corporation,”101 whose presence in the market is far too powerful to ensure 
consumer sovereignty. Instead of supply following the genuine demands of an independent 
public, mass market advertising actually creates consumer desire, telling people what they 
need. Hence the apparent freedom that the free-market is intended to ensure is almost entirely 
absent: consumers are not sovereign, business is. Indeed both Friedman and Nozick’s 
positions on freedom are brought into doubt given the power that such systems create. Like 
Smith does in his first conditional, Friedman acknowledges that an asymmetrical balance of 
power in favour of large businesses might result from the free market system. Solomon and 
Martin write that Friedman’s economic model “assumes that no force in the marketplace 
[should have] an undue amount of power, especially economic power, over any other 
group.”102 However, protection against this inescapable eventuality for both Smith and 
Friedman amounts to nothing more than simply stating that no business should be allowed to 
get too powerful. This is wholly insufficient: regulation is needed to ensure that this does not 
happen, but stating this would be in stark contradiction to their basic free-market 
assumptions. The systemic problem here is blatant and inexorable: whilst Friedman and 
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Nozick have been very careful to ensure that the power of bureaucracy is safe-guarded 
against, this has simply given rise to a new power they that is far more dangerous to liberty. 
While it is certainly not the case that all government presence serves the public good, it is 
certainly more suited to do so than the profit-motivated corporation.  
The argument from freedom – particularly when coupled with the argument from 
enlightened self-interest, which, as we saw, treats social justice as merely instrumental – 
appears to lead to the protection of the liberty of business owners and shareholders only, 
despite Friedman’s claims to the contrary. Entitling business owners to pursue their own 
interests in a deregulated climate often conflicts with the interests of other groups. Businesses 
can easily write off their negative externalities in a free market, forcing others to pay the true 
price of their operations. The treatment of all values other than profit as instrumental means 
that businesses are foremost loyal unto themselves. If this means paying employees below a 
living wage and forcing them to work long hours for little or no overtime then so be it. If this 
means ravaging natural habitats then so be it. The neoliberal claims that such practices are 
necessary stepping stones to greater socio-economic freedom, but in reality they appear to be 
stepping stones to less socio-economic freedom, as I aim to demonstrate in the next chapter. 
If we are genuinely concerned with social justice and the public good, which economics 
fundamentally is, then we need to find a way of balancing the freedom of all members of 
society.103 Friedman and his acolytes are similarly too optimistic about the workings of the 
invisible hand. Advancing a limited conception of freedom and treating as instrumental those 
values which we hold to be non-instrumental creates a system rife with injustice. This is 
because, as I have argued, the neoliberal holds a highly impoverished conception of value. 
What drives business in their view is profit, but this cannot be right because profit is clearly 
an instrumental value and so it becomes parasitical on ultimate values. As Friedman, Hayek 
and Nozick are concerned with what is just in the first place, we need to examine whether or 
not the methods of acquisition in a free-market are indeed just.104  
In conclusion, we have good reasons to re-examine the fundamental assertion that the 
best way in which a business can be socially responsible is by focusing on profits in a free 
market. The two arguments discussed in this chapter – the argument from enlightened self-
interest and the argument from freedom – attempt to provide rational grounds for the primacy 
of profit-making in business. However in the first case the argument from enlightened self-
interest inverts our basic assumptions regarding ultimate value. Those things which we hold 
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to be ultimately valuable are positioned by Friedman, Hayek, Nozick and even Smith to a 
certain extent, to be only instrumentally valuable, whilst that which we hold to be 
instrumental (money) becomes ultimately valuable. A further conceptual problem with the 
argument from enlightened self-interest, and to a lesser extent the argument from freedom, is 
that they make the assumption that we are primarily motivated by material greed, which 
portrays a very narrow understanding of human concern, and even of the concerns of 
entrepreneurs. The freedom to act in a certain self-interested way (which for Friedman and 
Nozick boils down to not much more than the desire for personal wealth acquisition) is not 
always in keeping with the freedom of other individuals. This is most obvious if we consider 
someone’s desire to kill another person, which Friedman and Nozick would certainly not 
condone. However if we are prepared to restrict the liberty of people in this sense, allegedly 
in order to protect the public good, then it does not seem to be obvious that we cannot restrict 
it in other senses for the same reason. These conceptual issues described in this chapter result 
in major systemic problems for the neoliberal tradition.    
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE INVISIBILITY OF THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE SOCIAL, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC FAILURE OF THE BOTTOM-LINE 
APPROACH TO BUSINESS 
 
There are not too many sweatshops but there are too few105 
 
If one finger brings oil it soils the others106 
 
It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it107 
 
In this chapter I aim to briefly show the real-world implications of the contradictions and 
conceptual errors embedded in bottom-line logic. In the previous chapter I argued that a 
genuine commitment to the idea that businesses are socially responsible when they maximise 
profits leads one to treat as instrumental that which we hold to be ultimately valuable, namely 
moral concerns, and in particular, social justice. If making money is the social responsibility 
of business then other legitimate concerns are too easily ignored, ironically in the name of 
social justice. In this chapter I aim to show that focusing on one’s own (materialistic) 
concerns will not impart broad social benefits in the best possible way. Neoliberals are too 
optimistic – far more so than Adam Smith – about the workings of the invisible hand. 
Similarly, the argument from freedom also fails to deliver on what it promises: greater 
freedom across the board. If the end of business truly is social justice then we have legitimate 
cause to question the assertion that the aim of business is to maximise profits.  
The cases discussed in this chapter are intended to point to trends that result from a 
commitment to bottom-line logic and are thus meant to be seen as indicators of larger 
systemic problems. For example, the indirect effects of the invisible hand are not necessarily 
positive ones. In fact, as argued in the previous chapter, a deregulated climate allows for 
negative externalities to be all too easily written off. Furthermore, placing the freedom of the 
market first does not mean that a society will necessarily “as a happy by-product end up with 
both greater freedom and greater equality,”108 as Milton Friedman argues. In fact, freeing the 
market from regulation ensures that there is little in the way of a moral tether on the actions 
that a business can perform. Hence the freedoms of those other than shareholders and capital 
                                                            
105 Sachs, J., as quoted in Arnold, D. and Hartman, L., ‘Beyond Sweatshops: Positive deviancy and global 
labour practices’ (online).  
106 Nigerian proverb (online).  
107 Sinclair, U., as quoted in Wade, R., ‘The Crisis: Iceland as Icarus’ Challenge, vol.52, no.3, May-June 2009, 
p.6.  
108 Friedman, M. and Friedman, R., Free to Choose, p.29.  
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or business owners are often violated, not enhanced. Inequality has, in many instances, 
increased. So, given that the point of both classical and neoclassical economics is to ensure 
the most just distribution of goods throughout society, there is serious cause to question 
whether these models are in fact the best route to such a goal. I shall argue that the bottom-
line approach to business, as it is embedded in the neoliberal economic model, is not the best 
way in which a business can contribute to social justice. There are at least three levels at 
which this approach has failed: socially, environmentally and even economically.  
The bottom line approach to business has, as these cases aim to show, led to 
businesses behaving, in essence, amorally and so at times, immorally. If a particular business 
is only concerned with moral issues insofar as they will serve to increase profits, then we 
could say that this business is amoral. Moral concerns are not thought to be a part of a 
business’s basic and primary functioning and so being moral is not something that is an 
explicit concern in the bottom-line business, unless these concerns will be instrumental to 
profits. This understanding of morality can, in turn, lead a business to violate accepted moral 
standards, making it immoral. Given the crucial position that business holds in modern 
society it is unacceptable for businesses to adopt a bottom-line stance because either they can 
justifiably be immoral or, if there are instrumental reasons to be moral, such an approach to 
morality does not express genuine ethical behaviour.109 In other words, moral actions of this 
sort are in the wrong register. The greater problem is that bottom-line theory is so designed as 
to make amorality not only acceptable, but even mandatory. If the social responsibility of 
business is to maximise its profits then social justice will never be properly valued and so 
moral concerns will always remain, at best, on the periphery. The issue is not only that 
bottom-line thinking can potentially lead to immorality, it is that it often does and unless we 
fundamentally redesign business and our economic assumptions, then practices, such as 
detailed in this chapter, can and will continue to occur.  
 
I. Social Failures: 
A. Violation: Sweatshop Labour 
The first failure of the bottom-line approach to business that I shall discuss is social. This 
means that there have been negative effects on people and communities as a direct result of 
                                                            
109 This statement is not intended to imply that morality is somehow connected to size and scope. As far as any 
action – whether it is performed by an individual or a global corporation - impacts on others it has ethical 
import. Immorality is unacceptable wherever it occurs. Business does hold a critical social position and so it is 
largely true that it has a greater scope to affect others than individual actors. It is indeed odd that we do not 
accept immorality at the individual level but are prepared to accept it at an institutional level.      
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business operations that are purely bottom-line motivated. The first case discusses the use of 
sweatshop labour as an example of such harm. It shows that the bottom-line approach to 
business can serve to justify the use of exploitative labour methods, and thus immorality. In 
fact, this kind of harm is not even particularly problematic for a bottom-liner. Firstly they 
argue that sweatshops are in fact justifiable. For example, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, by Friedman’s logic:  
 
Even sweatshops that pay below minimum wage are useful … because they give the otherwise 
unemployable and untrained worker a chance to climb onto the bottom rung of the economic ladder, 
learn a skill, and so go on to a better-paying job110 
 
 
However, I shall argue that firstly sweatshop labour does not necessarily result in the 
proposed social benefits. Secondly, I shall discredit this view by arguing that the idea of 
treating people inhumanely for the sake of profits, or even for the sake of social justice is, on 
its own, deeply problematic.  
Bottom-liners could alternatively argue that sweatshop labour is not necessarily a 
product of their thought. For example, they might argue that given how unpopular 
sweatshops have become, a company is at risk of antagonising their consumers if they 
employ such labour methods, and so there is a bottom-line reason not to use sweatshops. I 
shall respond to this position by arguing that such a theorisation continues to treat the moral 
as instrumental in such a way that doing the good is severed from actually being good, which 
is, for reasons I shall describe below, unacceptable. I shall conclude by arguing that however 
bottom-liners attempt to overcome the problem of sweatshop labour, they fail. 
Consider the following logical formulation of the bottom-line argument for sweatshop 
labour: 
  
P1  The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits 
P2 Increasing profits involves minimising costs 
 P3 Labour is a cost 
 C1 Therefore it is socially responsible to employ the most efficient form of labour  
  
P4  Sweatshop labour is extremely efficient 
 C2  Therefore sweatshop labour is socially responsible  
 
As unacceptable as this final conclusion might initially seem many bottom-line neoliberals 
openly defend C2. Their argument is that sweatshops are a good thing because the low labour 
                                                            
110 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business Ethics, p.423. 
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costs invite international investment, which creates jobs and thus uplifts the local community 
as a whole. For example, in his article, “In Principle, a Case for More Sweatshops”, Allen 
Myerson argues that sweatshop jobs “are precisely the jobs that were the stepping stones [to 
socio-economic prosperity] for Singapore and Hong Kong.”111 Hence, he concludes, such 
jobs ought not to be seen in a negative light. Indeed the areas where sweatshops exist are 
typically areas of extreme desperation and poverty and so as soon as a factory opens up it is 
hence perceived by the local people as a ‘god-send’ because it promises employment, no 
matter how harsh the conditions.  
   The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have also played a part 
in contributing to the creation and spread of sweatshop labour in the poorest areas of the 
world. The IMF, for example, attaches conditions to its loans and assistance by prescribing 
what is calls ‘structural adjustment programmes’ or ‘SAPs’.112 These programmes ensure that 
a country’s policies are in sync with neoliberal economic principles and they typically 
include three main prescriptions: privatisation, government deregulation and cuts to social 
spending.113 The argument is essentially that a reduction in red-tape will act as a lure for 
international investment in the local economy, which will create jobs and bolster economic 
growth. Thus the IMF attempts to ensure that the loan given will actually be paid back. Yet, 
the lack of restrictive labour laws ensures that there are no legal repercussions for long 
worker hours, excessive overtime, unsafe work conditions and so on. Companies are thus 
able to save money in the bottom line by operating in such climates: they can exploit their 
labour force and get away with it. So, even though the manufactured products will have to be 
shipped to the market areas – mainly in the United States and Europe – what is paid for in 
transport costs is more than made up for in savings on labour costs.  
However, as beneficial as these labour arrangements have been to increasing profits 
there are strong reasons to doubt that the companies involved have been socially responsible. 
For example, recent news reports from China reveal that workers in the factories of the 
supplier company Foxconn, which manufactures goods for, among others, Apple, Sony and 
Nintendo, have been forced to sign pledges that they will not attempt to commit suicide.114 A 
                                                            
111 Myerson, A. R., ‘In Principle, a Case for More Sweatshops’, New York Times, 22 June 1997, p.4-5. 
112 See for example ‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’ by the World Health Organisation (online) or Shah, 
A., ‘Structural Adjustment – a Major Cause of Poverty’ (online). For the IMF’s response to criticism regarding 
SAPs see ‘The IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF): Is It Working?’ by the IMF (online).   
113 ‘The IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF): Is It Working?’ by the IMF (online).  
114 ‘You are not allowed to commit suicide: Workers in Chinese iPad factories forced to sign pledges’, The 
Daily Mail, 1 May 2011 (Staff reporter). Most sweatshops are not actually owned by the corporations that 
manufacture their products there, rather most multinational corporations outsource to locally owned factories, 
like Foxconn. However this disjuncture in no way exonerates the multinationals from responsibility. The 
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number of suicides on Foxconn premises in 2010 resulted in the company having to pay large 
compensation packages to the families of the deceased.115 So, in 2011, in order to avoid 
further such financial losses, workers were forced to sign anti-suicide pledges, which entailed 
their families only being able to receive minimal compensation if they did kill themselves. 
The excessively demoralising work conditions in these factories are almost entirely to blame 
for the suicides. During peak demand periods for Apple’s iPad, for example, workers only 
received one day off in every 13 days.116 They are banned from talking on the factory floor 
because, as Foxconn spokesman Louis Woo comments, “conversations may distract [the 
workers] from the attention needed to ensure accuracy and their own safety.”117 They live in 
communal dormitories attached to the factories with as many as 24 people in a room and 
“some only go home to see their families once a year.”118 “Despite a legal [overtime] limit of 
36 hours per month,”119 60 to 80 hours of overtime a week is normal at Foxconn factories and 
“one payslip showed a worker did 98 hours of overtime in one month.”120 Leontien 
Aamoudse who works for the NGO that researched this information comments that, 
“Conditions are harsh and [the workers] don’t have a social life. Their life is just working in a 
factory and that is it.”121 Apple however has benefited hugely from this exploitation: its net 
profit in the first quarter of 2011 was approximately US$6 billion.122  
 Naomi Klein spent time researching factories in the Cavite area of the Philippines, 
particularly in what are called the ‘Economic Processing Zones’, basically fenced in areas 
that contain a high density of sweatshops. In her book No Logo she reveals that seamstresses 
sewing garments for Gap, Guess and Old Navy told her that the bathrooms are kept locked 
except for two fifteen minute periods each day.123 This is to ensure that worker productivity is 
not lost to toilet breaks. As a result these women “sometimes have to resort to urinating in 
plastic bags under their machines.”124 There are a myriad of other such stories. A simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
conditions are widely known and so the corporations are certainly complicit in the harms committed. The 
deregulated climate allows them to ignore many abuses, as they are not actually illegal.   
115 Most of the suicide cases involved people leaping from the high-rise windows of the factory, and so Foxconn 
also installed safety nets around the perimeters of their buildings to prevent further such deaths.  
116 ‘You are not allowed to commit suicide: Workers in Chinese iPad factories forced to sign pledges’, The 
Daily Mail, 1 May 2011 (Staff reporter). 
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40 
 
‘Google’ search of ‘Instances of sweatshop harm’, for example, generates nearly 12 million 
responses.125  
 By Friedrich Hayek’s and Friedman’s logic, as long as sweatshop labour is increasing 
profits, it is socially responsible, but this conclusion is simply unacceptable. Firstly it is not 
true that sweatshops are necessarily ‘stepping stones’ to greater socio-economic prosperity, 
and secondly, as above, the utilitarian idea of treating people inhumanely for the sake of 
profits, economic growth, or even social justice, is on its own deeply problematic. With 
regard to the first claim, although it might be true that Singapore and Hong Kong secured 
economic growth from sweatshop labour, as Myerson argues above, there are other countries 
that have not. Klein, for example, writes that: 
 
The no-pain-no-gain defence of sweatshops … took a severe beating when the currencies of those very 
countries supposedly benefiting most from this development model began crashing like cheap plates. 
First in Mexico, then Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, workers were, and in many 
cases still are, bringing home minimum wage paychecks worth less than when the ‘economic miracle’ 
first came to bless their nations years ago126 
 
 
It is simply unclear that “development built on starvation wages”127 will lead to greater 
overall social prosperity. In the case of sweatshop labour, Klein argues that governments “put 
their own people on the auction block, falling over each other to offer up the lowest minimum 
wage, allowing workers to be paid less than the real cost of living.”128 Increasing profits by 
employing the most efficient form of labour possible is thus not always an instrument to 
economic growth and therewith social development. Empirical evidence, in this case, can 
serve to refute the existence of the invisible hand because increasing profits is not necessarily 
socially responsible. In fact, in at least some cases, focusing exclusively on increasing profits 
has proved to be socially irresponsible.    
 With regard to the second claim above, sweatshop labour restricts the freedom and 
dignity of persons in a manner that is not in keeping with our basic moral assumptions. Even 
if bottom-liners are attempting to make a utilitarian-style argument in support of sweatshop 
labour, i.e. that some harms might be necessary for the greater good, it is still legitimate to 
question a practice that sacrifices ultimate values. Would we, in other words, really be 
contributing to greater overall social flourishing if getting there means having to forfeit the 
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freedom and dignity of a great number of people? Even a hardcore utilitarian would be 
pressed to accept that this would actually be for the greater good. From an Aristotelian point 
of view this society would not even be one worth living in, as a society which attempts to 
justify such atrocities is morally devoid.129 However bottom-liners attempt to justify 
sweatshop labour conditions, the point is that such harms are simply unjustifiable.  
 As we saw in the previous chapter the problem with bottom-line thinking is that the 
instrumental treatment of ultimate values is inescapable. By bottom-line logic (and 
Friedman’s own admission) social values are only worth considering if doing so will increase 
the bottom line. By extension this implies that they will often be trumped by profit-making – 
if there is a good bottom-line reason to trump them. It is this inevitable conclusion that makes 
sweatshop labour seemingly justifiable. The argument that increasing profits will result in 
social prosperity is, in a word, naïve because of course there will be cases of genuine conflict, 
that is, where bottom-line aims clearly do not accord with social aims. In the case of 
sweatshop labour it is simply not clear that the invisible hand is always working for anything 
other than the bottom lines of hugely powerful multinational corporations. Hence, we ought 
rightly to question a practice that sacrifices ultimate values on the altar of neoliberalism, as 
we cannot ever coherently condone a system that treats people as instruments for bottom line 
ends.  
 Bottom-liners could attempt to argue against sweatshop labour by claiming that such 
methods will turn out to be unprofitable in the long run. For example, as more and more 
people object to the conditions businesses might start to lose consumer support and so 
sweatshop labour will not be a good bottom-line practice. The market will ‘correct itself,’ so 
to speak, and more equitable labour policies will become the norm. However this is still 
problematic as the reason for being moral remains instrumental.130 In this way doing the good 
is severed from actually being good. Businesses informed by bottom-line logic are not ethical 
even though at times they might act ethically. They are not ethical because ethics is for them 
nothing more than an instrument and hence is not valued as it should be. It is valued for the 
sake of profits and hence its value is merely contingent. This explains why the ethical 
behaviour of many corporations is so fickle. Rather, a minimum requirement for being 
genuinely ethical is an ethical consistency that is born of the right sort of commitments. 
These commitments must in the first instance be commitments to being ethical rather than in 
the first instance to profit. So corporations that adopt ethical policies for the sake of the 
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bottom line are not ethical as they express no deeper understanding of the ultimate nature of 
moral concerns. Further, if economics is ultimately supposed to serve social justice then this 
end ought not to be masked behind profits. In order for social justice to be genuinely served 
people ought to have an explicit understanding that this is the real end of business, but this 
cannot be achieved in a system that places ultimate value on profits. The real intentions are 
obscured in such a system. Intentions ought rather to be formed in a way that is consistent 
with a proper understanding of the role of business in society. In Chapter Four I shall provide 
a tentative framework for how this might be achieved in practice. Social justice is the 
ultimate end of economics and this ought not to be forgotten.  
 Robert Nozick’s concerns regarding freedom are also relevant in this case. For him a 
just holdings of capital would have to be in accord with the principles of justice in acquisition 
and transfer. Given that sweatshop labour restricts the freedom of individuals, in the most 
extreme cases, for example the freedom to go to the toilet, we can rightly conclude that this 
situation is unjust. The labourers do not receive adequate compensation for their efforts and 
so the corporations are unjustly retaining that which actually belongs to another person, i.e. 
their fair living wage. So by Nozick’s logic sweatshop labour is unjustifiable.  
We ultimately need to ask whether or not we are prepared to defend a system that 
treats human beings as instruments for the sake of profits and which often does not even 
deliver the indirect social benefits it professes to. If there is a way to actually achieve greater 
socio-economic justice – and this without violating the freedom and dignity of persons – then 
this method ought, from a moral point of view, to be preferred. In Chapter Four I shall argue 
that such a system is at least plausible.  
 
B. Domination: The Coffee Industry in Brazil 
This brief case study reveals that far from reducing inequality and ensuring social prosperity, 
a deregulated neoliberal climate can in fact increase inequality and reduce general living 
standards. Coffee production is the world’s second biggest industry next to oil131 and 
approximately “25 million people worldwide base their lives on its production.”132 The 
impact of the coffee trade on many people’s lives is therefore unquestionably profound. Kelly 
Watson and Moira Achinelli demonstrate that the overriding global themes that have 
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developed as a result of coffee production are the marginalisation of traditional peoples and 
small-scale farmers, as well as “overall rural decline and poverty.”133  
As with the case of sweatshop labour the primary cause behind the associated harms 
is the deregulation of industry to encourage foreign investment. This has resulted in less 
protection for small-scale producers and wage labourers but increased revenue for 
agricultural and processing corporations. For example, in Rosário da Limeria, a province of 
Brazil, many small-scale coffee farmers have been forced to sell their land as a result of 
looming bankruptcy because they are simply unable to compete with the power and financial 
clout of the large-scale coffee growing corporations. Most of these farmers have now gone to 
work on the bigger farms and now are only being paid minimum level wages, far less than 
they had previously earned as independent growers.134 The large-scale producers benefit 
because they are able to buy the land for a percentage of its true value. Smaller scale farmers 
are bullied out of the market because they cannot produce coffee as efficiently as the well-
resourced corporations can, and so they find themselves in desperate financial situations and 
end up having to sell their land to the corporations. Before deregulation in the early 1980’s 
there was a fairly equitable distribution of land ownership in Rosário da Limeria, but as of 
2010, 20% of the landowners now own roughly 60% of the land.135 The large coffee-growing 
corporations are enjoying ever-increasing monetary profits, however the average citizen in 
Rosário da Limeria is worse off financially. It is not correct then for Friedman and his 
acolytes to assume that economic growth in terms of increased national revenue and 
monetary profit translates into a general increase in living standards. As John Maynard 
Keynes concludes, “It is not a correct deduction … that enlightened self-interest always 
operates in the public interest.”136  
These two case studies on the social failure of business also give cause to question 
Friedman’s aforementioned assertion that inequalities appear to be less “the more highly 
capitalist the country is.”137 Friedman argues that greater equality is a “happy by-product”138 
of free-market capitalism, however the above cases show that, in fact, at times inequalities 
appear to increase as a result of deregulation. Given that for Friedman deregulation and free-
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market capitalism would be the ‘highest form of capitalism’, we might not be as willing to 
accept the above assertion as true, particularly when there is good evidence to suggest that 
inequalities might in fact be exacerbated by such extreme forms of free-market capitalism. 
This fact gives us cause to question whether or not deregulation is in fact the best route to the 
desired end of social justice and flourishing.   
We do not only have good cause to question Friedman’s assertions on equality, but 
also his belief (and to a certain extent Nozick’s belief, insofar as he argues for minimal 
government) that free-market capitalism ensures greater freedom. Rather, these two cases 
demonstrate, freedom is often severely limited in a deregulated situation. Certainly the 
freedom of business owners and stockholders to advance their financial interests is protected 
but the freedom of other parties (for example, in these cases employees and the community) 
appears to be restricted. Sweatshop labour, by its very definition, makes highly unreasonable 
demands on the liberty of persons. Freedom has necessarily to be understood in much broader 
terms than the limited conception defended within the neoliberal tradition. The idea that free-
market capitalism protects the fundamental right to freedom is indeed naïve, to say the least. 
Instead, if we are concerned with defending a broad conception of liberty then we need to 
broaden our parameters beyond the dogmatic consideration only of capital owners, but doing 
this means that we will have to regulate, and not deregulate, business operations.  
 
II. Environmental Failure:  
Degradation: Oil and Natural Gas Operations in the Niger Delta 
The cumulative effects of oil and natural gas operations conducted by Shell, Total, Agip, 
Exxon-Mobil and Chevron in the Niger Delta demonstrate just how environmentally 
devastating the mining of non-renewable energy resources can be. The Niger Delta covers an 
area of about 20 000kmଶ and as the largest wetland in Africa it contains one of the highest 
concentrations of biodiversity on the planet. It is home to some 20 million people that base 
their livelihoods on the abundant flora and fauna that the Delta sustains. However when oil 
was discovered in the Delta in the 1960’s the area quickly became a major source of revenue 
for the Nigerian economy. Since 1975 oil mined in the Delta alone has contributed to 79.5% 
of Nigeria’s export revenue, with approximately 2 million barrels of oil extracted per day.139 
The environmental consequences of this practice have been profound, causing devastation 
throughout the Delta. 
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Much of this degradation can be attributed to the lack of adequate legislation in terms 
of environmental standards, as well as insufficient enforcement of the minimal standards that 
do exist. In such a climate oil and natural gas companies are able to cut costs by practicing 
the lowest environmental standards possible in order to generate profit. For example, the 
method of natural gas flaring is used to burn off associated gas in the oil extraction process. It 
has been illegalised virtually across the globe due to it being extremely harmful to the planet, 
animals and people, yet the Nigerian government repeatedly fails to meet “its own deadlines 
for the cessation of flaring.”140 With oil companies based in Nigeria still flaring an average of 
70 million mଷ/day as of 2009,141 there is clear evidence of scant regard for the environmental 
consequences of this practice shown both by the oil companies themselves and the Nigerian 
government. Both stand to benefit financially from this as it is by far the cheapest method of 
burning off associated gases. However, natural gas flaring releases a plethora of harmful 
chemicals into the environment, including methane, carbon dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and 
sulphur dioxide, all major sources of climate change. In fact some reports suggest that natural 
gas flaring forms one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions on the planet.142 As 
well as the consequences of flaring on the planet as a whole, the soot produced coats the 
surrounding land, damaging vegetation and preventing further plant life and crops from 
growing. It also causes acid rain which destroys plants and corrodes homes. On the whole 
natural gas flaring damages entire ecosystems and has a negative impact on biodiversity. 
Natural gas flaring is not the Niger Delta’s only environmental concern however. Due 
to the lack of regulation the area has faced the consequences of massive and widespread oil 
spills.143 Again the main cause of these spills is a lack of regulation that mandates 
compulsory maintenance of pipes. Old pipes that are above ground corrode easily, spilling 
their contents into the delicately balanced ecosystems of the Delta. The oil companies 
however, blame most of the spills on sabotage: a result of local people either intending to 
steal oil so as to gain some financial benefit from the industry, or the more intentional form of 
sabotage whereby locals deliberately tamper with the pipes in order to spite the oil companies 
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that have destroyed their livelihoods.144 The Delta people are no longer able to support 
themselves and their families as not only do oil spills contaminate and destroy their crops 
(like natural gas flaring does), they also kill fish. Hence, like the plight of the micro-scale 
coffee farmers discussed above, the people from the Delta are actually worse off as a result of 
the growth of industry and revenue in their area. It is therefore understandable that many bear 
a grudge against the oil companies and hence are involved in subterfuges against them. The 
oil companies are seen as a massive threat to their livelihood and standard of living. So 
although it might be true that in at least some cases the oil companies themselves are not 
directly to blame for oil spills in the Niger Delta, it is certainly the case that they remain the 
root cause of the problem.  
The environmental consequences of oil extraction in the Niger Delta have been 
profound.145 The situation in Nigeria is also a particularly delicate one because while it is all 
too easy to point fingers at the oil corporations and blame everything on their bottom line 
considerations, the Nigerian government is in fact the major shareholder of all Nigerian-
based oil companies. For example, they own approximately 55% of Shell Nigeria, 60% of 
Agip in Nigeria, 60% of Exxon-Mobil Nigeria and also 60% of Chevron Nigeria.146 The 
financial concerns of the Nigerian government and their interest on economic returns are 
therefore paramount in understanding the level of environmental degradation in the Niger 
Delta. It explains, for example, why effective measures have not been taken to prevent further 
spills and why little has been done to address the impact of existing spills. It explains why 
dates for the cessation of natural gas flaring are constantly deferred and why there is sparse 
regulation of the oil and natural gas industries as a whole. In essence if the government were 
to operate an effective regulatory board they would essentially be curtailing their own profits, 
as they would be filling the duel roles of investor and regulator, whose interests are typically 
not in sync. This situation points to the problem of not having an independent regulatory 
authority.  
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The bottom-line argument for business reduces all concerns other than profit-making 
to an instrumental status. This is not a good thing for the environment because if there is no 
financial reason to adopt environmentally sustainable practices and if governments 
simultaneously do not enforce adequate environmental regulations, then the planet will 
continue to be destroyed. This is assuming of course that businesses will continue to be short-
sighted regarding their environmental practices. Indeed the bottom-line approach does not 
discount a more long-term view of profit-making which would involve environmental 
protection. However the problem is that as long as the environment continues to be viewed in 
only an instrumental way then destruction and devastation will inevitably recur, even if 
sometimes, in some places, there might be instrumental reasons to protect it.  
As above, in a deregulated economy there is no independent incentive to protect the 
environment, rather there is a bottom-line incentive to make others pay the true costs of 
production and manufacture. Insofar as a business can write off their environmental costs by 
exploiting the lack of regulation enforcing appropriate environmental standards then, by 
bottom-line logic, this business is socially responsible. Surely we are not prepared to be 
committed to such an assertion, but the problem is that, in a bottom-line world, there is 
ultimately no escaping such claims. The problem of externalities causes Friedman’s 
arguments to lose their hegemonic force. In an interview for Joel Bakan’s documentary film 
The Corporation Friedman openly admits that, “there are real problems in that area [i.e. with 
externalities] there’s no doubt about it.”147 It is thus extremely odd if we continue to follow an 
economic system that one of its major proponents finds to be problematic in itself.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the problems with the bottom-line argument are 
systemic, and so the harms witnessed in the Niger Delta are merely an indication of greater 
structural problems. Governmental regulation of business typically exists in order to ensure 
that our major moral concerns are not violated. So, in a deregulated climate, as we have seen 
so far, amorality is the norm and immorality is not unusual. There are no structural 
safeguards in place to ensure that businesses behave morally, and as exploitation tends to be 
profitable, businesses behave immorally. They can ‘legitimately’ externalise many, if not 
most, of their greatest costs. Yet the writing off of negative externalities is illegitimate: it 
does not result in a just holdings of capital, as others are paying the true price of business 
operations. It is thus incorrect to argue that the social responsibility of business is to increase 
its profits. Increasing profits is seldom socially, or indeed environmentally, responsible. 
                                                            
147 Friedman, M., as quoted in an interview for The Corporation (Documentary film) written by Bakan, J. 
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III. Economic Failures: 
A. The Free-market in Practice: the Deregulation of Electricity in California 
The final failure of the neoliberal system that I shall discuss is the economic failure. I shall 
argue, following John Kenneth Galbraith, that the invisible hand market mechanism, 
described by Smith, does not necessarily work in the manner theorised. Freeing up the market 
does not always bring with it either increased competition or the intended consumer benefits 
that such competition is professed to secure, i.e. at the very least, reduced prices and 
increased quality. I shall argue that this system does not guarantee national economic 
flourishing or broad social well-being. In the case of Iceland (discussed in the next section) a 
staunch commitment to neoliberal market principles caused the economy to almost entirely 
collapse, and indeed we are witnessing evermore such failures. For example, in Europe in the 
last 18 months alone Italy, Spain, Greece and Cyprus have all suffered similar fates. Indeed 
since 2008 almost the entire globe has been affected by economic recession. So, aside from 
the external harms that a commitment to neoliberal principles can inflict on ‘third parties’148 
(people and the planet), continuing to support a free-market model does not even appear to 
work on its own economic and financial turf.  
Successful bottom-line businesses and hence national economic growth – which is 
theorised to be the harbinger of social justice – is not assured in a free-market system. In 
other words, a free-market does not necessarily create the conditions that are ‘best’ required 
for companies to ‘best’ fulfil their social commitments by making money. Friedman’s and 
Hayek’s approaches to profit-making in business do permit a long-term, ‘sustainable’, 
attitude towards the bottom-line. However, the problem is that this long-term approach is, for 
various reasons (which I shall describe below), more often than not precluded by the 
conditions of a free-market. Hence, even if Friedman and Hayek are correct in their 
assumptions concerning the invisible hand and the extended order, (which, as I have so far 
argued, they are not) a deregulated, free-market, is not the ideal economic situation to ensure 
a long-term approach anyway. In fact, regulation is required to ensure that harms, such as 
described in the next two studies, do not recur.  
So, firstly, in the case of Enron, while a neoliberal might attempt to argue that Enron 
was badly run from a neoliberal point of view because they took wild, almost suicidal risks, 
the real question is how, in a free-market, a company is supposed to behave otherwise. 
Adopting a long-term approach in a free-market would in fact be the suicidal risk. This is 
because neoliberal structures are designed to place emphasis almost exclusively on short-term 
                                                            
148 I am not entirely convinced that people and the planet would be third parties however. 
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growth. Success is defined in quarterly financial terms and that is all. So while Enron and the 
banks of Iceland (which I shall discuss in the next section) might be considered to be unideal 
neoliberal businesses, there are serious systemic issues with neoliberalism that, in essence, 
necessitate the kinds of behaviour described below. In order to ensure that businesses can 
fulfil even their most basic social mandate which, if Friedman and Hayek are correct, is to 
make money, we need to create the market conditions necessary for sustainable profit-
making. A free-market is not the answer.       
 In the previous chapter I described Smith’s theorisations of the market mechanisms. 
Basically Smith argues that a deregulated climate increases competition, which (by assuring 
allocative efficiency) reduces prices and increases quality. It also provides greater consumer 
choice and ensures that supply, and hence prices, are an accurate reflection of societal 
demand. State-sanctioned monopolies over certain industries, such as electricity and rail 
transport, are therefore subversive to social ends as they introduce artificial market conditions 
and thus consumer demand is unable to determine prices. Instead prices are determined by 
the government and, because of the lack of competition, remain relatively fixed. Opening up 
the market by privatising industry, Smith argues, safeguards consumer sovereignty by 
allowing people to participate actively in the market; ‘to vote with their dollars,’ as Friedman 
describes. Finally, by the argument from enlightened self-interest, private businesses ought to 
focus on their own bottom-line ends because financially successful businesses ensure a 
successful society.  
As described in the previous chapter, Smith does argue that people should cultivate a 
‘fellow-feeling’ so as to ensure that the pursuit of self-interest does not conflict with the ends 
of other people. He also argues that no business should be allowed to get too powerful within 
such a system. He realises then, as mentioned, that the system which he proposes is not fool-
proof. In a free-market some businesses are bound to become very powerful and some self-
interests are bound to dominate. Friedman also argues that powerful business interests could 
be subversive to the ends of the free-market. However, because both he and Smith are anti-
regulation, it is unclear how we are supposed to safeguard against such an eventuality. It is 
exactly a deregulated climate that enables some businesses to become so powerful as to 
dominate a market, as the following case details.  
 In 1996, under pressure from powerful corporate lobby groups, the Governor of 
California at the time, Pete Wilson, and the California legislature passed a bill allowing for 
the privatisation and deregulation of electricity. Before the deregulation bill was passed 
electricity had been controlled by a strictly regulated monopoly that was responsible for both 
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the generators and the wires over which electricity was transmitted. A number of stringent 
standards existed in order to protect the public good function that such a service provides.   
However, it was argued, along Friedman’s lines, that opening up the market would result in a 
better, more efficient service delivery for consumers. Jeffrey Skilling, CEO of Enron – a 
major trading company, particularly of energy, in the United States at the time – argued in a 
television interview that, “Reducing electricity costs is only one benefit from choice and 
competition.”149 Enron and a few other trading corporations, including Dynergy and Reliant, 
were very quick to take advantage of the newly deregulated climate. They used the lack of 
controlling legislation in a way that Friedman’s model would laud: they focused entirely on 
increasing profits.  
Enron traders quickly began to realise that there were a number of loopholes in the 
deregulation bill that could be exploited. They realised that they could legally reroute 
electricity out of the cities and into the Nevada desert, creating artificial shortages in the 
cities. As basic classical economics teaches, when demand increases prices increase, and so 
the traders would wait until the central switchboards became desperate, and were prepared to 
pay more, before they brought the electricity back. This became a favourite ‘game’ for the 
traders and they gave such operations names such as ‘Wheel Out’, ‘Ricochet’ and even 
‘Death Star’.150 Their actions did not go unnoticed by Enron management: the traders were 
handsomely rewarded for their ability to pump up the electricity price and therefore Enron’s 
bottom line. The individuals involved were ‘successful’ because they were making money 
and Enron itself was ‘successful’ because its quarterly profits were burgeoning. I shall 
elaborate below. 
In addition to rerouting electricity there were a number of other tactics that the traders 
used to make money. Phoney reasons, such as forced outages and maintenance, were 
provided so that power plants could be shut down, causing prices to rise ever higher.151 At a 
special investigation committee set up by the United States government after Enron’s 
bankruptcy in December 2001 (the biggest case of bankruptcy in the history of corporate 
America) evidence was put forward revealing the testimony of two (anonymous) Enron 
traders: 
 
                                                            
149 Skilling, J., as documented in Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Documentary film) written by Gibney, 
A.   
150 Gibney, A., Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Documentary film). 
151 Ibid. 
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What we did was overbook the transmission line we had the rights on and said to California utilities, ‘If 
you want to use the line, pay us’. By the time they agreed to meet our price rolling blackouts had 
already hit California and the price for electricity went through the roof152 
 
 
Enron was dramatically increasing its profits: from June 2000 to June 2001 they 
netted approximately US$2 billion from their operations in California alone.153 A recorded 
telephone conversation between two traders sheds light on how much money the traders were 
making for themselves as well. The conversation ends with one trader stating, “We’ll 
definitely retire by the time we’re 30.”154 However, increasing profits did not prove to be 
socially responsible. There was no positive correlation at all between acting from self-interest 
and acting in the public interest, in fact insofar as there was a correlation it was entirely 
negative. From April 1998 to April 2000 the average cost of electricity in California was 
US$30/megawatt hour, but by June 2000 – just two months after deregulation had been 
implemented – it had quadrupled to around US$120/megawatt hour. By early 2001 the price 
had increased eightfold, with the average price between January and June 2001 at 
US$234/megawatt hour.155 At times the price even went as high as a US$1000/megawatt 
hour.156 This led to dramatic blackouts across California in places that could not afford the 
extremely high price of electricity. Joseph Stiglitz comments, “for the first time, there were 
supply interruptions of a kind that one expected in poor developing countries, but not in the 
hi-tech centre of the world.”157 As a direct result of deregulation there was, in this case, a vast 
reduction in quality and an almost absurd increase in prices. David Freeman, former advisor 
to Governor Davis of California, had first-hand experience of the debacle that had become 
California’s electricity market. He concludes that, “You can’t just turn these people loose and 
let them have a, quote, ‘free-market’, because a free-market is god-damn expensive to the 
customers.”158  
The real irony of the situation is that these actions were not illegal. The deregulation 
bill was extremely complicated, ambiguous and hard to follow.159 As regards the bill, 
Skilling’s response to questioning at the public hearings set up after Enron’s bankruptcy was, 
                                                            
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid.  
154 Freeman, D., as quoted in an interview for Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Documentary film) 
written by Gibney, A.   
155 Stiglitz, J., The Roaring Nineties: Seeds of Destruction, p.250.  
156 Gibney, A., Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Documentary film). 
157 Stiglitz, J., The Roaring Nineties: Seeds of Destruction, p.250. 
158 Gibney, A., Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Documentary film). 
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“The only thing that I’m aware of … is that there was a difference of opinion on the rules of 
the independent system operator … The rules weren’t quite clear.”160 This, Stiglitz argues, is 
the problem with deregulation. The free market represents an idealised version of market 
principles which do not translate well in practice. In reality it is not possible, Stiglitz argues, 
to create the kind of free market which Freidman advocates, particularly from a long-term 
perspective. He therefore concludes that it is better to have an imperfect regulated economy 
(with federal/national price caps on the cost of basic services, for example) than attempt to 
create an impossibly idealised deregulated economy.161 The inevitable end point of such a 
system is market manipulation by powerful corporate interests in order to book profit after 
profit, as the case of electricity deregulation in California demonstrates. If the public good is 
the ultimate goal of economics then the public good ought to be explicitly protected: this 
requires regulation.  
Although Friedman’s economic model does not preclude the possibility of a long-
term approach to profit-making, the system is so designed as to encourage a short-term view. 
One reason for this is the narrow way in which business success is currently defined. A 
company’s value at the stock market, for example, is entirely determined by quarterly 
financial performance. CEO’s are typically hired and fired according to their ability to book 
profits and they are largely scrutinised by the media on these grounds. In the United States 
the primary legal responsibility of a corporation is to fulfil its fiduciary duties. Very basically 
a fiduciary duty involves not being careless with a person’s financial investment. The public 
hearings after Enron’s bankruptcy were almost entirely dedicated to lambasting Enron for 
‘playing fast and loose’ with stockholders’ money. Oddly this is what the courts seemed to 
find to be the most appalling. Marjorie Kelly comments that in the United States, “The courts 
continue to insist that maximising returns to shareholders is the sole aim of the corporation. 
And directors who fail to do so can be [personally] sued.”162 This is even more true after the 
passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, spurred by Enron’s collapse. It 
requires company executives to personally sign off on financial statements and causes them 
to be held personally liable for these. In South Africa although steps have been taken to 
expand the notion of fiduciary duty to include more than stockholder interests, it is still true 
that the primary responsibility of a public-listed corporation is to its investors.163 It is 
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161 Stiglitz, J., The Roaring Nineties: Seeds of Destruction, p.252. 
162 Kelly, M., The Divine Right of Capital: Dethroning the Corporate Aristocracy, p.54. 
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therefore very difficult in practice to adopt a long-term view to profit-making, because the 
allure of astronomical profits in the present often proves to be too great. The real issue is 
systemic. Given the structural organisation of neoliberal principles, success is very narrowly 
defined to be focused on short-term profits, and so taking a more long-term approach is 
extremely difficult. This is certainly true of Enron.  
The traders in particular were so caught up with making huge amounts of money that 
they never bothered to stop and ask whether their strategies were sustainable in the long-term. 
Their actions were legal and the logic appears to have stopped there. The further question of 
whether their actions would be sustainable was not one with which they were at all 
concerned: they would retire wealthy and soon and whatever mess was left behind would not 
be their problem. Aside from asking whether their actions were moral, the individuals at 
Enron were not even particularly concerned with whether their actions and operations were 
sustainable. This is because apart from having an incentive to do so, they had a powerful 
incentive not to do so. They were, in essence greedy because they were encouraged to be, 
both by the system itself and by the pervasive culture at Enron. Yet, indulging greedy self-
interest, in this case at least, did not quite turn out in the way that Friedman theorises. It is 
because people were extraordinarily selfish – to the point of ignoring the damage they were 
causing – that Enron ultimately collapsed. This is one of the problems with creating a system 
that gratifies and encourages greed. Enron ought to have adopted a more long-term, 
sustainable view, but given the economic climate, it was all too easy not to. 
The social experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram in the 1960’s164 could be 
enlightening in terms of the moral psychology behind the preparedness to ignore both a 
sustainable strategy and moral values at Enron. Milgram wanted to ascertain whether or not 
evil was a genetic trait or if ordinary people could perform heinous tasks. He asked test 
subjects to inflict electric shocks on actors (which they did not know to be actors) when they 
failed to memorise a series of random words. Milgram’s findings were quite astounding: an 
overwhelming majority of people were prepared to ‘shock’ another person to the point of 
(apparent) agony. Milgram concluded that if people believed their instructions to be coming 
from a seemingly legitimate source they were very quick to lose all sense of morality. This is 
probably what happened with the traders at Enron. Once they had accepted the idea that 
behaving inhumanely was acceptable they were prepared to do just about anything to make 
money. A recorded telephone conversation between two traders reveals this attitude: “It’s 
                                                            
164 Milgram, S., Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View. 
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kinda hard to say we shouldn’t do this even though it’s allowed because … you know, I 
mean, that’s what we do.”165 A multitude of recordings revealing the most bizarre responses 
to the plight of the people of California can be explained by the fact that Enron employees 
had developed a sense of contempt for all values except one: making money. Their personal 
moral convictions were almost entirely severed from their business activities and their ability 
to ‘see the bigger picture’ was stunted by the egoistic climate within which they operated.  
   A long-term approach to profit-making must be ensured by regulation. In fact what 
is required is a radical departure from neoliberal thought. Sustainable profit-making, while 
ideal for a neoliberal, is in practice elusive because of the structures of a free-market and the 
assumptions behind it. Increasing profits in such a climate is far from socially responsible. 
Friedman argues that, “There is nothing that could do more in a brief period to destroy a 
market system … than effective governmental control of prices,”166 but rather it seems that, 
in this case, there was nothing that could do more to destroy a market system than 
deregulatory measures that removed governmental control of prices.  
 
B. The Free-market in Practice: Financial Deregulation in Iceland 
The final case that I shall discuss in this chapter reveals that neoliberalism in practice does 
not necessarily lead to broad social prosperity, in fact this case demonstrates quite the 
opposite. A commitment to free-market principles can sometimes result in national economic 
recession and thereby in a decrease of living standards. The case of financial deregulation in 
Iceland is particularly enlightening as it gives insight into the causes of the almost global 
economic recession that began in 2008. In this study I shall conclude that given the failure of 
the neoliberal system to deliver on its primary aim of greater social justice it is not 
appropriate to continue bailing out a system that is so obviously volatile and problematic. We 
ought to re-examine our basic economic assumptions and in so doing develop an economic 
system that in actual fact stays true to the ultimate ends of capitalism, and indeed economic 
theory in general.       
In 2000 Iceland’s government under Prime Minister David Oddsson began a broad 
policy of deregulation, particularly of the financial sector. These measures allowed the three 
main commercial banks of Iceland (Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing) to expand their 
capital bases by speculating, both locally and internationally, with depositors’ money. 
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Basically financial deregulation allowed the commercial banks to behave much more like 
their riskier counterparts: investment banks.  
These measures allowed the banks to increase their leverage ratios to a much higher 
level. Leverage ratio is basically the amount of money a bank can borrow proportionate to its 
asset base. If a bank can only borrow as much as its asset base then its maximum leverage 
ratio would be 1:1. However, deregulation on leverage ratios allows banks to borrow more 
than their asset base up to ratios as high as, for example, 16:1. Deregulation also meant that 
banks could give much riskier loans than before, known as sub-prime loans. Such loans are 
given to people and businesses that cannot necessarily provide an appropriate level of 
collateral and who have fairly ambiguous guarantees of future income with which to pay the 
loan back. The incentive for the bank/lender to provide such loans is based on the fact that, 
because of risk that bank or lender takes on, they typically have very high interest rates. 
When deregulation allows for the giving of more sub-prime loans then a lender (bank) has a 
bottom-line incentive to sell as many sub-prime loans as possible, as the more are sold the 
greater the bank’s profits. Simultaneously, because leverage ratios could be increased the 
banks themselves could take more loans, so that they, in turn, could provide more loans (and 
also speculate on other markets, for example).   
Yet when a bank or financial institution sells a sub-prime loan they take on a great 
deal of risk, namely that the borrower will default on their payments and not be able to pay 
the bank back. So, to ameliorate this risk the commercial bank (that can now operate like an 
investment bank) combines thousands of sub-prime loans and sells them to investors as 
equity in the form of ‘collateralised debt obligations’ (CDO’s). Investors can insure their 
CDO’s with financial insurance companies by purchasing ‘credit default swaps’ (CDS’s) so 
that if their CDO ‘goes bad’, in other words if the majority of debtors in a CDO default on 
their payments, then the insurance company will reimburse them according to the insured 
value of the CDO. The risk of one person defaulting might be quite high when considered in 
isolation, but the risk of thousands defaulting will not be as great, so a CDO is not 
(theoretically) a bad investment. The insurance companies are also willing to insure them 
because of this. They make money from the premiums paid to ensure CDO’s (by selling 
CDS’s) as it is (or at least was) assumed that the risk of the majority of debtors in a CDO 
defaulting was very small. Hence they had a bottom-line reason to ensure CDO’s by selling 
CDS’s. In this way risk was spread across a much wider area in the sense that no single firm 
or investor took on too much risk. If the CDO matured, in other words, if the majority of 
debtors paid off their loans, then the holder of the CDO would enjoy a capital gain – at a very 
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high interest rate. This is at least how the system was, very basically, supposed to work in 
theory. 
The Icelandic banks encouraged foreign investment as purchasers of CDO’s (futures 
contracts)167 by providing a slightly higher interest rate than other countries.168 So, for 
example, a pension fund in the UK that would only be paid an interest rate of say, 13% on 
their deposit, preferred to invest in the Icelandic bank by buying a CDO that was offering a, 
say 13.8% return on the investment. Hence, Iceland had, as a result of deregulation, very 
quickly internationalised their banking system. The Icelandic economy boomed as more and 
more Icelandic people could take loans, say to buy a house, or even a second house. Basic 
economics teaches that the more demand there is for something, the higher the price, and so, 
in Iceland property prices, for example, exploded. Similarly, by 2007 the Icelandic stock 
market had grown to more than 9 times its size and value in 2001, a world record growth 
rate.169 Indeed, by all outward appearances Iceland was thriving and as Robert Wade 
comments, “Neoliberals around the world hailed Iceland as a vindication of free market 
principles.”170 
 However, such rapid growth had created a ‘bubble’, for example in housing and stock 
prices. Essentially this entailed that the actual value of the assets (e.g. house or stock) had 
been over-inflated and hence were unrealistic representations of value. Also, the rapid 
internationalisation of the Icelandic financial sector, which had been “hastily deregulated … 
[left the] inexperienced [financial] managers free to play in the big leagues, with little 
regulatory restraint.”171 By the end of the second quarter 2008 Glitnir, Landsbanki and 
Kaupthing alone had amassed external debts amounting to about €50 billion.172 The amount 
of debt taken is all the more staggering when compared to the fact that Iceland’s GDP in 
2007 was only €8.5 billion.173 Suddenly, and not surprisingly, more and more private sub-
prime loan takers began to default on their repayments and so masses of CDO’s ‘went bad’. 
The insurance firms found themselves unable to honour the CDS’s that they had sold to 
holders of CDO’s, and so masses of investors simply lost their money. The banks now found 
themselves ‘holding the bag’ for huge amounts of foreign debt which they in turn did not now 
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have the money to repay. The banks scrambled to refinance their debts by taking more and 
more loans, further deepening their debt status. This of course increased the banks’ creditor 
lists and as more and more creditors started to demand payment, and as other international 
banks became less willing to provide fresh loans, the banks found themselves with 
insufficient credit to make repayments. Finally in October 2008 the banks admitted that they 
were in trouble.  
However, as the banks had borrowed so far beyond Iceland’s capital base the 
Icelandic Central Bank was in no position to take on the roll of ‘lender-of-last-resort’.174 In 
other words the Icelandic government could by no means afford to bail out the banks and take 
on a portion of their debt. The government had to act fast. The Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FSA) of Iceland immediately took control of the domestic operations of Glitnir, 
Landsbanki and Kaupthing and their foreign branches were frozen and put into receivership 
(liquidation).175 All stock trading in Iceland was also frozen for two days on the 9th of 
October 2008. By the 17th of October the OMX Iceland 15 (the Icelandic stock exchange) 
was down by 96% from its historic high in July 2007.176 The value of the krona fell sharply 
and all foreign exchange transactions were suspended for weeks to mitigate the effects of an 
absolute collapse of the world value of the krona. The IMF took temporary control of the 
operations of the Central Bank to help manage the crisis and assisted the government in 
coming up with a plan of action.177 On the 19th of November 2008 a loan package had been 
drawn up and agreed upon to aid Iceland’s economic recovery.178 Essentially Iceland’s 
sovereign (national) debt rose from 28% of their GDP in 2007 to the equivalent of 130% of 
GDP in 2011.179 Furthermore, as a result of the economic collapse brought on by the 
unregulated banks, Iceland’s GDP had declined by 5.5% in the first six months of 2010.180 
The Economist magazine commented at the end of 2008 that, “Relative to the size of its 
economy, Iceland’s banking collapse [was] the largest suffered by any country in economic 
history.”181 
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As a result of financial deregulation the banks greatly expanded their (short-term) 
profit margins, and Iceland was heralded as the poster-child for the success of free-market 
economics. Many prominent economists reviewed the situation in Iceland before the crisis 
and few saw any cause for concern. For example, Dr Richard Portes, a British economist and 
Professor at the London Business School, commented that, “Overall, the internationalisation 
of the Icelandic financial sector is a remarkable success story that the markets should better 
acknowledge.”182 Neoliberal economics teaches that “fast economic growth with a large trade 
deficit183 and ballooning foreign debt [is] a sign of success,”184 and so perhaps this is why too 
few economists were willing to criticise Iceland’s banking operations. This fact also suggests 
that there is serious cause to question whether or not sustainable profit-making is in reality 
possible within Friedman’s proposed economic model. If prominent economists could not see 
a problem then how could those actually making money be expected to see a problem? By 
Friedman’s logic the banks were successful, and by the argument from enlightened self-
interest, socially responsible because deregulation had allowed them to drastically increase 
their profits.  
This suggests that economic actors need to have (as part of their motivational set) an 
explicit, and not an implicit, commitment to social justice. This means that greed ought to be 
tempered and not encouraged. As in the case of Enron, although the banks’ operations were, 
in retrospect, unsustainable the allure of astronomical profit-making proved far too great for 
the individuals working in the banks: in essence they were allowed to operate from greedy 
self-interest and so they did. Similarly, as a result of deregulation, “most of the activity that 
generated the financial fragility was within the letter of the (not very specific) law.”185 
Robert Wade argues that in order to avoid similar circumstances in the future 
commercial banks and investment banks should remain separate. He argues that as stable 
commercial banking “has a large public good element”186 such a move is necessary for 
economic stability and public welfare. Commercial banks ought not to primarily focus on 
increasing their profits, Wade argues, but rather on fulfilling a critical public good function in 
a stable and sustainable manner. It is not, in other words, the social responsibility of 
                                                            
182 Portes, R. and Baldursson, F.M., ‘The Internationalisation of Iceland’s Financial Sector’, Iceland Chamber of 
Commerce, November 2007 (online).  
183 A trade deficit is basically when the overall national value of  imports exceeds the value of exports. This is 
(traditionally) thought to be a good thing because it demonstrates that a country has the required capital to 
import.  
184 Wade, R., ‘The Crisis: Iceland as Icarus’, Challenge, vol.52, no.3, May-June 2009, p.6.  
185 Ibid, p.20.  
186 Ibid, p.32.  
59 
 
commercial banks to increase their profits. By extension it is not the social responsibility of 
business to increase its profits.187  
These failures are not isolated incidents, they are examples of larger systemic trends 
towards amorality and immorality. They discredit the neoliberal assumption that there is a 
correlation between acting in one’s own interests and acting in the interests of society in 
general. There is seldom an ‘invisible hand’ that imparts social benefits as a ‘happy by-
product’ of the pursuit of personal financial gain. Similarly the extended order which Hayek 
describes appears rather to be particularly disordered. In conclusion, greater freedom and 
social flourishing are certainly not obvious results of a free-market system. Instead, people 
are exploited, the environment is abused and greed is allowed to flourish. All values other 
than profit-making are in practice written off in a bottom-line world because the system is 
designed to reward and encourage – especially short-term – profits and not virtue. From an 
ethical perspective we cannot condone a system that treats as instrumental those things that 
we recognise to be non-instrumental. Simply put, if we can find a way to meet the ends of 
economics and in particular capitalism – which no one can dispute to be greater social 
flourishing – without causing harm and restricting freedom, then such a system ought to be 
preferred.188     
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business has a primary and pressing responsibility to the public good. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE ULTIMATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF BUSINESS 
 
What distinguishes the capitalist economy from the simple exchange economy is the separation of capital and 
labour, that is, the existence of a labour force without its own sufficient capital and therefore without a choice as 
to whether to put its labour into the market or not. Professor Friedman would agree that where there is no choice 
there is coercion189 
 
I have so far argued that the bottom-line approach enables a business to be amoral and that at 
times this amorality can lead to immorality. The former is true because moral concerns can 
only ever be instrumentally valuable in a bottom-line business climate. They are only worth 
acting upon, or indeed even considering, if doing so will either have no impact on the bottom-
line or if it will increase it. This leaves businesses morally neutral. The latter is sometimes 
also true because if there are good bottom-line reasons to ignore or violate moral norms and 
standards then this can become justifiable, as we saw in the previous chapter. If it pays to be 
immoral then a business ought to be. As the end of business is constructed as ‘to increase 
profits’, moral concerns are all too often trumped by this purpose, further, they ought to be 
trumped. However, increasing profits is simply not a justifiable end. It can only ever be a 
means. Profit-making may or may not be necessary to social flourishing, but this necessity 
does not make it an end-in-itself.  
 Rather, as even Milton Friedman implicitly, and inconsistently, realises, there is a 
‘greater purpose’, if you will, to profit-making. Friedman thinks that businesses should be 
bottom-line focused because this is what is best for society at large: for example, it creates 
jobs, ensures realistic and fair prices and addresses inequality, thus generally ensuring a kind 
of distributive justice. It is for him, because people act self-interestedly that social justice will 
come about. Friedman and Friedrich Hayek assume, incorrectly, that our self-interest is 
primarily greedy and materialistic in nature: that we desire above all else to make money. 
This is misguided to say the least. Essentially Friedman and Hayek do not rightly understand 
self-interest: our will is certainly not typically aimed at profit-maximising. We are motivated 
by far more than money and so to assume that material gain is for us important above all else 
is disingenuous. Even the greediest person makes some sacrifices for others. That, for 
instance, is a condition of love, one of our greatest values.  
Aside from this narrow conception of human motivation, it must be remembered that 
neoliberal prescriptions for business are motivated by a desire for social justice in the first 
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place. Yet, the aim of social justice is obscured behind the explicit demand to act from greedy 
self-interest: for Friedman and Hayek, to acquire wealth, where ‘wealth’ is largely defined in 
monetary terms. Because of this the systems that have been created to advance the neoliberal 
agenda encourage a deficient approach to individual pursuits. People become greedy in a 
system openly designed to encourage greed. In the next chapter I shall briefly argue that this 
has become an institutionalised social pathology that needs to be treated. Basically we need 
to recognise that people are motivated by more than greedy materialism and this fact ought to 
be reflected in our economic systems and business structures.  
It is not enough to rely on people to nurture a ‘fellow-feeling’ individually, as Adam 
Smith suggests, when the system that prevails rewards financial gain and only financial gain. 
So although social justice might theoretically be the point, this fact is not at all clear in a 
system wholly geared at profit-making. As we have seen, social ends can be trumped and so 
it makes sense that personal ends do not accord with social ends in such a system. As Thomas 
Nagel writes, “There is no substitute for a direct concern for other people as the basis of 
morality.”190 It seems to be the case that concerns of a moral nature, in this case for social 
justice, at times require us to sacrifice and not to indulge our self-interest. There is, more 
often than not, a tension between acting from self-interest and acting morally. Hence to 
suggest that it is moral, ‘responsible’, a social good, to act selfishly is to misunderstand what 
morality, and particularly social justice, requires of us. We ought also to expand the 
parameters of self-interest to be about more than increasing profits. To this end success needs 
to be redefined, both on a personal and on a business level. In the next chapter I shall suggest 
how this might be done.   
It is partly because of this ‘fudging’ of the relationship between self-interest and 
social justice that externalities are such a big problem for the bottom-liner.191 There will 
always be relevant moral interests that will have to be simply written off if self-interest is the 
effective end of business operations. This problem is particularly worrisome when we 
consider that those things written off as externalities are sometimes harms against human 
dignity, fair compensation for one’s labour, environmental sustainability: in essence harms 
against exactly what constitutes social justice. To return to John Maynard Keynes: 
 
It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always 
operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often 
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individuals acting separately to promote their ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these192 
(Keynes’s italics) 
 
 
Self-interest is not, in other words, a particular safeguard of social justice, in fact it is often in 
conflict with social justice. Friedman and his acolytes thus provide an inadequate conception 
of social justice and an inaccurate account of what is needed to achieve it. In essence, given 
that they are concerned with social justice, their positions are internally inconsistent or 
contradictory. To genuinely serve the end of social justice, social justice, and not ‘increasing 
profits’, ought to be the end of business. Businesses are not, in other words, ultimately 
successful by mere virtue of a magnanimous bottom-line. 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly state what social justice does demand of us 
and from there to argue that even businesses (i.e. not just people) have a positive duty to be 
primarily and directly committed to achieving it. They do not simply have a negative duty to 
do no harm. This commitment requires more than a background, theoretical presence of 
social justice, it requires that social justice be explicitly instated as the end of business. 
Achieving this will not be easy, but it is not impossible, and it is certainly necessary. In the 
next chapter I shall suggest some ways in which social justice might come to replace profit-
making as the (legitimate) end of business operations.  
The moral sceptic might be tempted to ask why moral concerns should even be a 
concern in the first place but I shall just assume as John Rawls, and many others, do that it is 
simply rational to want to be moral. As far as social justice goes I shall make the same 
assumption: it is in wanting to be moral that we desire social justice. Given that Smith, 
Friedman, Hayek, and to some extent Robert Nozick, are all primarily interested in detailing 
the economic conditions necessary to achieve social justice, assuming that my reader has a 
primary concern for social justice intact is not unreasonable. However what social justice 
requires or entails is a matter that must be addressed. As argued in Chapter One our responses 
to the arguments from enlightened self-interest and freedom are determined by what the 
requirements for a just society actually are.  
 
I. What is Social Justice? Fairness and Equality of Opportunity 
Hayek argues that social justice is a “weasel word”193 that is “irreconcilable with growth or 
even maintenance of population and wealth.”194 In so doing he makes a performative 
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contradiction: he rejects social justice on the grounds that promoting it diminishes it. In other 
words, he is essentially telling his readers to reject social justice for the sake of social justice. 
To be fair, in the context of this quote Hayek is responding to the kind of social justice 
advocated by socialists, which is fundamentally redistributive in nature. Nozick’s entitlement 
theory of justice (discussed in Chapter One) is similarly a response to a conception of social 
justice as redistributive, as a kind of ‘Robin Hood’ justice which involves, in essence, taking 
from the rich to give to the poor. In its most basic sense this (the socialist) conception of 
social justice is about creating economic equality among persons in the sense that all people 
are similarly situated economically. Emphasis is placed on equality, whereas for Hayek, 
Nozick and Friedman the fundamental safeguard of social justice is freedom. Friedman 
writes: 
 
The businessmen believe that they are defending free enterprise when they declaim that business is not 
concerned ‘merely’ with profit but also with promoting desirable ‘social’ ends; that business has a 
‘social conscience’ and takes seriously its responsibilities for providing employment, eliminating 
discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop 
of reformers. In fact they are – or would be if they or anyone else took them seriously – preaching pure 
and unadulterated socialism. Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual 
forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades195  
 
 
For Friedman - and for Hayek and Nozick as well - equality will not drive a market (and 
hence national development or social flourishing), instead we must first and foremost protect 
the freedom of people to pursue their own interests. But this presupposes inequality. 
Inequality is what drives the market because it provides the incentive for lesser-off persons to 
want to do better. For Hayek, Nozick and Freidman, social justice is hence constructed in 
response to the demand – which they wrongly think of as an essential feature of socialism 
alone – for equality. For them social justice is about creating the conditions necessary for 
people to pursue their own self-interest: to be free. However, free-market capitalism, as we 
have seen, can lead to gross injustice and the limitation of freedom (something that, despite 
the bravado, Friedman and Nozick reject) indicating that social justice has to be about more 
than simply ensuring freedom.  
Rawls argues that social justice requires fairness. His stated aim in A Theory of 
Justice is to “discover the most appropriate moral conception of justice for a democratic 
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society wherein persons regard themselves as free and equal citizens” (my italics).196 To do 
this Rawls asks his readers to engage in a thought experiment wherein they imagine that they 
do not know any particulars of their person. This entails imagining that they do not know 
their:  
 
place in society, [their] class position or social status, nor does anyone know [their] fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, [their] intelligence, strength and the like”197  
 
 
He even assumes that “the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special 
psychological propensities.”198 People are hence placed in the “original position”199 behind a 
“veil of ignorance”200 about themselves and their particularities. The only facts that one is 
aware of in the original position concern the tendencies of human behaviour and an 
understanding of “the primary social goods needed to live life.”201  
Once in the original position people are then asked a series of questions regarding the 
type of society they would rationally want to live in, such as what political system they would 
choose to live under, what economic circumstances ought to prevail and what justice system 
would best enable cooperation among social beings. Rawls asserts that rational persons in the 
original position would follow a ‘maximin strategy’, wherein they attempt to minimise loss 
and maximise gain, in order to answer these questions. Such a strategy would direct rational 
persons to “play it as safe as possible by choosing the alternative whose worst outcome 
leaves [them] better off than the worst outcome of all other alternatives.”202 That is, they 
would choose their political systems, economic systems, justice systems and so on so that no 
matter where they ended up being placed, and with what advantages or disadvantages, they 
would be able to pursue a good life, no matter what their conception of ‘the good life’ turned 
out to be. So, even if they ended up being placed on the lowest rung of the socio-economic 
ladder they would still be in a position to “maintain [their] conscientious convictions and 
sincerest affections and pursue a wide range of permissible ends.”203 Given that rational 
persons in the original position are identically situated, Rawls conceives that the conditions 
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deemed to be the best ones possible, whatever eventuality arises, will be the result of 
unanimous agreement: everybody will come at last to the same point.  
Rawls concludes that “if the parties to the social contract are fairly situated [as they 
are in the original position] and all relevant information is taken into account, then the 
principles that would be agreed to [would also be] fair.”204 We would essentially devise a 
conception of justice that is not solely about either equality or freedom, but rather about 
having good reasons for whatever inequalities or freedom restrictions that may have to exist. 
If restricting freedom in some senses is fair, no matter who you turn out to be, then this would 
be just. It is rational to assume that the freedom to pursue one’s own ends must be restricted 
in such a way that these pursuits do not infringe on the well-being and freedom of others: this 
is fair, and Nozick would agree. Similarly, some inequalities could be just if everybody in the 
original position agreed that these were arranged fairly and that they were to the benefit of all 
members of society. Essentially inequalities are necessary, Rawls assumes, as long as they do 
not violate the first principle of fairness. He calls this second principle ‘the difference 
principle’.205 Inequalities might exist because it is fair to reward merit. Further, inequality 
does indeed provide the incentive for people to want to do better, as Smith, Friedman, Hayek 
and Nozick argue in response to socialism. However, whatever inequalities do exist must be 
backed up by good reasons for their existence, in the sense that they would be deemed fair. 
Nozick’s account of justice is too narrow in this regard. His arguments against 
taxation (discussed in Chapter One) would perpetuate and entrench a system of inequality 
that is unfair. Those born poor – i.e. those who do not have the financial resources to meet 
their ends – would have to work very hard indeed to overcome their circumstances because 
they would have no assistance from the taxation system. But this does not seem fair, as it is 
skewed to favour a particular group (the affluent) and so is very limited in its scope. Rather, 
we have, according to Rawls, to determine what is fair in terms of freedom restrictions and 
inequalities, in order to ensure the conditions necessary for all members of society to pursue a 
good life. Rawls’s final aim is to suggest that we have a normative duty to rearrange our 
social, political and economic structures if we find that what is fair in the original position 
does not prevail in reality.  
The free-market economic system attempts to protect liberty, but (a) it protects a very 
narrow conception of liberty and; (b) this limited-focus freedom results in inequalities that 
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are, at times, extreme. If Nozick is correct and people are entitled to the whole of their 
earnings and inheritance, and if at the same time economic structures are organised so as to 
enable people to pursue only their own greedy interests, then those who are financially better 
off will be better placed to advance their own ends. The free-market is not, in other words, as 
‘free’ as it might initially seem. It results in an unfair balance of power because those with 
more money will have more clout in such a market: they will be better placed to pursue their 
own interests. By freeing up the market to avoid bureaucratic power influences, the free-
market simply gives way to a new kind of power: the power of the moneyed (be it an 
individual or a business). Hence this system is skewed to favour a particular group in a way 
that those who are not financially well-off have less power, less force, less opportunity. This 
situation is just not one that rational persons in the original position would agree to accept: it 
is unfair and hence unjust. Therefore, according to Rawls, we have a normative duty to 
abandon this system.    
Robert Solomon and Clancy Martin provide a similar account of social justice as 
fairness and they argue that the best way to effect this in practice is by ensuring the 
conditions necessary for ‘equality of opportunity’.206 They also agree that social justice and 
self-interest do not always go together. They write:  
 
Justice is first of all, a concern for the well-being of others, and justice is served, if imperfectly, by our 
sense that there are others in society less fortunate than we are, whom it is our responsibility, if not our 
obligation, to help207  
 
 
For them the problem of justice comes down to “defining what counts as a fair share”208 in a 
society where inequality is inescapable. This is, they correctly point out, a particular point 
that those opposing the market ideals of neoliberalism cannot but address. The solution, they 
argue, is to delineate what socio-economic parameters ought to exist in order to ensure 
equality of opportunity.209 They argue that our primary duty as human societies is to protect 
the ‘positive rights’ that “pertain to certain goods that society can provide; the right to a 
decent job, to adequate health care, and to education are among these.”210 In other words if 
someone is born into poverty this is not simply a matter of ‘bad luck’ as Nozick would have 
it, but rather an escapable situation by virtue of equal access to that which affords the 
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opportunities to do better. If we can create a society in which these rights are guaranteed for 
all, then although there will still be inequality, people will be equal in the sense that they will 
have equal access to the opportunities needed to live a good life. The notion of equal 
opportunity hence, “provides a middle concept in which equality of opportunity fulfils our 
sense of equality, while the actual use of that opportunity fulfils our sense that rewards should 
be based on merit.”211  
 In order to affect this kind of society Solomon and Martin describe what they call “the 
ascending circle of responsibilities.”212 They argue that “it is the responsibility of those who 
have more to contribute more for the good of society,”213 and the more they have the more 
they ought to contribute. This positive duty argument does not apply to businesses alone but 
to all those who have the resources available to help those who do not. They write, “Indeed, 
we all do have such responsibilities now, proportional to our abilities to pay. But, as things 
are, business has the money, so business has the responsibility.”214 All businesses, regardless 
of their resources, have responsibilities that apply to jobs, wages and products, they argue. 
For example, a business has the responsibility to ensure that their product is safe and 
responsible: a point that seems all too often to be forgotten in the business world, because the 
focus is on profits and not on social justice. Paying a fair wage is a similar responsibility that 
applies to all businesses regardless of their resources, they argue.215 From there the ‘circle of 
responsibilities’ expands according to the business’s ability to fulfil them. Commitments to 
stockholders are a secondary responsibility as are things such as, basic science research, 
customer satisfaction, community welfare, education and social harmony. The third and final 
level of responsibility is comprised of a commitment to world poverty and world peace, and 
those institutions (including business) and individuals that are suitably situated to address 
these problems have a positive duty to society, according to Solomon and Martin, to address 
them.216  
Solomon and Martin’s point is that, given the necessity of ensuring equality of 
opportunity for a just society, those who are well-placed to ensure the conditions necessary 
for this are responsible for doing so. Given that many businesses are today well-situated to 
address these problems they hence share the responsibility to be committed to them. So for 
them duty to society is not to be considered in static terms as simply the duty not to harm, 
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rather it is a positive duty that must be conceived of as the duty to actively advance the ends 
of social justice. Hence, like Robert Wade argues in reference to the responsibility of 
commercial banks (see the case of Iceland in the previous chapter), a commitment to the 
public good must be first and foremost among the responsibilities of business. Solomon and 
Martin’s conclusion on this point is worth quoting at length: 
       
Equal opportunity is the heart of our economic-ethical system. The world of business depends on it, for 
in a world where fortunes can be staggering, justice requires that everyone have accessibility to 
success. Otherwise, our market system is no longer ‘free’ but rather just an aristocratic playground in 
which the lucky few – by virtue of birth or circumstances – can play an extravagant game. Equal 
opportunity is the precondition of the business world, insofar as there can be no justifying ‘free 
enterprise’ without it217  
 
 
The argument that we have a positive duty to society in terms of guaranteeing the 
minimum conditions necessary for everyone to live a good life is not a new one. Furthermore, 
the emphasis on ensuring fairness is as good as unanimous among these. Aristotle’s notion of 
justice is similar to the idea of ‘equality of opportunity’ forwarded by Solomon and Martin. 
For Aristotle justice requires equity.218 This is not exact equality, but rather justice is to be 
found in the middle-ground between the conflicting values of charity and selfishness.219 To 
be just, for Aristotle, requires the fair consideration of both one’s own interests and the 
interests of others. Aristotle argues that justice consists in ensuring that all members of 
society have their fair share of social benefits.220 Ensuring justice is thus, according to him, a 
positive duty that we all possess. This kind of duty “goes beyond the written law”221 in the 
sense that assuring “justice is not mere conformity to law but a value and a moral 
requirement.”222 Aristotle adds that justice is “the greatest of the virtues, and that ‘neither 
evening star nor morning star is such a wonder’ … ‘In justice is all virtue combined’.”223 
Behind Amartya Sen’s demands for the assurance of ‘capability equality’ in society is 
the same proclivity for ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘equity’.224 His ideas are later developed 
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by Martha Nussbaum.225 Similarly, for Spinoza, justice “consists in the habitual rendering to 
every man his lawful due.”226 There might still be some lingering doubt harboured by the 
obdurate sceptic who refuses to accept that we have positive responsibilities to society, but I 
am not, as stated above, concerned with addressing this uncompromising position. My 
undertaking here is simply to state that social justice is an obvious moral responsibility and 
from there to flesh out what social justice requires, particularly of business.        
Marjorie Kelly also argues that businesses have a responsibility to the public good, 
and she concurs with Solomon and Martin’s views that the neoliberal economic system 
resembles ‘an aristocratic playground’. She argues that neoliberal ideals, which have largely 
been bought into, are so outdated with modern democratic thought (with its emphasis on 
human rights, liberty and equality before the law), that neoliberalism is in essence 
“archaic”227 and “feudal.”228 She rightly points out that the free market system is grossly 
skewed to favour the rights and financial interests of the already wealthy, propertied 
‘economic aristocracy’: shareholders in public-listed corporations. As previously pointed out, 
American corporate law requires corporations to put their fiduciary duties to shareholders 
before all other interests, thereby making it illegal for corporations to have any more 
important interests than maximising their bottom line.229 The United States law states that: “A 
business corporation is organised and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders 
[and so] the powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”230 Shareholder return is 
thus the feature that American corporations have to focus on, on penalty of the law if they do 
otherwise. This system, Kelly argues, harks back to a dark period in human history when the 
wealthy were ‘more equal than others’, to use an Orwellian turn of phrase. 
In the feudal era those that created wealth, the serfs, were not able to enjoy the fruits 
of their labour as their landlords were the exclusive beneficiaries of any created wealth. The 
rights of the privileged reigned supreme while those of the workers were barely existent. It 
restricted the liberty of the serfs to pursue a decent living and advance their own ends through 
hard work and merit. It also did not recognise the inherent equality and dignity of each 
human life, and so there was a socio-political revolution – in thought and in reality – aimed at 
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correcting these harms.231 What did not accompany this critical change in human thought and 
history was an economic revolution based on similar principles; a fact, Kelly argues, that is 
oddly ignored. Kelly envisions a new system of ‘economic democracy’ which does not solely 
favour a propertied elite but rather openly respects and protects the rights of all persons 
involved in the creation of goods and services for trade,232 as well as the rights of the society 
as a whole. She writes: 
 
We can embrace a new democratic vision of capitalism, not as a system for capital, but a system of 
capital – a system in which all people are allowed to accumulate capital according to their productivity, 
and in which the natural capital of the community and the environment is preserved233 (Kelly’s 
emphases) 
 
 
Kelly’s economic model does not ignore the importance of investing shareholders in 
business, but it recognises that there are other relevant parties, such as employees and the 
communities affected by corporate activity, who ought to be equally considered.  
The neoliberal system of ‘economic aristocracy’ is, for Kelly, a “myopic,”234 “one-
dimensional economy”235 because it is skewed to favour an elite: the wealthy. “The design of 
the system itself”236 creates systemic pressures that inform the mistaken belief that a 
business’s primary responsibility is to its shareholders. Economic authors like Friedman and 
Hayek provide the credibility for this system by arguing as they do that ‘the social 
responsibility of business to increase its profits’. Hence the solution that Kelly proposes is to 
overturn this entrenched principle by encouraging new ideas in economic thought. Such a 
“(r)evolution,”237 as Kelly calls it, is necessary because, she argues, corporations in particular 
have a primary responsibility to the public good.238 So, like Solomon and Martin she argues 
that businesses have a positive duty or responsibility to address social issues and to create the 
conditions in which all members of society have the opportunity to flourish. The current 
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system as it is skewed to favour shareholder interests is outmoded and wholly unjustifiable 
among a democratic polity. Kelly quotes Thomas Paine in order to attempt to explain why we 
have lived so unquestioningly with ‘economic aristocracy’ for so long: “a long habit of not 
thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right.”239 In conclusion she 
urges her readers (particularly the American public) to recognise that corporations hold a 
‘contract’ with them and that as such they have “the sovereign power to require public 
services from corporations.”240 Kelly concludes that: 
 
The real way for everyone to win is to redefine business success to encompass genuine long-term 
enduring gains for real people – through measures like a living wage, corporate investment in 
communities and protection of our clean air and water241 
 
 
Kelly does not however detail the actual means by which economic democracy can be 
brought about. She does mention certain structural changes that would be necessary, such as 
“new variations on financial statements … new property rights … new groups represented in 
corporate governance … [and] an enlarged corporate purpose.”242 Her treatise is thus more a 
call to arms than an actual battle plan, but she nevertheless urges her readers to recognise that 
the current purpose of (American) corporations is outdated and unjustifiable in a democratic 
context.   
By drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi243 and Eric Hobsbawn244 Kelly argues that, 
in particular, the deregulatory measures of free-market capitalism are not in keeping with the 
principles of economic democracy. Polanyi’s ‘two nations effect’ describes “the tendency of 
capitalism to uplift some even as it degrades others.”245 The one period in history, Hobsbawn 
argues, when the two nations effect was not in evidence was the 25 years following World 
War II, when “a rising tide did actually lift all boats, bringing luxuries like the refrigerator, 
the private washing machine, and the telephone to the masses.”246 Yet, the striking feature 
which made this era so successful in terms of social flourishing was the fact that businesses 
were very highly regulated, Hobsbawn concludes. They were able to pursue bottom-line ends 
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but not in a manner that conflicted with the interests of other relevantly affected parties, such 
as employees and communities at large. “The free market was remarkably successful in that 
era when it was notably not free,”247 Kelly writes. Regulation in this period did not stunt 
economic growth but in fact was far more effective in meeting the initial aim of genuine 
social development and flourishing than deregulation because wealth was not created at the 
expense of employees or communities. In fact, more than this, because of regulation they 
were unable to ‘sweep’ their commitments to the public good ‘under the carpet’ and so in 
many ways some businesses operated primarily from this perspective and not solely from the 
desire to increase profits.248   
This same conclusion (the need for regulation) is reached by Solomon and Martin. 
They argue that because of the responsibilities that businesses have “by virtue of their power, 
wealth and influence,”249 the regulation of business operations is all the more important.250 
As long as business operations do not coincide with the demands of justice (equality of 
opportunity) they ought to be regulated to ensure that business actually succeeds in what it 
sets out to do, that is, to be an important instrument of distributive justice. They agree with 
Keynes on this point as well. They write that for Keynes, “when the [free] market fails to 
satisfy even the minimal needs of so many millions of people, then government intervention 
is both ethically and economically necessary.”251 The free-market argument that deregulation 
will best ensure social justice is for Kelly, Keynes and Solomon and Martin misguided. Smith 
argues for the necessity of individual restraint to offset the systemic risks of deregulation, but 
in a system designed to encourage greedy self-interest far more solid safeguards are required. 
To encourage deregulation is to ultimately ignore the demands of justice: demands that 
businesses are not exempt from, for reasons that I shall discuss below. 
As above, for Friedman, Hayek and Nozick defending freedom is paramount, and the 
existence of inequality is a necessary by-product of this. In a free economy some will earn 
more based on merit than others and some have to be worse off to provide the incentives that 
drive market innovation. Yet, despite this, there will be a greater protection of freedom across 
the board. However, as Kelly demonstrates, it is seldom true that a broad conception of 
freedom is protected in a free-market. She argues that “In reality, if the invisible hand does 
not always function very well [see Chapter Two] the free market does not always extend its 
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freedom very far.”252 Freedom is largely reserved for shareholders whose interests are placed 
above all others. We are told that the free market is the champion of liberty but in fact the 
only freedoms that are genuinely protected are the freedoms of the already wealthy to obtain 
more wealth. As we have seen, Friedman’s model, which has at times been taken as 
sacrosanct, necessitates the paying of employees as little as possible, the writing off of 
externalities as the community’s problem and often also the unsustainable use of natural 
environmental resources which can be exploited elsewhere when they run out. The 
conception of liberty defended by neoliberals is very limited indeed.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, John Kenneth Galbraith also denounces “the 
institutionalised power of wealth”253 and the limited, unfair, sense of freedom that is created 
by neoliberalism. In The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time he writes that, 
“while employees and the community are left to the protection of the invisible hand, wealth is 
protected by the visible hand of government and corporation” (Galbraith’s emphasis).254 In 
this system some are indeed ‘more equal than others’. Nozick may well be correct to argue 
that, “It cannot merely be assumed that equality must be built into any theory of justice,”255 
however ‘equality’ does not necessarily imply redistribution, as he seems to assume. Instead 
under a conception of justice as fairness, equality would require – by methods such as 
ensuring equality of opportunity - the equal protection of the liberty of all affected parties. 
The onus is on us to recognise that an economic system that protects the liberty of one party 
to the detriment of another is unjust, and hence ought to be revised. 
 
II. Business and Social Justice 
In the next and final chapter I shall describe how business operations can be remodelled to 
align more closely with these rational common sense considerations of social justice. There is 
another argument to address however and this is the argument that as businesses are not 
persons they are not endowed with the same responsibilities as humans. They are not moral 
beings and so demanding that they conform to our moral assumptions is inappropriate. 
Friedman makes what has come to be known as his ‘third argument’256 in this regard. He 
suggests that while we might indeed say that individuals have a direct responsibility to the 
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public good, we cannot say the same of social constructs like businesses which are not 
persons. Businesses are artificial entities and it is thus not correct to assume that they ought to 
behave morally. Albert Carr makes a similar argument in his notorious paper, “Is Business 
Bluffing Ethical?” He argues that “the ethical standards of the business game … are a far cry 
from those of private life.”257 As such he likens business to poker, arguing that those not 
prepared to bluff in their dealings are foolish. Like poker, business is an impersonal game, “a 
game that demands both special strategy and an understanding of its special ethics.”258 Hence 
those business ‘players’ that abide by the morality of persons, and not of ‘the game’ are 
almost certainly destined for failure. Business executives should do whatever they possibly 
can, Carr argues, to make money, but without breaking the law. Concern for ethical custom is 
for him entirely irrelevant in a business context. Thus, he concludes, a company has “the 
legal right to shape its strategy without reference to anything but its profits.”259 
 However Carr’s argument is fundamentally flawed on the basis that, unlike poker, 
business actions can have a profound, morally relevant effect on society. Business is indeed 
“a part of society rather than apart from society”260 and is a key social player. As Colin Fisher 
and Alan Lovell write, “The argument to leave business alone ignores the profound influence 
of corporate decisions and their impact upon, potentially millions of lives.”261 They suggest 
that artificial entities can develop “to such an extent that society deems it necessary to place 
constraints, or responsibilities, upon corporations.”262 Such developments would not be 
philosophically objectionable or flawed because insofar as businesses have morally relevant 
effects they ought also to have the attendant moral responsibilities. Without a doubt business 
is a key social player – many corporations are wealthier than some countries – and so the 
argument that businesses do not have a direct responsibility to the public good because they 
are artificial constructs is seriously misguided. Friedman himself seems to contradict ‘the 
third argument’ when he writes that businesses ought to conform to “the basic rules of 
society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom” (my italics).263 
The idea that there is in some way a disjuncture between personal and business values has 
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become effectively ubiquitous and as discussed with reference to Enron, this is deeply 
problematic. As Robert Jackall writes in Moral Mazes: 
 
What is right in the corporation is not what is right in a man’s home or in his church. What is right in 
the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you. That’s what morality is in the corporation264 
  
 
There is no legitimate reason for this separation, in fact there are good reasons to suggest that 
this convention is entirely inappropriate. Businesses are indeed endowed with specific 
responsibilities to the public good that go beyond increasing profits. 
Solomon and Martin’s ‘ascending circle of responsibilities’ and the broad assumption 
that business has a primary responsibility to social flourishing is, on the other hand, 
altogether justifiable. They argue that:  
 
Even if business is out to make a profit, social responsibility, which is not intrinsic to business life as 
such, may be more important; indeed, it may even be the reason for the existence of business and 
business life in the first place265  
   
  
Their claim here is an important one. They are in essence arguing that while profit-making 
might be a necessary feature of business, it is not the end of business. Profit-making can only 
ever be a means to achieving a greater aim and that greater aim is something that is not only 
instrumentally valuable: social justice. Just as we might say that a functioning digestive 
system is necessary for a good life but not an end of life, so we might say that profit-making 
might be necessary for a business to fulfil its social aims, but not that it is the end of business. 
Aesop’s fable, ‘The Miser’, teaches in very simplistic, but very effective terms that money is 
not in and of itself valuable; it is only valuable insofar as it used for another purpose. It is a 
short story and so I shall quote it in entirety:   
 
A Miser sold everything he had and bought a lump of gold, which he buried in a hole in the ground by 
the side of an old wall and went to look at every day. One of the Miser’s workers observed his frequent 
visits to the spot and decided to keep an eye on the Miser. The worker soon discovered the hidden 
treasure, and digging down, came to the lump of gold, and sold it. The next time the Miser visited his 
gold, he found the hole empty and began to tear his hair and sob loudly. A neighbour, seeing him, 
overcome with grief and learning the cause, said, ‘Pray do not grieve so. Go and take a stone, place it 
in the hole, and pretend that the gold is still lying there. It will have the same effect; for when the gold 
was there, you didn’t really have it, as you did not make the slightest use of it’266  
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The Miser might just as well gloat over a stone as a piece of gold, as money has no intrinsic 
worth. If I take your R100 note and replace it with another R100 note, you have lost nothing. 
Yet, if I take your child and replace it with another child you lose much. The value of gold 
lies only in the value we attach to it as a means to achieving other ends. The point is that it is 
not correct to argue that the end of business is to make money, because making money is not 
a legitimate end. The point of business in the first place is rather, as Solomon and Martin 
point out, to be actively committed to ensuring the conditions necessary for social justice. 
This end cannot be implicitly assumed behind the guise of self-interest as Friedman, Hayek 
and even Smith attempt to do.  
 Rather, in order for a business to remain genuinely committed to its real end this end 
cannot be obscured in any way. It is not correct for people to be kept ignorant of the ultimate 
aim of business as they are via the argument from enlightened self-interest. We therefore 
have a positive duty to restructure economic and business principles so business will indeed 
succeed in what it sets out to do, that is, to be an instrument of social justice. This is because 
social justice is not, as we have seen, a ‘happy by-product’ of self-interested profit-making. It 
becomes instrumental and can be trumped by profit-making and this is just not the right way 
to treat the ultimate end of business and society. To suggest that there is a correlation 
between acting in one’s own interests and acting in the interests of society in general is (as 
shown in the beginning of this chapter) to misunderstand what morality, and in particular 
social justice, requires. The end of business is social justice and this must be instated as the 
end of business, from everyday operations to performance measurements. Profits should only 
be valued insofar as they are instrumental to achieving social ends. This means (as shown 
above) that we have a duty to regulate business operations so that the demands of justice are 
not forgotten or ignored. Denying that ‘increasing profits’ is the ‘social responsibility of 
business’ does not imply that businesses should not make profits. Rather, the point is that 
profit-making is not what ultimately makes them successful.   
 In conclusion both of the arguments for the primacy of profits discussed in Chapter 
One – the argument from enlightened self-interest and the argument from freedom – are 
inappropriate because they do not conform to our rational assumptions about what is required 
to achieve social justice. A fair or just society would be one that protects the freedom of all 
individuals by ensuring the conditions necessary for equality of opportunity. The free-market 
economic system results in inequalities and freedom restrictions that are unfair and hence 
unjust. The notion of freedom that is defended by neoliberals is very limited indeed, in that it 
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favours the liberty of a capital-owning elite. This is to the detriment of employees, 
communities and the environment, whose roles in the chain of production are of equal import 
and value to the role played by shareholding investors, as Kelly argues. So, as Solomon and 
Martin propose “A corporation [therefore] has obligations not only to its stockholders but 
also to its stakeholders, all of those people who have a vested interest in or are affected by the 
activities of the company” (their italics).267 But more than this, given the critical position that 
businesses hold in society, they are a part of those who are thereby endowed with the positive 
responsibility to ensure that our society is a just one. That is, that it is one in which all 
persons are assured of the conditions necessary for them to pursue a good life.  
Given their necessary grounding in the fabric of society businesses cannot be 
legitimately exempt from conforming to our most basic moral commitments. As it stands 
however, business purpose is still very largely assumed to be profit-making, but this is not a 
legitimate end. Instead the end of business is social justice and this is not achieved by 
indulging greedy self-interest. Social justice ought therefore to be made explicit in business 
motivations and operations. By the same token, profit-making should be valued only as a 
means to this ultimate goal. We thus have a moral responsibility to restructure our economic 
and business systems so that they are indeed fair to all concerned and so that they actively 
and knowingly advance equality of opportunity. Doing this will better achieve the initial aim 
of economic philosophy: to describe the conditions necessary for genuine social development 
and flourishing, that is, social justice.   
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CHAPTER 4: 
EFFECTING CHANGE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR SUCCESS 
 
Restoration calls, however, not for changes in ethics alone. The nation asks for action, and action now268 
We believe that in the long run the special contribution to the world by Africa will be in the field of human 
relationship. The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and 
military look, but the great gift still has to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face269 
 
Given that social justice is the end of business operations, and profit-making simply a means 
to this end, we have to restructure our business and economic systems to better reflect this 
relationship. It is inappropriate to measure the success of a business in financial terms 
because this is simply not the ultimate aim of business. Therefore we ought to redefine 
success in terms of that which is ultimately aimed at, that is, in terms of social justice. 
Success in business terms ought to be determined according to the business’s ability to fulfil 
its ultimate social and environmental aims. Financial measurements only reflect a company’s 
instrumental capacity to address social and environmental concerns and not its actual 
fulfilment of these ultimate ends. What counts as ‘successful’ in business terms needs to be 
redefined. 
 In this chapter I shall suggest some ways in which we can begin to redefine success in 
business by restructuring business operations so that the ultimate aim of social justice is 
neither obscured nor ignored. I shall argue that effective change will require a combination of 
both individual effort and systemic changes to both the internal and external climates of 
business. It is simply not true that business and ethics are in tension with each other. As 
demonstrated in Chapter One, most neoliberals argue that the incorporation of explicit ethical 
concerns into business practice has the potential to seriously disrupt the functioning of market 
mechanisms. This, the argument goes, will have extremely detrimental effects on the 
economic health of businesses and so too on society. However, such concerns are misplaced. 
It is quite possible to fulfil financial aims but at the same time to do so in a manner that 
advances the public good. We can indeed restructure business operations in such a way that 
they will not contradict our fundamental moral assumptions. Morality, at the very least, 
demands that we do no harm. However, as Robert Solomon and Clancy Martin (for example) 
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argue, businesses have a further positive duty to ensure that the social conditions necessary 
for equality of opportunity prevail. For them the more money a business makes, the greater 
their responsibility to society. Whether we take a business’s moral responsibility to society as 
being ‘to do no harm’ or as the more onerous ‘to do some good’, there is no doubt that, in 
modern businesses moral concerns are consistently overlooked. Given the significant social 
position that business holds, the instrumental treatment of moral concerns is unacceptable, 
particularly when such concerns are trumped by the bottom line.  
 As neoliberalism implies that we ought to act from self-interest in the market, 
economic structures have been arranged to ensure the conditions necessary for people to act 
from that interest: narrowly defined, as described, in monetary terms. Yet, as previously 
introduced, the construal of self-interest as being almost entirely about making as much 
money as possible portrays a very narrow conception of what motivates us as human beings. 
Insofar as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek suggest that we ought to act from self-
interest, their conception of what qualifies as self-interest is, as argued, distinctly materialistic 
in nature. In contrast, Adam Smith’s argument for ‘fellow-feeling’ suggests that part of what 
motivates us is the desire to treat other people with due dignity and respect. Yet, as 
mentioned in Chapter Three, these kinds of considerations are not intrinsic to the dominant 
global economic paradigm. Instead, the system, through mass-advertising, encourages 
rampant consumerism and greed by attaching worth and success only to material, or 
financial, gains. As Henry David Thoreau observes: 
 
If a man walks in the woods for love of them half a day, he is in danger of being regarded as a loafer; 
but if he spends his whole day as a speculator, shearing off those woods and making earth bald before 
her time, he is esteemed an industrious and enterprising citizen270    
  
 
 
 Robert and Edward Skidelsky’s aim in How Much is Enough: Money and the Good 
Life is to highlight the absurdity of considering money as an ultimate end and hence as the 
motivator for human action. They argue that money is only an instrument to achieving what 
we really value – they list seven goods: health, respect, security [especially of one’s job], 
personality, harmony with nature, friendships and leisure – and that these things, not money, 
are what ultimately motivate us. For them capitalisme sauvage informs an exceptionally 
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narrow view of the good life. Hence both our economic assumptions and our personal 
standards of ‘success’ ought to be revised. 
The mistaken presumption that we are all fundamentally miserly and materialistic has 
created what one could almost call a social pathology. John Kenneth Galbraith argues that as 
a result of free-market capitalism we have lost our sovereignty and independence. He claims 
that the classical idea of “consumer sovereignty”271 has been replaced by the “monolithic 
corporation”272 that creates consumer demand by mass market advertising. Friedman is hence 
rash to argue that:  
 
In fact, the people responsible for pollution are consumers, not producers. They create, as it were, 
demand for pollution. People who use electricity are responsible for the smoke that comes out of the 
stacks of generating plants273 
 
  
It is much more complicated than this, Galbraith argues. Structural conditions create the 
social pathologies – greed and consumerism – that inform reckless business operations. 
Hence, the possibility for genuine choice does not exist in the ‘free’ market, Galbraith 
concludes. Overturning these ‘pathologies’ will have to involve both systemic and individual 
changes.  
Anthony Giddens argues that a combination of individual moral agency and systemic 
changes will be sufficient, if not to completely eradicate amorality (or even immorality) in 
business, at least to significantly reduce it. He calls this combination of the self and the 
system working to alter conditions ‘structuration’.274 Giddens argues that agency can effect 
change but that in order for such changes to be meaningful institutional and organisational 
measures need to be implemented so that it becomes less easy for individuals to evade their 
moral obligations.275 Hence, “Structuration is the idea that there is a duality to human 
action”276 in the sense that while our actions are guided by social structures, or in this case 
business systems, individual actions “can both define and change those structures.”277 
Therefore, he argues, we ought not to be intimidated by the magnitude of the task before us: 
it is indeed achievable.   
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Structures both internal and external to business need to better reflect the ultimate end 
of business, viz social justice. These changes will have to be coupled with individual efforts 
in order to ensure that the real goal of business is achieved. With regard to internal changes I 
shall discuss business management and corporate governance changes; as well as how 
business cultures might be changed so that the expression of individual moral agency within 
business becomes possible. In this latter section I shall argue that the African philosophy of 
Ubuntu – the recognition of our implicit connectedness to other people, of all generations, 
and to the planet – could be useful in terms of creating more ethical business cultures. With 
regard to external changes I shall discuss the need for greater regulation; the restructuring of 
stock markets so that success is considered in terms of the ultimate ends of business and not 
the instrumental means; the onus on consumers in terms of awareness and responsible 
investment, and related to this, the onus on academic institutions, especially business schools, 
to adapt their curricula; and finally the onus on regional and global economic institutions and 
associations and the need for a global commitment among different individual national 
governments. I shall conclude with two brief case studies (The Grameen Bank and Interface) 
intended to show that the vision for more ethical business practice is not in fact unachievable.  
 
I. Internal Changes: 
A. Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Management 
Changes within business will have, probably necessarily, to begin with those who run them. 
The management team of a business, or the governors of a corporation, are after all the one’s 
who will ultimately make the decisions and determine the path that a business will take. It is 
therefore appropriate to begin the discussion of change here. There have been numerous 
efforts worldwide to redesign corporate governance policies, but for the sake of brevity I 
shall focus on South Africa’s King Reports and Codes for Corporate Governance.278 The 
most recent King Report, King III, is certainly a step towards ensuring fewer negative 
externalities, greater environmental and economic sustainability and a greater representation 
of interests. However, it is not free from criticism, as I shall argue below.  
 I shall not describe King III in too much detail, as it is a very detailed and thorough 
document. There are nine key governance elements that serve as a guide for management 
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teams to implement sustainable strategies.279 There are three core principles to the document: 
leadership, which recognises that sustainable businesses need engaged and dedicated leaders; 
sustainability, which speaks, primarily, to the fact that a long-term approach to profit-making 
will have to involve stakeholder engagement and sound environmental policies; and 
corporate citizenship, which recognises that businesses do not operate in a vacuum and that, 
in fact, they are embedded in their social and environmental contexts. It also recognises, in 
contrast to Friedman’s third argument, that businesses are ‘moral agents’ and that they are 
endowed with the responsibilities of citizenship. These values contribute to an overall vision 
for corporate governance: ‘leadership for sustainability leads to responsible corporate 
citizenship’. King III urges the governors of all entities – that is, not just businesses – to 
engage with the document and apply the principles as applicable. It is not therefore meant to 
be taken as simply a list of boxes to check, but rather as platform for an honest engagement 
with the issues surrounding sustainability.     
 In the eighth governance element, ‘Governing Stakeholder Relationships’, King III 
urges the leaders of an entity to engage with all of their relevant stakeholders to ensure that 
the sustainability of their operations will not be compromised. Stakeholders include all those 
parties that are affected by the operations of a business. The term has arisen in opposition to 
the belief that managers are only answerable to stockholders, or shareholders. Shareholders 
are stakeholders in a business, but they are not the only ones that hold a ‘stake’, as it were, in 
the business. Customers, employees, suppliers, the government, and the communities within 
which business operations occur, for example, are all relevant stakeholders in a business. The 
environment is also considered to be a stakeholder, often referred to as ‘the silent 
stakeholder’, and in the case of large corporations, is ideally represented by environmental 
impact assessors. King III recognises that stakeholder interests may often vary and that 
deciding which values, or whose interests, are more important is no easy task. However after 
engaging with a variety of concerns, leaders are encouraged to make the decision that they 
deem to be in the best long-term interests of the company, or entity.        
 The vision of King III is best understood with reference to the historical context that 
gave rise to King I in 1994. The political leaders of the time recognised that societal change 
from the divisive and authoritarian conditions of apartheid, would have to include a change in 
business practices. Just as previously alienated peoples would have to recognise their 
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“universal brotherhood”280 and “spiritual collectiveness,”281 so businesses must recognise 
their connectivity to a broader society. King I (and also King II and III) thus describes the 
economic imperative of a company to create wealth within its broader context, and not at the 
expense of it. Leaders have to personally recognise the interconnectedness of business, 
society and nature. Thus we see how systemic changes can inform individual changes, and 
visa versa. King II says of King I that:       
 
Unlike its counterparts in other countries at the time, the King Report, 1994, went beyond the financial 
and regulatory aspects of corporate governance in advocating an integrated approach to good 
governance in the interests of a wide range of stakeholders having regard to the fundamental principles 
of good financial, social, ethical and environmental practice282     
  
 
This holistic approach to business is an attempt to widen the parameters of business purpose 
to include more than simply profit-making.   
However, the justificatory status of all the King reports is that this is what is in the 
best long-term, sustainable interests of the company, where those interests are defined in 
financial terms. For King III essentially ‘ethical business is good business’ implying that 
profit-making is still ultimately the point of good governance policy. Thus, despite its 
‘universal brotherhood’ rhetoric, King III still reaffirms the paradigm that business is only 
about making money. Even if it is true that business practices are more ethical because of 
governance codes like King III, this is still not enough to ensure that businesses are primarily 
committed to their ultimate aim (social justice) and not simply to the instrumental means to 
this aim (profit).  
 The real ends of business are obscured and masked behind the professed commitment 
to economic sustainability. So while high-minded theorists might see the bigger picture, not 
all those involved in business necessarily will. Neoliberalism, despite its theoretical claims to 
be just, is responsible for creating a world in which profit is generally seen to be the ultimate 
end of business. Legitimate moral concerns are therefore all too easily disregarded. The point 
is that if we really want our economic systems and business practices to achieve their social 
aims then we need to make these aims the explicit end of business, and not hide them behind 
profit-making, or even ‘sustainability’. The choices made by a governance team must be 
informed by a proper sense of what the ultimate point of corporate activity is. Perhaps a 
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future King IV could be instrumental in beginning to change the paradigm within which 
business operations currently occur. This could be done by stressing the fact that the reason 
for profit-making in the first place is social development and well-being, that is, social 
justice. Its rhetoric could change from being about sustainability to being about sustainability 
for social justice. Substantial shifts in other areas of business (both internal and external), as 
well as in individual mindsets, would have to accompany such progress however, in order for 
this approach to be truly understood. A new economic paradigm will not solely be achieved 
by changes in management and governance but changes in management and in the principles 
and assumptions behind it are nonetheless central to achieving such an aim.     
 
B. Business Cultures and Moral Agency 
The second change internal to business that could also contribute to creating a more ethical 
economic climate is in the sphere of business cultures. This suggestion involves more 
individual effort than actual structural changes, as it relates to how individual moral agency 
can be exerted in the workplace. The ability of individuals to act as moral agents within 
organisations has certainly not been something that has reigned supreme in the modern 
corporation. Instead, as in the case of Enron, the dominant business culture was one of make 
money, at whatever cost. The traders were all too easily able to ignore their personal values 
because they were part of a culture (system) in which the only relevant value was profit-
making. As argued in the previous chapter, the disjunction between personal values and 
business values is one of the main problems with neoliberal economics. Instead what we truly 
value ultimately in our lives ought to be explicitly valued, regardless of the context. Solomon 
and Martin hence argue that, of the key developments that will be necessary for more ethical 
business practice, one of the most important is for there to be a much closer integration 
between our personal, and particularly our ultimate, values and the values of business.283 If 
the ethos of a business is not moral then we can hardly expect its operations and practices to 
be so. The question then is how to foster organisational cultures that are “conducive to well-
intentioned expressions of concern and the fostering of ethical behaviour”?284 
 Colin Fisher and Alan Lovell offer a plan for enabling the expression of moral agency 
in the workplace as a means of resolving internal ethical issues. The nature of their 
suggestions are such that they would also be useful in terms of balancing stakeholder interests 
and deciding on a plan of action. Fisher and Lovell ultimately argue that dialogue and debate, 
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on many levels, would be critical. They suggest that there are two important elements that 
individuals within business will have to address when faced with a complex ethical issue. The 
first is deciding what to do and the second is summoning up the will to actually do it. Fisher 
and Lovell suggest a three-tiered approach to making a principled judgement regarding the 
resolution of problematic ethical issues. Firstly, we need to exercise our moral imagination by 
not simply following previous solutions to past problems. Then we need to discern the ethical 
nuances of the particular issue with which we are concerned, adopting a case-by-case basis to 
our judgements. They suggest that moral imagination “requires pictures and passion, not 
maps alone.”285 Once the ethical concerns have been identified we then follow a process of 
what Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin call ‘casuistry’.286 The “particularities and 
peculiarities”287 of each case are examined and internalised. Jonsen and Toulmin argue that 
this kind of approach is necessary because: 
 
A morality built from general rules and universal principles alone too easily becomes a tyrannical 
disproportioned thing, and … only those who have learned to make ‘equitable allowances’ for the 
subtle individual differences among otherwise similar circumstances have developed a true feeling for 
the deepest demands of ethics288 
    
 
Once ‘the subtle individual differences’ have been both identified and understood we are 
able, Jonsen and Toulmin suggest, to engage in ‘moral double-loop learning’. Moral double-
loop learning involves discerning not only the moral issues and circumstances of a particular 
case but also the identification of the rules and assumptions that led to the problem in the first 
place.289 This enables us to improve the business culture itself by making ourselves, and 
others, aware of the failings that are contributing to the creation of ethical problems, both in 
the workplace and in how the business operates. Finally, in order to ensure that we can come 
up with the best possible solution to the problem at hand Fisher and Lovell suggest that we 
engage in dialogue and debate with our colleagues (and/or with stakeholders if relevant) who 
will thereby also assert their own moral agency. This process will lead us, Fisher and Lovell 
argue, to make a principled judgement as to what ought to be done to rectify the perceived 
problem.  
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 Now that it has been decided what to do, we then have to summon up the will to do it, 
Fisher and Lovell argue.290 They suggest that leaders ought to foster a climate or culture in 
which concerned individuals are able to express their moral agency. The culture should be 
such that there are no punitive conditions for expressing ethical concerns, rather there should 
be structures in place that encourage concerned individuals to express their concerns. To this 
end they argue that ignorance of harm and wrong-doing should not serve as a legitimate 
excuse in courts of law when company executives are brought to bear for a business’s 
actions. The ‘Aw Shucks’ excuse, as Fisher and Lovell call it, cannot be acceptable, which is 
why it is necessary to create a business culture in which moral agency can flourish.291 They 
conclude that, “At both an institutional and an organisational level we should be setting up 
structures and establishing norms that make it less easy for managers to evade their moral 
obligations.”292 If such structures could be established, Fisher and Lovell argue, then 
summoning up the will to actually do something about the problem will become much easier. 
However, whether Fisher and Lovell’s model could actually be applied is quite 
another question. Their proposals appear to be somewhat cumbersome and time-consuming 
and we have to ask, as they do, whether “the prospects for such open, balanced and informed 
debates are … propitious.”293 Is it possible for companies to be run in the manner of an 
ongoing ethical debate, in such a way that personal values could in fact be integrated with 
business values? Perhaps the prospects might not be all that propitious, but the real question 
is whether or not such dialectical debates within business are in fact necessary. Do we 
genuinely desire to create more ethical business climates in which negative externalities are 
not simply written off, and which do not treat as instrumental those values which we logically 
know to be non-instrumental? One of the most pressing concerns with the bottom-line 
approach to business is, as I have argued, the issue of externalities. Friedman was indeed 
correct when he commented that, “there are real problems in that area, there’s no doubt about 
it” (my emphasis).294 The coffee corporations of Brazil do not seem to particularly ‘mind’ 
that they are driving small-scale, local producers to bankruptcy. The oil and natural gas 
companies operating in the Niger Delta are not concerned with their social and environmental 
impacts for the simple reason that they do not have to be concerned with them. However, if 
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we were to create business cultures that support and encourage dialogue and debate, not only 
among the people working at, for example, Shell but also between Shell and its stakeholders, 
then it seems to be possible that we could in fact create a more ethical business culture. 
Hence, as time-consuming as such debates might be, they might well be necessary for the 
fostering of ethical business.  
 Perhaps the great gift that Steve Biko talks about (see epigraph) to come from Africa 
might be Ubuntu. If individuals can internalise, or even attempt to, the idea of their 
connectivity to a greater cosmos of being, then fostering a business culture of dialogue and 
debate in which moral agency can be exerted might be easier to implement. Richard Welford 
suggests that the key to transformation in the business world lies in shifting our perceptions 
from seeing people and the environment as objects to rather seeing our relationship to 
them.295 Margaret Mead expresses a similar inclination when she writes that all persons, but 
especially business persons, need to: 
 
develop a greater sense of relationship to the whole. Relationship to the planet, in terms of resources 
and production, a relationship to the community in which they exist, a relationship between all the 
different echelons within an industry. Less segmentation, less fractionation, less narrowness of 
approach296 
  
 
Accepting that we are connected would be an individual endeavour but if business cultures 
and structures are set up so as to allow people to engage with each other, as well as with 
stakeholders, then, although this might be time-consuming, it will be a better eco-ethical 
climate than the neo-liberal one that currently reigns supreme. 
 Of course such an integration of the self to the cosmos is very difficult to actually 
adopt, we will always be self-interested to a point. What might be useful then in a business 
context is not to merge ourselves and our opinions into an “indistinguishable oneness”297 but 
rather, as Rogene Buchholz and Sandra Rosenthal suggest, to engage in an “accommodating 
participation.”298 In this way compromises can be creatively sought through an “active 
engagement”299 with each other and each others’ concerns. This kind of approach to Ubuntu 
within business would urge us to see the other’s concerns as legitimate and worthy of 
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attention and accommodation. If businesses are to develop a ‘greater sense of relationship to 
the whole’, then dialogue and debate with the whole will be necessary, however unpropitious. 
If the expression of moral agency in the workplace and in stakeholder management can be 
habituated then it will become a part of business in such a way that it will no longer seem so 
laborious to perform, but will in fact be seen as a key element in developing a business 
strategy and agenda. In other words, eventually we will reach a tipping point where such 
behaviours will become the norm. In this sense individual changes drive structural changes, 
which will then, in turn, drive more individuals to change their approach to management 
procedures. Yet, changes to individual mindsets and the internal structures of business will 
still not be sufficient to ensure that capitalisme sauvage is overturned. They will have to be 
bolstered and supported by a number of external changes.      
 
II. External Changes: 
A. Regulation 
In his article ‘Corporate Citizenship: Rethinking Business Beyond Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ David Birch argues that:  
 
The tensions between capitalism and democracy as currently defined are irreconcilable without serious 
change … Business needs therefore, significant policy directions to enable this change to occur, not 
just within business practices but within society overall300 
 
 
In order to protect individual sovereignty, Galbraith argues that we need to create what he 
calls “countervailing powers”301 against too powerful business interests. For him regulation is 
key to protecting liberty. It is in a deregulated climate that businesses are able to transfer 
many of their costs to society and the environment (as externalities) thereby making others 
pay the true costs of their activities. Given that businesses have a primary responsibility to the 
public good, regulation is all the more crucial. Regulation could be implemented and 
enforced by governments, but perhaps also by publicly-funded independent boards. Either 
way, what is important is for regulators to be independent (both of political and corporate 
agendas), as pointed out in the case of the Niger Delta.    
 In 1997, frustrated with the myopia and impotence of governments to adequately 
respond to corporate wrongdoing, the United Nations set up the ‘Global Compact’. Its 
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intention was to bypass governments as the enforcers of responsible standards and instead to 
get multinational and transnational corporations to comply with the set-out standards via their 
own accord. However, for the obvious reason that there were no punitive measures to punish 
non-compliance, the Global Compact proved to be ‘pie-in-the-sky’. Even among those 
companies that did sign on there were, according to the ‘Gearing Up Report’ of 2004, few 
monitoring powers and verification resources to ensure that the companies were actually 
committed to better practices. The Gearing Up Report thence concluded that the only real 
way to ameliorate business harms was to ensure stricter national regulations, with real 
penalties for poor practice.302 Fisher and Lovell suggest a reward/penalty approach to 
regulation. Rewards for policy compliance and good practice could include grants and tax 
concessions, while punitive measures for non-compliance could include such measures as 
penalties and fines.303 But, the incentive here would be not the public good but rather a 
financial one. We need to find a way of ensuring that the ethical occurs in the right register, 
that is, that people do the good with a proper understanding of the responsibilities of 
business, if we truly desire businesses to act for the public good. 
 Deregulation has clearly failed to achieve what it was set out to do: ensure a fair 
distribution of goods and opportunities and enrich lives across the board. John Maynard 
Keynes argues in Essays in Persuasion that “when the market so dramatically fails to satisfy 
even the minimal needs of so many millions of people, then government intervention is both 
ethically and economically necessary” (my italics).304 Similarly Solomon and Martin write: 
 
Are we not, at least sometimes, wholly justified in imposing on business the strictest regulations and 
the highest penalties without waiting for the world of business to correct itself, perhaps after the 
damage is done?305 
  
 
Solomon and Martin argue that given the magnitude of the task that free-market economics 
sets out for itself – namely to be a major instrument of social justice – this makes 
“governmental regulation and control even more important.”306 For them, governments have 
a responsibility to set adequate policies in place, monitor businesses and punish them when 
standards are violated. 
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 As an aside, another crucial reason to impose regulations from above is that the 
systemic nature of the problems places restrictions on what businesses can do (for the public 
good) in a ‘dog-eat-dog’ environment. Salary regulation is a case in point. It would very 
difficult for one business to remain competitive if it increased its salaries in the face of 
extremely low salaries paid by competitors. Regulation in this case would help ensure a level 
playing field, and potentially help target systemic issues that are very difficult to target at the 
level of companies in the first instance.   
 Aside from punitive measures for non-compliance, perhaps a ‘licence to operate’ 
strategy would also be effective in ensuring high ethical standards in business. Businesses 
would have to earn and maintain their licence to operate. If a corporation is seen to be 
engaging in gross misconducts their licence could be temporarily suspended and all 
operations would have to come to a halt. The licence would only be reinstated after the harm 
has been righted and internal systems have been put in place to ensure that it does not happen 
again. Repeat offenders would eventually have their licence to operate completely revoked 
and the company would, for example be put into liquidation or taken over by another 
company that better fulfils its ultimate aims. This measure might also go a long way in 
ensuring that moral agency is exercised within an organisation. Employees would be ever the 
more vigilant for wrongdoing as they would have a personal incentive to protect the 
organisation within which they work to ensure their own security of income, and more 
broadly, to pursue their conception of the good life.     
 Another issue that could be addressed by governments so that they can act as external 
impetuses for change is corporate lobbying. The vast financial resources of large corporations 
enable them to successfully influence legislative matters by making discernable contributions 
to, for example, presidential campaigns. As Fisher and Lovell comment, “Corporate influence 
remains strong in political corridors and politicians remain highly receptive to corporate 
needs.”307 This state of affairs cannot continue if we are to create ‘countervailing powers’ to 
corporate bottom-line interests. Indeed it is arguable that the entire idea of corporate lobbying 
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is unacceptable and ought to be abandoned, as should all corporate financial ‘donations’ to 
political organisations and parties. But, this is not to suggest that lobbying is in itself a bad 
idea. Many good reforms have been passed as a result of concerned individuals lobbying 
governments for action. What could be done then is for governments to allow lobbying only 
from independent persons, groups or professionals. For example, the moratorium passed by 
the South African government in April 2011 on natural gas exploration in the Karoo was the 
result of lobbying by Karoo landowners and environmental professionals. However, whether 
the lifting of the moratorium on the 7th of September 2012 has been the result of independent 
environmental and economic analysis or corporate (in this case Shell) lobbying is decidedly 
more dubious. This is why corporate lobbying should be eradicated: it is simply far too easy 
for rich and powerful corporations to get their own (bottom-line) way while other legitimate 
values are left by the wayside.  
If society and the environment are not responsible for paying the costs of negative 
externalities, which indeed they are not, then more tightly regulated business operations are 
not negotiable. On this point, at least, most economic philosophers and national governments 
are starting to concur. The free-market is a highly abstract ideal, as Galbraith and Joseph 
Stiglitz (see Chapter Two) argue, and so when businesses fail “to meet the demands of justice 
that we share as a society”308 – which they routinely do given the structural issues with 
neoliberalism – then regulation must be established.    
 
B. Stock Market Changes: A New Paradigm for Measuring the Success of 
Business 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, Aesop’s ‘The Miser’ shows us that a lump of gold has 
no value independent of the use that it is put to. Yet, the structures of neoliberalism are 
arranged so that profits hold an ultimate value status in business. Stock markets are one of the 
most pervasive structures that affirm this mistaken assumption. Success at the stock-exchange 
is, in every respect, defined in terms of financial earnings per share. Value judgements 
amount to nothing more than determining who made, or who will make, the most money. 
Stock exchanges are in essence what cause corporate investors and board members to be, as 
Fisher and Lovell comment, “unrelenting in terms of the enormous pressures placed upon 
company executives to deliver improved financials year upon year, half-year upon half-year, 
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quarter upon quarter.”309 There have been developments recently in terms of the creation of 
adjacent indices that attempt to measure not just how much money was made, but how the 
money was made. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), for example, has the Social 
Responsibility Index (SRI), the Dow Jones in the United States has the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index and the FTSE (Financial Times Stock Exchange) in London, the 
FTSE4Good Index. The idea is that companies are given a second score on the adjacent index 
that reflects the company’s commitment to social and environmental responsibility. This 
score can be used by investors who prefer to make a so-called, responsible investment. 
However, like with the advances made in corporate governance policy, this step is 
insufficient to offset the intrinsic problems with the bottom-line approach to business, and 
indeed neoliberalism in general.  
 The inclusion of triple-bottom line accounting (people, planet, profit), or integrated 
reports, into corporate reporting is an attempt to compel corporations to be more wary of their 
social and environmental impacts. But, insofar as profit remains one of the triple bottom 
lines, this movement is still fundamentally misleading. Profit is not the end of business, social 
justice is, and as such, the financial bottom-line should only be valued instrumentally. 
Making money is a means by which businesses are able to contribute to the public good, but 
it is not the end of business. It would not be appropriate to completely ignore the financial 
imperatives of a business, but these should be, as Fisher and Lovell argue, “a minimum 
constraint”310 and not “a maximising objective.”311 Financial returns on an investment are 
important insofar as they ensure a steady flow of capital into the business, but given that a 
business’s primary responsibility is to the public good, the financial interests of investors 
ought not to be the ‘be-all and end-all’ of business operations. Instead, Fisher and Lovell 
argue, if returns are set a minimum level, say 10%, then financial considerations will not be a 
maximising criteria. Focusing on maximising the bottom-line for the sake of shareholders 
makes financial aims parasitical upon ultimate aims, and so in the end, the stock market 
system is fundamentally subversive to the real ends of business.  
  In order for a company to list publicly, that is to be on a stock exchange, that 
company must be worth a certain amount, where that amount is rather substantial. So, if 
Solomon and Martin are correct in arguing that the more moneyed a business is the greater 
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their responsibilities, then public-listed corporations are all the more endowed with the 
responsibility to ensure that the conditions necessary for equality of opportunity are realised. 
The role of business in the social compact is to be an instrument of social justice, yet stock 
markets, as they are currently structured, incongruously do not measure a corporation’s 
commitment to this ultimate end. They need therefore to be reorganised.  
 One suggestion in this regard is for stock exchanges to be rearranged so that the 
criteria of responsibility indices apply across the board. There should not, in other words, be 
two separate indices. If a company fulfils certain social and environmental criteria, and if 
their net financial worth warrants a public-listing, then and only then can they list on a stock 
exchange. As it currently stands, the onus to be responsible lies solely with investors. Those 
companies that do not see a need to list on both indices can still very well ignore their social 
and environmental responsibilities and choose to list only on the all-share index. Only those 
investors who are committed to a broader sense of business value will choose to put their 
investment in a corporation based on its high, for example, SRI score. This is obviously 
problematic. If we are to ensure that the end of business is made more explicit and that 
companies cannot evade their ultimate commitments, then the criteria for a public-listing 
need to be made far more stringent. Corporations will have to fulfil certain social and 
environmental obligations before they can list and so in this way any investment made will 
necessarily be a responsible one.  
 A particular problem with this suggestion is raised by Wayne Norman and Chris 
Macdonald who argue that social and environmental impacts can only ever be measured 
qualitatively. They therefore criticise triple bottom line initiatives for involving “subjective 
value judgements, about which reasonable people can and will legitimately disagree.”312 
Financial measures are quantitative, and so business success is far more easily measured in 
these terms, they argue. However, firstly, success cannot be defined in financial terms. A 
company might make a lot of money, but yet be very unsuccessful in ensuring social justice. 
Hence, however qualitative social and environmental measures might be, at least they are 
measuring the right thing. If the idea is rather that financial measures can be used to 
determine a company’s fulfilment of social justice ends, then this is still not correct. There is 
simply not enough of a correlation between financial wealth and social justice, and so the 
suggestion that a company’s bottom-line gives a good indication of their commitment to 
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social justice is inappropriate. Secondly, social and environmental assessments need not 
necessarily involve unreliable qualitative measures.   
The JSE’s SRI, for example, approaches assessment in a ‘yes/no’ style, applied under 
nine broad criteria. There are three categories of assessment: ‘Environment’; ‘Social’; and 
‘Governance and Related Sustainability Concerns’. Under each of these three categories, 
‘Policy and Strategy’; ‘Management and Performance’; and ‘Reporting’ are assessed, thereby 
making nine broad criteria groups. Instead of attempting to make qualitative assessments, the 
SRI looks for certain predetermined indicators, to which the only response given is yes or no. 
For example, one criteria under ‘Environment’ and ‘Policy and Strategy’ is: Is there evidence 
of responsibility for the policy, e.g. have company executives and/or directors signed off on 
the reports?313 Assessing this does not have to involve a qualitative judgement. The answer is 
either yes or no. In order to list on the SRI a company must have fulfilled the majority of 
indicators (which are vast) in all nine groups. There are core indicators and desirable 
indicators, and at least one third of the core indicators must be met. Under the category 
‘Environment’, corporations are classed into three levels: high impact (e.g. mining), medium 
impact (e.g. banks) and low impact (e.g. IT firms), depending on the type of industry which 
the business is involved in. The criteria are more stringent according to the environmental 
impact of the business’s core operations. A company is given a score based on how many 
criteria it meets. This system is a step towards resolving the problem of having to make 
qualitative assessments, but more needs to be done. We need, as Norman and Macdonald 
rightly argue, to develop a global methodology that would be useful in terms of ranking a 
company’s social and environmental achievements.314  
 An interesting question is whether a company that does not make money, but which 
makes a big contribution to ensuring social justice, would be considered successful. Say, for 
example a company develops a malaria vaccine and they do so in a manner that empowers its 
employees and the surrounding community. At the same time, their operations have a zero-
impact on the environment, but this company only breaks even. Are we to consider it a 
successful enterprise? Yes. If success is measured in terms of the ultimate ends of business, 
then this company would certainly be successful. One could perhaps argue that some profits 
ought to have been made in order to, for example, fund future projects or ensure a steady 
stream of investment, and perhaps this is fair. Making money is, in many ways, what makes it 
possible for a business to fulfil its social and environmental goals. But when all is said and 
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done, this company has been an instrument for social justice. The value that we attach to 
profits must only amount to how far they are useful for a company to fulfil its ultimate aims.       
This suggestion is perhaps rather radical, however, given the entrenched problems 
with neoliberalism, radical change is required. In many ways neoliberalism affirms, if not 
creates, the belief that success is to be measured in financial terms. As Galbraith writes: 
 
Good performance is measured by the production of material objects and services. Not education or 
literature or the arts but the production of automobiles, including SUVs: Here is the modern measure of 
economic and therewith social achievement315   
 
 
Redefining success in business terms demands that individuals change their own assumptions 
about success as well. As the Skidelskys argue (above) success is not about material wealth, 
it is about respect, personality, harmony with nature and friendships, for example. We should 
make enough money to be able to pursue our ultimate ends, but we should recognise that 
money is only instrumental to these.316 Their argument is informed by Aristotle, who argues 
that: “The good thing is that at which all things aim … and men are agreed that this is called 
happiness.”317 Ultimately it will be individuals that have to decide what kind of world they 
wish to live in and what kind of values they wish to underpin their economic systems. 
Solomon and Martin conclude their Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business 
Ethics by arguing that: 
 
In business life, one ingredient in the good life stands out before all of the others: success. It is not to be 
conceived simply in terms of money, although making money is obviously an important part of it. 
Respect of colleagues and neighbours is far more important … Making money, like having money, is a 
means, not an end. Appreciating and aspiring to the good life in business means looking beyond ‘the 
bottom line’ to the real values that rule our lives318 (their italics) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
315 Galbraith, J.K., The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time, p.15-16.  
316 They also argue that national success needs to be redefined. Instead of measuring it in terms of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) – the amount of goods and services that enter into and are exchanged in a market in a 
given year – we should rather measure national success in the kind of way that Bhutan does, as Gross National 
Happiness (GNH). This is because they recognise that GDP gives no real indication of a country’s ability to 
meet its ultimate goals. See for example, Kelly, A., ‘Gross National Happiness in Bhutan: the big idea from a 
tiny state that could change the world’, The Observer, 1 Dec. 2012 (online).  
317 Aristotle, as quoted in Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line: An Introduction to Business 
Ethics, p.12. 
318 Solomon, R.C. and Martin, C., Above the Bottom Line, p.513.  
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C. Consumer Awareness, Investor Responsibility and Education 
“It is all too easy to pass all the responsibility for curing the ills of the world on to corporate 
executives, with consumers accepting no responsibility,” Fisher and Lovell maintain. Even if 
Galbraith is correct that consumer sovereignty is largely an elusive concept, we should not 
allow this to imply consumer apathy. If we are to be sovereign over business, and not the 
other way around, then we have the responsibility to ensure this. If enough people begin to 
demand higher standards in business and also that businesses have an explicit commitment to 
social justice before anything else, then eventually a tipping point will be reached and 
businesses will begin to change. I shall argue in this section that the exertion of individual 
moral agency can indeed effect structural change.  
 Patience Kabamba explores the relationship between sovereignty, power and 
individuals.319 He argues that power as potentia, as Spinoza calls it, should be seen as 
“ontologically prior” or “anterior” to state power. Individuals are able, Kabamba argues, to be 
creative and productive, even to the point of governing their own social relations and 
development, through their exertion of power as potentia; as the creative ability that is the 
primary endowment of the human species. Kabamba uses this assessment to support free-
market neoliberalism in particularly African contexts where the nation state (Spinoza’s 
concept of power as potestas) has failed to provide good governance. To this end, Kabamba 
argues that governance can come from individual efforts that are separate from government. 
For him, having a free market removes the need for onerous regulations and impositions from 
the state because in post-colonial Africa, he argues, the state has largely failed to deliver on 
the promises of good governance. Therefore, involving the state in business is not always a 
good idea. In response to the lack of good governance, some communities have begun to 
exert their power as potentia. For example, the Nande people in the Beni and Lubero 
territories of north-western DRC have organised social governance through traders who 
maintain the roads and have helped to build a university and have stocked it with books.320 
Individuals have taken on the responsibilities that they feel governments ought to perform, 
and have thus had a positive impact on society.  
 This situation is dependent on the good will of traders insofar as they are individual 
community members and speaks to the fact that individuals are capable of exerting a 
powerful force for change. In the context of the war-torn DRC a free-market might not 
                                                            
319 Kabamba, P., ‘In and Out of the State: Working the Boundaries of Power in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’, Working Paper Series #15, 2012. 
320 Ibid.  
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necessarily be a bad thing, that is, as long as the traders continue to see a higher purpose to 
their own wealth creation and business pursuits. Regulation is only appropriate if those 
enforcing it are properly informed and committed to the belief that business cannot ignore its 
moral imperative to be committed to the public good. Kabamba’s ultimate point is not that 
free-market capitalism is necessarily a good thing, it is that individuals need not feel impotent 
in the face of daunting tasks.  
 Naomi Klein argues that individual consumer pressure can indeed be powerful 
enough to effect meaningful change in business. She describes the success of a student 
boycott movement against Pepsi that began at Carleton University in Ottawa in 1993 and 
spread throughout the United States by 1996. Students at Carleton became outraged after 
their university signed a deal with Pepsi, which gave Pepsi exclusive vending machine rights 
on the campus. Although “resentful at being forced into this tacit product endorsement,”321 
the primary cause for the students’ anger was based on the fact that Pepsi was producing and 
selling their products in the then dictatorship of Burma (now Myanmar). Thanks to the 
internet and email a group of concerned students were able to rapidly spread their message to 
boycott Pepsi throughout campuses in Canada and the United States. By April 1996 the 
movement had taken such strong hold among students that Harvard University rejected a 
US$1 million vending deal with Pepsi, citing the company’s Burmese holdings.322 
Eventually, after a series of such failed campus deals, Pepsi announced its “total 
disengagement”323 from Burma in January 1997, thereby refusing to collaborate with the 
dictatorial regime. Zar Ni, coordinator of the American student movement against Pepsi’s 
Burmese operations, commented that, “We now know we have the grassroots power to yank 
one of the most powerful corporations in the world” (Ni’s emphasis).324 We should not, 
therefore, underestimate the ability of the exertion of individual moral agency to affect 
structural change. This effort had humble beginnings among a few concerned students at a 
relatively small Canadian university.   
 Owens Saro-Wiwa, brother of Ken Saro-Wiwa, argues that, “It is important not to 
make people feel powerless. After all, they need to fill their cars with something. If we tell 
them that all companies are guilty, they will feel they can do nothing.”325 So even if some 
consumers do care enough to want to do something, the task of overhauling such an 
                                                            
321 Klein, N., No Logo, p.402.  
322 Ibid, p.402. 
323 Ibid, p.403. 
324 Ni, Z., as quoted in Klein, N., No Logo, p.403. 
325 Saro-Wiwa, O., as quoted in Klein, N., No Logo, p.423. 
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embedded system of business might be enough to put them off the whole idea. What Saro-
Wiwa thence goes on to suggest as a solution is for consumers to take the task one company 
at a time. By breaking the task into smaller, more manageable chunks, such feelings of 
impotence in the face of such powerful systems might be overcome. So, Saro-Wiwa 
concludes, “What we are trying to really do, now that we have this evidence against this one 
company [Shell], is to let people have the feeling that they can at least have the moral force to 
make one company change.”326 By focusing consumer awareness and boycott efforts on one 
company, in this case Shell – which accounts for more than half of the oil operations in 
Nigeria – it is hoped that other companies will also be pressured into changing. As with the 
case of Pepsi above, if enough people are brought on board then once a critical mass is 
reached, structural changes will become inevitable. The route to collective change does not 
lie in instantaneous overhaul, but in tackling the system one step at a time. The important 
thing is for us to begin discussing the necessity of systemic changes, and a very good place to 
begin this discussion is at academic institutions that are responsible for educating, 
particularly the youth, about the efficacy and ethicality of our socio-economic assumptions. 
We have, particularly in business, lost sight of our ultimate values, and have replaced 
them with the pursuit of things that are not ultimately valuable: money and profits. This 
paradigm creates the unrelenting consumerism which spurs the system on. Bringing these 
problems to light is the first step to altering the current systemic paradigm and quite simply 
the more people that are enlightened, the more the paradigm, and hence the systems, will 
change. Therefore, at both a school and a university level it is necessary for business 
education to be adapted in such a way that the ‘frauds’ – as Galbraith calls them327 - of neo-
classical, free-market economics are made apparent. This would be beneficial in getting 
students to realise the instrumentality of profit-making and the ultimately valuable status of 
social justice. Attached to this it would be important to stress the relevance of, for example, 
stakeholder management, ethical business cultures and what success in business terms 
actually means. If it can be taught that bottom-line principles all too easily lead to harm, 
amorality and even immorality, and that profits should be valued only for their instrumental 
contribution to greater social ends, then we could (theoretically in one or two generations) 
begin to see significant systemic changes. It is therefore an important responsibility of 
academic institutions to adapt their curricula accordingly so as to reflect the importance and 
necessity of both ethical business and ethical consumption.  
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Aside from boycott campaigns, another way that consumers could make a real 
contribution to the creation of more ethical business is by responsible investment. Solomon 
and Martin place particular emphasis on the responsibility of stockholders to effect 
meaningful change. They argue that, “To be a stockholder is to have certain privileges and 
opportunities and, with them, certain responsibilities.”328 “Investors are people, first and 
foremost,” they write: 
 
and as stockholders – ‘owners of a publicly held company’ – are responsible for evaluating their 
investments not only in terms of financial security and expected return but also the quality of the 
company, the way it treats its employees, its impact on the surrounding community, and its attitude 
towards the world329 
   
 
It is crucially important that individuals, as investors, realise the critical role they play in 
creating more ethical business practices, and the more that do so, the more business practices 
will amend. Responsible investment is one area in which real effects could be felt simply as a 
result of heightened personal awareness and responsibility.  
Individual moral efforts can indeed create and inform systemic change. Hence 
education, at an institutional level as well as on a personal level, is necessary for consumers 
to both adopt a more enlightened approach to their own consumerism and to ensure that 
businesses do not ignore, but rather advance – to the best of their ability – the demands for 
justice that we share as a society.    
 
D. Global Commitment 
Klein writes that: 
 
The conduct of the individual multinational corporations is simply a by-product of a broader global 
economic system that has steadily been removing almost all barriers and conditions to trade, 
investment and outsourcing. If companies make deals with brutal dictators, sell off their factories and 
pay wages too low to live on, it’s because there is nothing in our international trading rules to prevent 
them330 
 
  
A global problem requires a global solution. National efforts to ethicise business could be 
decidedly undermined by the lack of a global commitment to oppose irresponsible and 
unsustainable business practices. The need for a global effort is enhanced by the fact of 
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multinational and transnational corporations. As we saw in Chapter Two, corporations can all 
too easily relocate their resourcing and labour operations to countries with laxer standards 
than the one in which the company is managed or listed. Out of bottom-line motivations, 
some large corporations choose to operate in areas where land and labour are cheap and 
where what regulations do exist are seldom enforced. Aside from the obvious problems with 
such instances (eg. human rights violations and environmental degradation), one of the 
biggest problems is that it is extremely difficult to hold these companies accountable for their 
actions. It is very hard to legally punish a company in America for what they have performed 
in Indonesia, for example. For this reason Fisher and Lovell argue that one of the biggest 
tasks facing the shift to responsible business is “to find the institutions and mechanisms by 
which large corporations can be brought to account for their global impacts.”331  
Perhaps the best solution is to model such a global governance initiative after the 
International Criminal Court at the Hague. It could be overseen by an international body, akin 
to, if not, the United Nations and any and all businesses found to be violating a set of globally 
agreed upon standards would be publicly tried and punished. Again, perhaps their licence to 
operate, at least in certain areas, could be revoked. If we cannot find a way to bring 
businesses to account for their global impacts (eg. take Shell’s operations in Nigeria), and if 
global governments and organisations cannot agree upon an international code for business 
conduct then any individual, national, or perhaps even regional, efforts may turn out to be of 
little worth. For example, if South Africa were to restructure its stock exchange - in such a 
way that any company that did not meet the SRI criteria could not list – it would be very 
tempting for a listed corporation to shift its listing to a country with laxer standards. Hence in 
order for stock market restructuring to be successful there would have to be a global 
commitment to redefining business success in ultimate value terms. It might well be enough 
however if the economic superpowers of the world committed to such a move.332 Large 
corporations would probably choose to remain listed in those countries as their scope for 
investment – needed to achieve their ends – would probably be greater the wealthier the 
country is. Nonetheless it remains imperative that the nations of the world collaborate to 
ensure that the kind of harms caused by the bottom-line approach to business are significantly 
reduced, or ideally, entirely eradicated. 
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 Another important facet of global change would be in the international organisations 
that oversee the world’s trade and economic development, particularly the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These 
institutions have been major players in the spreading of neoliberal economic principles 
around the globe. For example, as mentioned in Chapter Two, loans are given to countries 
typically on the condition that they adopt the neoliberal practices of deregulation and 
privatisation. Worldwide public debate and pressure, particularly from those nations, regions 
or continents currently underrepresented in such organisations, is necessary to challenge the 
ideological assumptions and preferences that are built into them. Just as Ubuntu and dialogue 
could be brought into the internal functioning of a business, so could they be brought into our 
global economic institutions. A one-size-fits-all economic model has been found to be 
seriously wanting.  
Take for example the case of Malawi. In 2002 Malawi suffered its worst famine since 
1949 for two reasons. Firstly the crop failed but secondly, and more importantly, the central 
grain stock that had been maintained by the previously state-owned Malawi Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (to protect the public good) had been abandoned as 
a result of the deregulation and privatisation of the corporation. After Malawi applied for a 
loan from the IMF, in 1996 the IMF and World Bank began overseeing the implementation of 
a programme of “austerity, deregulation and privatisation”333 in the Malawian grain industry. 
The regulations that had existed before the IMF-instituted programme led to the absence of a 
central grain stock (because there was no bottom-line incentive to maintain it) and therefore 
no contingency plan for if the grain crop failed. Hence, when it did there were no reserves to 
prevent a famine. Speaking at a G7 meeting in Cancun in 2003 the then Malawian Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, Samuel Mpasu, commented, “We have opened up our economy. 
That’s why we are flat on our backs.”334  
Our international economic institutions have typically placed neoliberal principles 
above all other considerations, imposing on the developing world economic policies that are 
often grossly inappropriate. What should replace this approach is a spirit of cooperation and 
“constructive dialogue”335 in which unique solutions are found to unique problems. The core 
of meaningful business and economic change lies in the realisation of our “universal 
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brotherhood,”336 (my emphasis) to quote King I, and a direct commitment to deliver that 
which economics promises to do: enrich lives. The free-market, bottom-line model has failed 
to deliver and there is indeed an alternative eco-ethical system that is worthy of our 
attention.337 The following two case studies aim very briefly to show that the vision for more 
ethical business practice is not in fact unachievable; it is already a reality.  
 
 
Case Studies:  
A. The Grameen Bank 
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh founded by Muhammad Yunus in 1983 demonstrates that 
it is indeed possible for business to fulfil their social mandate of advancing societal well-
being. In this case profits are created in partnership with society and not at the expense of it. 
Profits are seen as being merely instrumental to the implementation of a greater vision: 
establishing social justice by ensuring the conditions necessary for equality of opportunity. 
The Grameen Bank provides micro-finance, ‘Grameen credit’, to people, particularly the 
poor, without requiring collateral that the poor typically do not have or cannot afford. A 
condition of the loan is that the money be used to either start or expand a business. The 
lending is based on a principle of ‘solidarity lending’. This essentially involves grouping 
debtors into groups of five or six. If one member of the group defaults on a loan, the other 
debtors are not liable to pay it, but rather are simply no longer eligible for further Grameen 
credit until the defaulting member has caught up with her repayments.338 So, it is in the best 
interests of the individual group members to keep a watchful eye on every other member of 
their group to ensure that they are spending their money wisely and making their repayments 
timeously. Before being eligible for Grameen credit every debtor commits to the ‘16 
Decisions’. An example of one of these is that all children of school-going age must be in 
school. So an adult with children that wishes to take a loan must have their children in school. 
If it is found that a debtor has violated any one of the 16 decisions they are either not awarded 
credit, or their loan is revoked.339  
                                                            
336 Institute of Directors, South Africa, ‘King (I) Report on Corporate Governance’, paragraph 38.6 (online).  
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The Grameen Bank claims on its website that it has been responsible for lifting more 
than 20 million Bangladeshis out of poverty since 1983.340 This is measured according to the 
World Bank poverty standards of children being in school, every member of the household 
eating three meals per day, access to clean drinking water and sanitary toilets and living in a 
rainproof home. Added to this is the ability to make an approximately US$4 loan repayment 
per week. Another interesting aspect of the Grameen Bank is that the board of directors is not 
appointed but rather directors are elected from the pool of borrowers and are voted onto the 
board by the millions of credit holders. In this way, “the same people who rely on it for credit 
also have a direct role in managing its operations.”341  
In 2006 the Grameen Bank and Yunus were co-awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 
Representing the Grameen investors and borrowers was Mosammat Taslima Begum who 
used her first micro-loan to buy a goat and became a successful entrepreneur, as well as one 
of the elected board members of the bank. It was, and still is, the only time that a business has 
won this prize, demonstrating that businesses need not only be profit-making machines, they 
can also be powerful and positive forces for change. If business is approached not with 
profits, but with the ultimate goals in mind, then success, in the true meaning of the word, can 
be achieved.   
 
B. Interface 
The carpet manufacturing company Interface founded by Ray Anderson, an environmental 
visionary, aims to be 100% environmentally sustainable by 2020, a plan that has been dubbed 
‘Mission Zero’. The company’s aspiration is to be “the model for the sustainable enterprise of 
the next industrial revolution – ‘The Prototypical Company of the 21st Century’.”342 Interface 
has made great leaps in researching and developing ways to reduce energy usage, reliance on 
non-renewable energy sources, their carbon footprint and the production of waste. For 
example, since 1996, these efforts have resulted in “an 81% decrease in total waste to 
landfills”343 from their carpet factories, as well as a 32% decrease in carbon emissions.344 In 
1996 Interface was completely dependent on non-renewable energy, but by 2011, 31.2% of 
their total energy usage was renewable, with this percentage climbing steadily every year.345 
                                                            
340 Ibid. See also Shahjahan, S., ‘Grameen Voices: Documentary on Grameen Bank’ for a critical review 
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Interface aims to entirely source their raw materials from recycled fibres by 2020. Interface 
hopes to prove to other businesses as well as to society in general that products need not be 
made at a cost to the environment and they hope that the techniques they develop will be 
utilised by others. Even though they are still seven years away from achieving their 100% 
sustainability goal, the company seems set to be successful in this aim. With the recent death 
of Anderson, the leaders and stakeholders of Interface must remain committed to this goal to 
prove that business for justice is not an elusive concept.   
The ultimate end of business operations at Interface is not profits but rather to initiate 
a new model for doing business that recognises and respects the absolute necessity of 
environmental protection. By achieving this goal Interface hopes to impact global business by 
being “restorative through the power of influence.”346 There is a recognition at Interface that 
business success is to be defined much more broadly and that profits ought to be made, not 
for their own sake, but for the purposes of “leaving the world a better place.”347 Anderson 
argues that, “Unless we can make carpets sustainably perhaps we [Interface] don’t have a 
place in a sustainable world but then neither does anybody else.”348      
To achieve their aim of climbing what Anderson calls ‘Mount Sustainability’ - a 
difficult mission, but with a careful and attentive plan, not an impossible one - Interface has 
come up with a number of unique operating initiatives.349 A first example is in the culture at 
Interface. To keep employees connected to Mission Zero, Interface encourages an engaged 
culture by stimulating organisational learning and creating forums for idea-sharing.350 
Employees are encouraged to debate with one another, as well as with management and 
executives on new ideas for achieving Mission Zero. In this way all those at Interface can feel 
that they are a part of a greater plan and so are empowered to effect change. The ‘QUEST’ 
programme (Quality Utilising Employee Suggestions and Teamwork) is an employee-led 
system in which dialogue is encouraged in order to consider a variety of perspectives and 
generate new ideas. “Inviting new thinking and allowing permission to fail creates an 
abundance of positive takers.”351 This programme has been extremely successful. For 
example, an employee team led by Billy Ingram in Georgia, USA developed a new technique 
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for feeding yarn into the carpet manufacturing process. This development has reduced the 
amount of scrap yarn (waste) produced in the process by an estimated 54%.352  
 Interface has also developed two systems for measuring their environmental and 
social performance in real terms. ‘EcoMetrics’ measures the material and energy flows in and 
out of the company.353 The amount of materials and energy that flow into the company are 
measured in terms of their environmental impact, as are those that flow out: the products and 
the waste. Interface is thus able to assess their progress in comparative terms and identify 
areas that need more attention and development. ‘SocioMetrics’ measures the company’s 
impact on people, from their associates to their employees to their community. Data in 
several key areas is collected that can be used to (quantitatively) measure the company’s 
social investment. Categories that are taken into account include employee training and 
development, community education and philanthropy. By using these two measures Interface 
is able to assess their performance in terms of what ultimately matters: social and 
environmental justice. The implementation of these techniques also suggests that it is not 
altogether impossible to make quantitative judgements of a company’s social and 
environmental performance. Interface has made huge leaps in changing both the manner of 
business and the purpose of business and as such is well suited to be a “model for the 
sustainable enterprise of the next industrial revolution,”354 which is fast becoming inevitable.        
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CONCLUSION 
The seemingly impossible is possible355 
The suggestions for a new paradigm of success in business, and in society more broadly, 
made in the final chapter are not intended to be taken as sacrosanct. Instead, their purpose is 
to stimulate, and contribute to, what I think is one of the most important global conversations 
of our time. It simply cannot be disputed that important changes are required in the global 
community and that one of the most critical changes required is in the world of business. 
Business is, as Milton Friedman rightly claims, one of the major instruments of distributive 
justice in modern society.356 Yet, for business to truly achieve this goal we cannot continue to 
condone and support a bottom-line system that treats all values other than profit-making as 
instrumental. Social justice is ultimately valuable and businesses have a direct positive 
responsibility to protect and advance the public good.   
Insofar as the argument from enlightened self-interest fails, social justice ought to be 
the explicit goal towards which business operations are focused. This is not to say that profit-
making should be disregarded, rather it should be recognised only as an instrument to the 
achievement of greater aims. Ultimate success in business should be measured by a 
company’s ability to meet its social and environmental ends because profits are not what 
make a business successful. As Robert Solomon and Clancy Martin suggest, we indeed have 
to look “beyond ‘the bottom line’ to the real values that rule our lives”.357 
In this thesis I have argued that the instrumental treatment of moral concerns – which 
is inevitable in the kind of system that Friedman, Friedrich Hayek and even Adam Smith, to a 
certain extent, condone – is entirely inappropriate. This is because social justice is not 
protected or valued in a system that positions profit-making as the end of business. We 
cannot treat as instrumental that which we are ultimately aiming at. Hence neoliberal business 
theory is internally inconsistent and essentially contradictory. My goal has been to resolve 
this contradiction by taking the idea that social justice is the end of business and arguing that 
a genuine commitment to this involves rejecting the claim that the aim of business is to 
maximise profits.  
I have also argued that committing to social justice in a business context requires a 
proper understanding of the ultimate ends of business that is born of the right sort of 
commitments. These must, in the first place, be commitments to social justice and not to the 
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bottom line. It cannot rightly be assumed that we are primarily motivated by material greed 
and so it is incorrect to structure our business and economic systems in accordance with this 
mistaken assumption.  
 In the current tumultuous economic climate, and with alarming global poverty 
statistics and our increasing recognition of the fragility of the natural world, we have never 
been better placed to open a platform for dialogue and debate on the role and responsibility of 
business to these issues. To end ironically, with the words of my adversary, Friedman writes 
that: 
 
Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are 
taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop 
alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible 
becomes politically inevitable358  
 
 
It is our responsibility to ensure that the ideas that are ‘lying around’ at this critical time are 
in actual fact, and not just on face value, about ensuring the realisation of our most greatest 
value: social justice. 
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